

MAN AS HE IS

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ESSAYS IN A NEW PSYCHOLOGY

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PREFACE

THE Great War has demolished many theories, showing that what we believed to be solid walls in the Temple of Truth were often but painted screens—frail structures, not of our intelligence, but of our feelings. With ghastly brilliancy it has illumined realities, and has forced upon us glimpses of human nature which will not serve as illustrations to any of the pages of current psychology. Is our psychology well founded? If not, we must continually slip into error in the judgment and conduct of life. This science alone may enable us in some degree to predict the behaviour of ourselves and others. It alone can show what measure of truth is attainable in our beliefs; and what tests we should apply in our search for actualities.

In constructing a science of human conduct we depend, firstly, upon our observation of the behaviour of others, and, secondly, upon introspection, or the observation of ourselves. Both sources are sufficiently fruitful; but we are beset by influences that impede us in attaching correct values to the things which we observe. There is our self-esteem, or the desire to maintain a good opinion of ourselves. There are our ideals: we cannot bear to believe anything that conflicts

with them. And there are our wishes :• how eagerly, as the war has shown, do we grasp at any excuse for believing what we wish to believe! So long as our judgment is coloured by self-esteem, prejudice, or self-interest, we are unable to see things in the cold light of truth. Nor does cynicism help us. For this may be as misleading as vanity, since it is inclined to make too much of what is evil, and too little of what is good. To draw out a faithful record of the nature of man, it is necessary to maintain the attitude of dispassionate detachment with which one may observe the habits of bees. But frigid impartiality is very difficult to preserve when we are considering and passing judgment upon ourselves.

Our examination will introduce us to impulsive susceptibilities—energies which are as real as those which we call ‘physical,’ although of very different quality. Psychologists cannot deny the existence of these forces, but are inclined to relegate their study to the domain of metaphysics, since they lie beyond the scope of our perception and can, indeed, hardly be comprehended by our minds. But precisely the same statements may be made concerning gravity, electricity, and chemical affinity. Men of science, however, have not permitted the elusiveness and incomprehensibility of these forces to preclude the study of their character, as shown by the perceptible results which they produce. Why should not the action of human impulses be similarly investigated?

To isolate these living energies and determine

their character and influence is of immense importance to human progress. Only by this means can a science of human nature be built up, and a sure foundation be established for our ventures in education and politics. Towards the construction of such a science some materials are now humbly offered.

Cherished ideals will come under analysis. But there is no question of irreverence in the enquiry. We are climbing painfully upwards, with our grip upon a chain the ultimate links of which will for ever remain shrouded in mystery. But with each fresh hand-grasp the scope of our prospect widens, and we obtain a broader view of the labyrinth through which we have to travel and to guide our fellows.

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MAN AS HE IS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE Angel of the Sun, if he takes the interest of a naturalist in the swarms of industrious humanity which are daily lit up before him, must be impressed by the mechanical regularity of their behaviour. Every morning, as London comes within the circle of daylight, strings of market carts are moving along the roads towards Covent Garden. By eight o'clock a column of smoke from every house in the suburbs signals the preparation of the morning meal. An hour later crowds of black-coated men emerge from their houses and hasten City-wards by railway, tram-car, or omnibus, to plunge into the cover of their offices. Midday passes, and they appear in the streets: lunch-time has arrived. In the evening the current of humanity surges up again, setting this time from the centre to the circumference. On the surface these masses of mankind seem to conduct themselves with the automatic precision which one observes in an ants' nest or a beehive. But there is an essential difference. Man's regularity arises from habit: that of the insects from instinct. The one is acquired: the other is innate.

Not one of the men whose lives are spent in systematic oscillation between the suburbs and the City would dream of such behaviour were his home upon a country farm. An insect, on the contrary, will endeavour to pursue its natural activities wherever it be placed. It is enslaved by promptings which are born with it, and cannot be put off. So also a beaver, brought up by hand, will be instinctively impelled to attack the furniture: ducklings, mothered by a hen, still take to water. But a child of European parentage nurtured by savages will display no trace of European culture.

The sun has, however, shone upon mankind in circumstances that are in extraordinary contrast to this vision of complicated peaceful regularity. In days incalculably remote, when Western Europe lay in the throes of the Glacial Epoch, alternatively frostbound for immense periods under ice and snow and scoured by the muddy torrents of continuous thaws, man appeared, settled in small colonies, like beavers, along the margins of streams, ape-like in his protruding jaws and savage habits, but surpassing the apes in possessing some rough stone tools. The most primitive of these seems to have been an instrument of manslaughter—a sharpened mass of flint, grasped in the hand, point downwards, which can hardly have served him but to brain those of his own kind who were weakly or asleep, and give a cannibal relish to his diet of shell-fish. Two traits redeemed his kind from utter brutality—the disinterested love of the mother for her child, and the tie of comradeship—the link which draws the ‘pal’ closer

than a brother. In instinctive knowledge they were the poorest of animals: but in one way their ignorance was a precious endowment. It left them free to alter their manner of life. Whilst the rest of the animal creation could change only by the slow process of evolutionary development, man could profit by experience and modify his habits. Slowly he gained experience and haltingly he made use of it, aiding himself by the invention of tools, and gradually obtaining some command of natural forces. The earliest—and perhaps the greatest—of these discoveries is the utilization of fire: this occurred long before the beginning of any tradition that has come down to us. But, indeed, we have no traditions that run far back into the past. Our ancestors have destroyed them.

For, in contrast to other social animals, man has been perpetually in conflict with his own kind, effacing the innovations of others almost as rapidly as he developed them himself. The Glacial Epoch had not ended when a glimmer of artistic culture appeared amongst the cave-men of Southern France. They were exterminated and their civilization blotted out. So has been quenched, countless times over, the torch of progress. But man continued to construct as well as to destroy. Slowly the one process gained upon the other, until, twenty centuries ago, civilization appeared to have secured a permanent foundation. The people of Western and Southern Europe were tranquillized by an Imperial authority, under rulers who, often selfish, cruel, and incapable, could at least afford a breathing space to industry and commerce. But in the forests of Central

Europe there remained uncontrolled a warlike, roving population which for centuries strove to break up the Roman civilization and finally succeeded in destroying it, barbarously devastating and depopulating flourishing provinces, and annihilating the gains of a thousand years. On the ruins culture began to grow afresh : but its shoots were periodically cut back by fire and sword—instruments of ambition or jealousy, sometimes of kings, sometimes of religious leaders who, in the name of a Teacher to whom their practices would be abhorrent, mercilessly killed one another's adherents. Within the space of a single generation wars prosecuted in the name of the Christian faith reduced the population of Germany from sixteen to less than seven millions. Religious animosities grew cold with time : dynastic ambitions were restrained by the development of democratic authority : and, drawing near to our own period, the growth of international trade, the interacements of finance, the appreciation of comfort, and the spread of kindly feeling seemed to have made peace a reality and war but the terror of a dream. But the spirit of Germany once more shattered these illusions. The combative propensities of one of her peoples launched a war upon Europe which has been utterly barbaric in its cruelty and destructiveness. The moral achievements of culture were cynically thrown aside : its material achievements merely served to enhance the efficiency of slaughter.

Judged by the first of these visions man is a peaceable creature who lives by routine and is controlled by the 'force of habit.' That is to say,

he is guided by memory. For if the clerk forgot his duties he would not perform them : a stock-broker who had lost his memory would no longer feel the call of the Exchange. Judged by the second vision man is a creature of impulses—sometime gentle, often fierce—and his life, so far from being regular, is agitated by impulsive fits of creativeness and destructiveness, of homely affection and savage antipathy. And underneath the placid regularity of civilized life impulses are also to be detected. Memory would not suffice of itself to drive the machinery of routine. For we may remember our duties and may still neglect them. Memory may be likened to the rails which keep the train on the track. What is the force which gives the train its motion ? The contention which we shall endeavour to maintain is that this force is, in fact, a number of impulses which are born with us, and are part and parcel of our lives—as intimately connected with our behaviour as the organs and limbs of our bodies. These impulses have not as yet been classified, or even catalogued, by science. But they are recognized in literature and in popular conception. We speak of selfish and unselfish, cruel and kind, sensuous and ascetic impulses : and the plots of novelists and dramatists, considered scientifically, represent phases of the conflict which rages unceasingly between various impulses for the mastery of the conduct of a man or a woman. But before developing this point let us touch for a moment upon other theories that have been put forward to account for the uniformities and the vagaries of human nature.

A view which has had the support of much philosophic authority is that man's behaviour is directed by a definite, although often misguided, desire to secure pleasure and avoid pain. This is the Utilitarian doctrine. Unquestionably such a desire is amongst our strongest impulses. It is not merely that our nerves respond to pleasurable and painful sensations—that, for instance, we immediately withdraw a foot that is being crushed—but that we make full use of our memories and our reason to seek and avoid what experience or precept has taught us to be pleasurable or painful. That is to say, influenced by recollections, we *choose* our conduct. Choice undoubtedly plays a part of immense importance in our lives. But it represents only one instrument of an orchestra. Of the impulses which sway man's behaviour some are actually painful. Yet we cannot shake off their dominion. There are, for instance, few emotions so disagreeable as that of fear. But many men are quite unable to resist it and adopt the pleasurable emotion of courage. What pleasure is there in such emotions as cruelty, dislike, arrogance, and jealousy? That they are painful in themselves is evident from the facial expressions which they provoke. We dislike them, but follow them nevertheless. It is true that we are influenced by a regard for consequences. But it is also true that we may altogether disregard them. Is it to secure her own satisfaction that a mother will give her life for her child? Is it merely in anticipation of lustful pleasure that a man is caught in the trammels of love? There are impulses, such as that to imitate, which influence our lives im-

mensely but are practically emotionless. The Utilitarian doctrine is obviously incomplete, and gains its simplicity by limiting its view, as it were, to one side of a polygon.

And, being incomplete, it leads to very false predictions as to the probable course of human behaviour. In present days the desire for wealth has become one of the most potent motives of conduct. It has not always been so, nor is it so now in some countries, notably those of Asia, where industry and acquisitiveness are still less powerful than family affection, religious emotion and a desire for distinction. But amongst Western peoples civilization has assumed an industrial and mercantile complexion, and the desire for riches has become so engrossing as to appear to be the mainspring of almost all activities, the key to almost all social and political questions. So we assume that Trade Unions are simply a machinery for securing higher wages, that wars are economic, waged to capture trade or annex colonies, that diplomacy is ultimately controlled by finance. These views are in some measure correct: men struggle to better themselves: a war may be provoked by the operations of a group of speculators. But we shall err very greatly if we imagine that these utilitarian considerations exclusively, or even predominantly, govern human conduct. Workmen prize their unions, not only for the strength which may enable them to bargain with their employers, but also because they realize in them their desire for sympathetic comradeship. When combativeness, jealousy, or religious feelings are excited they will throw nations into war

with an absolute disregard of profit or happiness : lives which science has been preserving in tens will be sacrificed in thousands ; and resources that have been accumulated by the industry of a generation will be flung to the winds in an ecstasy of extravagance.

The Materialistic theory, on the other hand, denies that life possesses any energies or impulses of its own. According to this doctrine the activities of a living organism result from the effects of its environment upon tissues which it has inherited—they are, in fact, reactions between the organism and the things with which it is associated. Its energy is derived from its food and the air that it breathes. Its movements are determined by the stimuli which touch its senses. It certainly appears that no action occurs without a preceding impression, either sensory or memorial, of which we may be conscious or unconscious—that hunger and fatigue result from physical conditions which make their mark upon us, that we desire only what we see or recollect, and that even our growth may be a succession of changes, each of which is stimulated by the change which preceded it. This theory is attractive in its simplicity. It is, indeed, so simple that it puts living activities on to a lower plane than energies which are possessed by some material objects. Can we refuse to credit a magnet with the possession of an attractive force ? Is it endowed with this force only when it is actually attracting—or being stimulated by—an iron filing ? But however this may be, so long as we take a very general view of human conduct there is much to persuade us that man is simply

the creature of his environment, although it is not without hesitation that we can bring ourselves to ascribe the vagaries of asceticism, for instance, to physical causes. If, however, forsaking generalities, we endeavour practically to test this theory by confronting it with observed facts we shall find that it becomes less convincing.

It is obvious, to begin with, that a stimulus, whether of sensation or recollection, produces no effect upon us unless it is, so to speak, energized by a special susceptibility, the origin of which can hardly be physical, since it varies from time to time, and may come and go. If we examine typical cases of living energy we shall find that a stimulus is, generally, of no effect unless it is offered at a particular moment—that life, in fact, proceeds according to a time-scheme, and that stimuli are operative only when they happen to fit in with this scheme. One of the most remarkable of instincts is that of the hunting wasps which capture, and paralyse by a sting, grasshoppers, caterpillars and other insects, and store them in their burrows to serve as food for their grubs. It may be argued that the wasp would not seize a caterpillar unless it was stimulated by the sight of one. But the wasp does not wait until the caterpillar presents itself: at a particular moment of its life, and not until then, it begins actively to hunt for caterpillars. It is, in fact, obsessed by a time-scheme, which from week to week prescribes its behaviour.

It may be argued that in these cases susceptibility is a refinement of the nervous system which is developed in the course of growth, and that,

inasmuch as growth may be the result of physical stimulation, susceptibilities may also have such a physical basis as renders grass attractive to a horse and flesh to a tiger. To this it may be replied that the susceptibilities of a particular individual vary to an extraordinary degree from one time to another. They depend upon his habits and his moods. By perseverance in smoking a boy changes tobacco from an irritant into a stimulus. So far, indeed, from being at the mercy of stimuli we can very largely make them for ourselves. Our behaviour towards another depends upon the aspect from which we regard him. If a stranger treads upon my foot at a railway booking-office, I have a flash of anger and a temptation to use strong language: if it were a friend I should remonstrate in kindly fashion. Who, then, is a friend and who a stranger? The answer is given in the parable of the Good Samaritan. Actuated by kindly impulses we may come to regard all mankind as our friends, converting stimuli towards anger into stimuli towards forbearance.

But, the Materialist may rejoin, habits and moods are produced by sensations or the recollections of sensations: they may accordingly be considered as reactions to stimuli, and are not conclusive proofs of the existence of independent vital energies. We have, however, kept in reserve two facts which the materialistic hypothesis can hardly explain. It seems impossible to ascribe to the effects of stimuli the experimental efforts which all living organisms make when confronted by a difficulty. These efforts, as we shall see, are the beginnings of all that is original in our be-

haviour. We experiment, it is true, because of the difficulty which impresses us. But the difficulty does not determine the nature of the particular action of which we make trial. Secondly, Materialism can offer no solution of the problem of consciousness or *feeling*. A horse jumps forward at the touch of a whip: so scraps of paper leap aside from a piece of electrified sealing-wax. But how comes it that the horse *feels pain*—not only responds to the stimulus, but is conscious of it?

There is, moreover, a general argument against a theory which regards life's activities as merely resulting from the effect of stimuli upon specialized tissues. The greater number of living creatures are altogether unprovided with nerves. The simplest forms of animal life are minute masses of protoplasm, which, so far as we can ascertain by the microscope, contains no specialized tissue. Yet they perform the essential functions of life—distinguish, grasp, and assimilate their food, and reproduce their kind. A survey of the animal kingdom appears to show that life, in accomplishing its objects, is indifferent to machinery—that organs are created by impulses, not impulses by organs. Functions which generally appertain to special organs may be exercised by unspecialized tissue. There are creatures which appreciate light without eyes, can move without nerves and muscles, digest without stomachs and aerate their blood without lungs or gills. Sexual generation is the rule of reproduction: but the females of numerous insects can produce fertile eggs without the intervention of a male. Among flowering

plants cross-fertilization is usual : but there are plants—and very prolific plants—whose flowers are compelled by their shape to fertilize themselves. The course of development of organs, of embryos, abounds with anomalies which tear holes in any unifying theories, and seem to prove that life is concerned with results and is indifferent to processes, so that our observations of its methods and of the materials which it uses does not enable us to forecast the character of its products.

How, then, with injuries or diseases ? If we lose our eyes we cannot see : if our stomach is deranged we cannot digest. Impulses are obviously dependent upon organs when special organs have been provided for them. But we must distinguish here between a *condition* and a *cause*. Our behaviour is conditioned by our bodily organs, but we are not thereby forced to the conclusion that it is caused by them. To use a homely illustration : I cannot go out unless I find my boots, but I do not go out *because* I find them, but because, say, I wish to take exercise. Our sense-nerves influence the course of life's activities. But this does not prove that they are the forces which put these activities in motion.

As a matter of fact, however, the most decided Materialist must admit that there is a basis for our present enquiries. For he will not assert that a stimulus will produce movement unless it is met by a special susceptibility : this susceptibility is an active response to the stimulus and is in fact identical with that which we term an 'impulse.' Our object is to classify these impulses—or impulsive susceptibilities—and to determine their

effect upon our behaviour. For this practical purpose their ultimate origin is not a matter of importance. It may be ascribed to the workings of memory—to the effects of recollections inherited or acquired. Or we may incline to the view that our impulses are attributes of life—that life, in fact, may be defined as a magazine of the impulses which are manifested by living creatures. The definition is vague and in a measure only repeats what it should explain. So much, however, may be said of any definition that is attempted of energies which lie outside the scope of our perception—of the energies, for instance, of gravity, electricity, and chemical action. These energies, unlike those of life, act regularly. Their effects can, accordingly, be predicted. We term our predictions the ‘laws of nature.’ But if we attempt to go behind their effects we are in the presence of forces which we can only describe as ‘impulsive’—as forces, that is to say, to which we can ascribe no origin. Heat, we assert, is generated by the combination of oxygen and carbon. But there is in the background the immaterial, strange, inexplicable attraction of these elements for one another.

Many will view with impatience a theory which postulates the existence of a multitude of forces. It runs counter to the desire to unify—to regard everything in the universe as proceeding from a single cause. But our object is practical, not metaphysical. We are searching for an explanation of the vagaries of human conduct by tabulating and classifying them. The different organs of the body are apparently all derived from the simple

tissue of the germ-cell. We recognize them, nevertheless, as existing separately, each with peculiar functions of its own. Our impulses may similarly proceed from a single origin. But they differ extraordinarily in their character, and no enquiry into human behaviour will be practically fruitful unless it treats them as distinct existences.

CHAPTER II

OF IMPULSES GENERALLY

THERE is behaviour which we all recognize as impulsive or spontaneous. It is displayed by one who is passionately in love, or is transported by such emotions as fear, anger or jealousy. There is no calculation of consequences—no balancing of advantages: action proceeds to its goal with unhesitating directness. In this it resembles the ordinary behaviour of the lower animals. A butterfly, sighting a female of the species, pursues her at once: a terrier bristles for attack immediately he sees another terrier. On occasion man acts with similar impetuosity, —less frequently, however, in mature years than during childhood. With advancing years impulsive spontaneity gives place to behaviour which is reflective and is dictated by a balanced regard for self-interest. Conduct of this description plays a part of such great importance in civilized life that we are apt to regard it as fundamental, and to treat emotional spontaneity as an exceptional aberration. But this view reverses the truth: spontaneity is the more primitive phase of conduct; it underlies and is, indeed, the origin of the processes of calculating reflection.

For when we act with a regard for self-interest we choose the course which seems most to our advantage—that is to say, which will afford us most pleasure. But this seeking of pleasure is itself a spontaneous impulse, as irresistible as the attraction of a magnet for an iron filing. We may develop peculiar pleasures for ourselves, such as that of self-sacrifice. But the fact remains, that *in the process of choice*, it is pleasure which we pursue, and our object is to attain the greatest possible pleasure. Moreover, the pleasures or pains which determine our choosings originate in spontaneous impulses. They are the accompaniments of the impulses which we have experienced in the past,—the pain which attends the craving for food, or the impulse to run away, the pleasures of eating and drinking, of ambition or of affection; and, associated with these impulses in their uprising, they are associated in memory with the conduct which we pursued on these occasions. It is these recollections of past conduct that are the subject of our choice when acting self-interestedly, and they influence us by the feelings of pleasure or pain that have become attached to them. If, for instance, we choose to avoid travelling by tramway, we are actuated by recollections of disagreeable experiences which we have encountered in travelling by tramway, or by the recollections of other persons which they have communicated to us. The process of choice is, then, impulsive in itself, and is guided by considerations that have arisen out of impulses. Evidently, then, if we would understand its complexities we must first address ourselves to the

study of the impulsive conduct that is unreflective and unhesitating.

Impulses of this class declare themselves in the idiosyncrasies which are so noticeable in individual character. Habit tends to repress eccentricity, and by means of education, the laws, and public opinion, each community strives to reduce its ideas and conduct to a habitual uniformity. But Nature will out. One man is still more affectionate, less ambitious, more amorous than others; and that these peculiarities are innate—not the result of education or training—is evident from the contrasts which we observe between members of the same family. The veneer of convention is, indeed, but thin, and a trifling experience, a casual meeting, will suffice to break it:

There are flashes struck from midnights,
There are fire-flames noondays kindle,
Whereby piled-up honours perish,
Whereby swollen ambitions dwindle,
While just this or that poor impulse,
Which for once had play unstifled,
Seems the sole work of a lifetime,
That away the rest had trifled.¹

In ecstasies of love or hatred, in such terror as is caused by fire or shipwreck, habit releases its grip entirely, and men act with the unreflecting intensity of the lower animals.

There are several kinds of activities which may be classed as impulsive. The movements that constitute the external behaviour of an animal appear at first sight to be radically different from

¹ Browning's "Cristina."

such internal processes as those of growth and nutrition: and we draw almost as sharp a distinction between behaviour which is instinctive—that is to say, preordained—and that which adapts itself to circumstances. We ascribe the internal functioning of the body and the mechanical operations of instinct to forces which we collectively idealize as ‘Life’ or ‘Nature.’ It is Nature which keeps the heart beating and compels us to wink when our eyes are threatened. Adaptive conduct, on the other hand, seems to be motivated by ourselves: if we close our eyes to avoid seeing an object, we do so voluntarily. But if we examine the evolutionary history of these different classes of movement—and in no other way can we hope to arrive at their true relationships—we find that it is exceedingly difficult to draw a hard-and-fast line between them. The workings of instinct can hardly be distinguished in essence from the processes of growth and nutrition. It is under the guidance of instinct that a caterpillar at a certain stage of its life turns itself to cocoon spinning. The caterpillar is the embryo of a butterfly, differing from the embryo of a mammal, developing itself within its mother’s womb, in that it is cast adrift to fend for itself. The spinning of its cocoon is part and parcel of its embryonic development, and if this process is instinctive, so also is the growth of an embryo within the womb.

Nor can instinctive behaviour be rigidly distinguished from conduct which is reflective, or chosen. We have no doubt that it is by instinct that a bee is able, without practice, to construct

its cells with such curious accuracy ; yet if, in the process of construction, novel difficulties arise, they are met by contrivances which are certainly adaptive. The only difference that can be imagined between instinctive and adaptive conduct is that the one is guided—or expressed—by memorial repetitions which are inherited, whereas in the other these repetitions—or recollections—are acquired. In man practically all the controlling recollections are acquired. He alone of all animals is bound by no scheme of life : the instincts which prompt his external behaviour are reduced to vague impulses which urge him in certain directions, but leave him to choose the itinerary of his course. Thus he may attain the holiness of sainthood : he may also become more cruel than the tiger, and, in response to an ideal, may cheerfully deluge a continent with the blood of his neighbours and inflict ghastly brutalities upon women and children.

We may observe, moreover, that modes of conduct which have been acquired by voluntary effort may, in their effect, resemble instinct. The dexterities by which we walk, eat, and speak, the complicated movements which have been learnt by practice—as a piece of poetry may be learnt—are exercised mechanically, without attracting our conscious notice, and are, so far, comparable with the instinctive movements of an insect. These memorial movements are not *felt*—that is to say, we are unconscious of them. They belong to our subconscious life, which includes all the internal activities of our bodies, so long as they are normal, and far

more of our external activities than is generally supposed. Herein is one of the great difficulties of psychology. We cannot examine or appraise that of which we are unaware : we cannot understand the working of a factory if we are excluded from a portion of the engine-room. Three of the most potent of our impulses—those to construct, to imitate, and to make trials—are, we shall see, essentially subconscious, and hence we do not realize the extent to which they influence our behaviour. We do not *feel* them as we do the impulses to eat, to rest, or to antagonize and to be kind towards others.

An impulse which is conscious—that is to say, is accompanied by feeling—becomes a desire, or an emotion. Its effect upon us remains. The attendant feeling (as we have seen) attaches itself to the conduct which the impulse inspired, and is recollected with it : a lover remembers with pleasure every incident of his courtship. Tinged in this fashion with sentiment, recollections of conduct become objects which are weighed by choice. Without feeling choice would be impossible : there is no place for it in instinctive conduct. Moreover, it is feeling which makes life happy or miserable ; and, since feeling takes its complexion from the impulse which it accompanies, it is evident that the value of a man's life depends upon the character of his impulses. To many of them pleasurable feelings are attached : we are happy when we are acting courageously, or displaying ourselves to advantage : we are happy when we are moved by love, affection, reverence, or pity. On the other hand,

it is a tragedy of life that many impulses are always accompanied by unhappiness. Fear is one of the strongest of impulses : it may produce agony more acute than physical pain. Misery attends upon such impulses as jealousy, anger, cruelty and scorn. Let us picture to ourselves the facial expressions which accompany them. Do not they illustrate a gamut of pain ? Happiness may, it is true, be won by the gratification of the senses. But this, as moralists often remind us, is less abiding than the happiness of emotion.

Feeling must not be confused with *sensation*. We may use our senses without feeling that they are employed. We may see a thing without feeling—or ‘knowing’—that we see it : vast numbers of our sensations are subconscious. It is by our senses, for instance, that we maintain our balance in walking. But we are unconscious of their assistance. Sensation, as ordinarily understood, is the reception and assimilation of outside impressions by our senses of sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch. We must attach to it a broader meaning. It seems clear that sensation attends every movement of our internal life : that it is a co-ordinating agency, without which our organs of digestion, circulation and secretion could not acquit themselves of their complicated functions. Sensation is, then, distinct from feeling and may not be accompanied by feeling. When we speak, our tongue and lips perform a number of elaborately co-ordinated movements. But we do not feel them, although it is possible to feel them if we give them our attention. The idea that sensation may be

unconscious, may exist apart from feeling, is difficult to realize. The use of the special term 'sensing' may assist us to conceive it.

Impressions which reach us through our sense organs (or the recollections of such impressions) are the stimuli that call impulses into activity. It appears that no impulses can arise without the touch of a stimulus—that even such an impulse as that to eat requires to be stimulated by internal conditions of cell-exhaustion. Our sensory nerves may be likened to the levers by which one directs the movements of a complicated piece of machinery: if these are left untouched the machine is motionless, however strong may be the power within it. We grasp at food only when we see it: we would not imitate others unless we perceived them: we could not seek things or avoid things, be moved by anger or love, unless objects for these impulses were offered to us through our senses, or in recollection.

Our sense organs collect impressions, like the tentacles of a zoophyte. But the process of sensation takes place in the brain. The sense organs are 'transformers,' not transmitters, which change the vibrations of light and sound, the touch of minute particles of substances, into the impressions which the brain appreciates as light, colour, and sound, solidity, and the shades of tastes and scents. Our sensations are, accordingly, not pictures of the outer world, but messages from the outside world which are transmitted to the brain, as it were, in cypher. The things which we perceive are, then, in the brain, not outside

it : they are, in fact, special conditions of nervous stimulation, exhilaration, irritation, or depression, and were we equipped with but a single sense we might never obtain an idea of external reality—of objects existing apart from ourselves. But from the earliest infancy we combine two or more senses in observing an object, and since these give quite different impressions of it, we conclude that it exists independently of ourselves. The vision of a lump of sugar may be a hallucination ; its taste may be a hallucination. But when sight and taste combine we are assured that the sugar exists. Among the impressions which our brain receives are those which relate to the constitution and movements of our own bodies. We can, for instance, watch the movements of our fingers and at the same time be made aware by our tactile nerves that they are moving. So far, then, as sensation is concerned, our bodies are amongst the things that are outside us ; and from this we have gathered the remarkable idea that our bodies are apart from ourselves.

If we realize that sensation occurs in the brain, and not in the sense organs, we can arrive at some comprehension of the mysterious process by which we *perceive our recollections*. These do not come to us through our sense organs : they are offered to the brain from within us. But they touch the brain and may be apprehended almost as vividly as if they were seen by our eyes, or heard by our ears. And they may stimulate impulses as strongly as do impressions which reach us through the senses. Thoughts are not uncommonly accompanied by gesticulation, by a

start of fear, the clenched hands of anger, the deprecating movements of respect. Does not the recollection of an insult make us tremble with anger?—the recollection of a loved one bring a glow of affection? It is essential to realize that stimuli may come to us from within, through the memory, as well as from outside, through the senses.

A sensation (or a recollection), as we have seen, leads to external action only when it is met by an impulsive susceptibility. There are some sensations to which we are naturally and always susceptible: a sudden crash of sound, or blinding flash of light, will make us blench at any time. There are other sensations our susceptibility to which is acquired, or varies from time to time: the strains of the National Anthem invigorate us because of the associations that we have learnt to attach to them: a ragtime melody which may attract us in a cheerful mood may irritate us when depressed. We cannot, then, hold that sensation, as a 'thing in itself,' is the actual cause of our impulses. But this much seems true, that no impulse can come into activity without preliminary sensations or recollections—in fact, that we do not move until we are touched.

An impulse prompts us to take action: its first-fruits are, it appears, some involuntary movements that are vaguely directed to a certain end. When suddenly threatened by a blow, we attempt to ward it off, instinctively, and before we are conscious of anything: a crashing noise makes us start before we have time to feel alarmed. The behaviour of young children affords us a

means of studying the action of our impulses in their primitive form. At that age, responses to impulsive promptings are simple and direct, not complicated or checked by the recollections and feelings that come with the culture of later years. We may observe that each impulse manifests its uprising by a particular nervous or muscular action. Thus a child that is afraid runs away or hides : it shows affection by stroking or clasping, contempt by spurning, dread by cringing, admiration by reaching out towards a person or object, dislike by turning away. Vanity is naively displayed by a strut. Any antagonism, real or fancied, whether of people or furniture, is resented by a blow : so may be the success of another child, unless it provokes fawning or rivalry.

With increasing years, these simple movements become elaborated into complicated methods of conduct. Thus the simple impulse to strike another may, under memories created by education, take the form of swearing at him, slandering him, or even ruining him in business. The impulse to display oneself, which man shares with the peacock, may be clothed with much diversity in the garbs which are provided by modern culture for the display of vanity, as by self-advertisement in the Press, by hospitality, by extravagance, or by nicety in dress. And the impulse to acquire is elaborated into the multitudinous activities of construction, manufacture and commerce, which may differ in form from one country to another—from one century to another—but are all actuated by the desire for gain.

The primitive movements which are capable of so great a development, are purposeful in that they are aimed at something beyond ourselves. But there are instinctive movements, of a different class, the object of which is simply to express feeling. Such are smiles and frowns, tears and laughter. Of this kind are the beginnings of speech: the first utterances of childhood are ejaculations of pleasure or pain. These manifestations of feeling can be elaborated as finely as the primitive actions of impulse. By practice, and the acquisition of recollections, they are drawn out into the multiform activities of Art. The rôle of the artist, be he painter, musician, or orator, is to express feeling. His methods vary according to the recollections that guide him: so Art differs in form from country to country, from epoch to epoch. But through all its mannerisms there runs a current of instinctive vitality—the propensity to express the touches of feeling. These two promptings—to achieve impulses and to express feeling—are often mingled in our behaviour. An artist may paint a picture in order to gain money, as well as to illustrate a sentiment. But the two currents can always be distinguished—the one as Practical, the other as Artistic.

But, it may be asked, what becomes of these instinctive movements when we repress them, when we check our hands from striking, our tongues from speaking, or our lips from smiling? It cannot be asserted that movements do not take place within us: indeed, there is much to show that there is in these cases an internal thrill which is abortive in that it does not pass into

our external organs. It is held back by choice. Recollections and feelings have, in fact, called into activity another impulse which conflicts with the one that originally moved us. Choice may substitute language for action: we may use our tongue when afraid to strike. But it may repress this also, as, for example, if we remember that it is more dignified to keep silence.

An emotion, as we have seen, is an impulse which is attended by feeling. The impulsive element in an emotion we term "desire." Thus anger is a desire to strike, fear a desire to run away or hide. What active desire is there, it may be asked, in such emotions as admiration and dislike? Undoubtedly, as the conduct of little children informs us, a desire to stretch out towards, and a desire to turn away from. These impulses—to approach and to avoid—pervade, as we shall see, every phase of our conscious life, and appear to be the origin of the feelings of pleasure and pain.

What do we mean when we say that we *will* an action, or course of behaviour? Simply that an impulse has gained mastery over us. This interpretation is not in accord with common ideas, according to which the will is a special faculty that sits in judgment upon our desires. Yet it is obvious that we will in response to a desire, and it follows that when we are swept away by an impulse our will is simply our consciousness of the impulse. Do we, however, not "will" when we choose?—when after a period of hesitation we select one course or another? Deliberate as we may, choice is ultimately decided

by the strongest liking of those which are presented to us by memory. We cannot attribute to will a process which is determined by attraction; and some philosophers have held that there is really no spontaneity in our behaviour. Nevertheless, we are convinced in our own minds that we can exercise free will. Nor do we altogether deceive ourselves. Inherent in all living creatures is a propensity for making trials or experiments, and, since these may be made at random, they are certainly free of controlling influences. In man, this propensity is limited and guided by recollections up to a certain point. But beyond this point it acts at large. Chemical investigations follow a determined order up to their final stage: a series of speculative essays then commences. So we may exercise in our behaviour a venturesomeness, which is really free will—unless we have bartered away our spontaneity for the less exhausting habit of imitating others.

* * *

Psychologists may not have admitted the existence of impulses that are the mainsprings of behaviour. Nevertheless, they have always been attracted by the problem of classifying them. Their enquiries have been grievously misled by a tendency to treat man as though he stood alone in the animal creation—as if his propensities and faculties could be studied without reference to the connections which may be established between them and like endowments of the lower animals. No one would dream of isolating man from all

other organisms in studying his morphology, in discussing the characters of his limbs and organs. In their case, most careful regard is paid to all indications that are available of the course of their evolution. To have any hopes of scientifically listing and classifying human impulses, we must similarly endeavour to follow the stages in which they have evolved.

Our examination should begin with the primitive instincts that actuate *bodily functions*—instincts such as those of eating and reproduction, which are insistent in man and in the simplest of organisms. Thence we shall pass to instincts which serve the *development* of the various faculties, bodily and mental,—the propensities to construct, to imitate and to make trials. They are traceable in every form of animal life, but in man attain so great an elaboration as to render us incredulous of their humble origin. Next we shall consider the impulses *to seek some things and avoid others*, which sway our relations with the world around us. These propensities—originally simple instincts to approach and to draw back—are, it will be shown, the origin of the emotional impulses which influence our behaviour towards the living creatures—human and brute—of our environment. We may perceive a connection between the course of the elaboration of these emotional impulses and the various stages of evolutionary development. To the days when life was one long endeavour to escape from death—when self-preservation by flight was a paramount necessity—we owe the compelling emotion of *fear*. The next stage begins with the evolution

of organs of offence, as teeth, horns and claws : *antagonism* evolved with them, and life became, not a flight, but a struggle, in the course of which strongly *antipathetic* feelings developed. With the inception of social life, mutual assistance became a principle of conduct ; and at this stage the *sympathetic* impulses of affection, helpfulness and obedience rose into existence. Finally, we shall deal with the impulses of *memory*—the tendency to repeat—which perhaps contributes more than any other element to the astonishing superiority of man over the brutes. Following this order, impulses will be grouped for the purpose of our survey, according as they appertain to bodily functions, to development, to seeking and avoiding, and to memory.

CHAPTER III

IMPULSES OF FUNCTION AND OF DEVELOPMENT

Impulses of Function

LIFE cannot continue unless food be absorbed and wastage ejected, and the minute living creatures which the microscope reveals to us appear to be incessantly engaged in these processes. The simplest of them possess no organs that can be detected—not even the rudiments of a mouth or stomach. They fold themselves round their food, as paste is folded round an apple in the making of a dumpling. Their appetites are independent of any digestive machinery.

Hunger and *Thirst*—the conscious manifestations of the craving for food—yield only to fear in compelling strength, and will outlast fear in insistency. When acute, they ordinarily drive out all other emotions. In the extremity of thirst one will drink without hesitation liquor that he knows may kill him : on a parching day in India, when the water supply has gone astray, men will slake their thirst in the fetid slime that remains at the bottom of a horse pond. The pangs of starvation are rarely experienced in civilized countries. But in the East, when famine presses, one may see that hunger can dissipate all morality

and decency, that starving mothers will desert their little children, or gladly sell them for a few pence.

Primitive unicellular organisms can multiply simply by dividing themselves. They become pinched by a constriction, as of an hour-glass, and they part in two. But it seems that this process cannot continue indefinitely and that after a certain period the race must be regenerated by sexual reproduction—by the conjugation of two cells which together give birth to a swarm of offspring. Here we see the germs of *lust*, that passion the imperative energy of which gives way before hunger, thirst and fear, and before these impulses only. In man it is more tyrannical than in most others of the higher animals, inasmuch as its reign is not limited by times and seasons. Its promptings are a standing menace to the organization of society. This is recognized in the earliest laws that have come down to us: they are greatly concerned with its control, firstly, by rendering passion unthinkable between members of the same family circle, and, secondly, by assuring to a man the exclusive possession of one or more women. As a legal custom polygamy is more widely spread than monogamy. But, where it is permitted, the vast majority of men are content with one wife, and it may appear that a tendency towards monogamy is inherent in mankind. If so, we enjoy a heritage which is unusual amongst gregarious animals. It can, however, be mastered without difficulty. But woman possesses a strong natural susceptibility which must have actively promoted the institution of

marriage—the disgust with which she repels the advances of one man if she is in love with another.

Sexual love is so capricious in its onset, so catastrophic in its effects, that the most materialistic of philosophers can hardly deny its impulsive origin. We really cannot think of it as the product of protoplasm tickled by a sensation. In a moment it can put to flight all controlling memories, can overwhelm all ambitions that stand in its path, can in fact change a man's character as well as his prospects, and completely bewitch his reasoning faculties. How comes it that so strong an impulse may not be lasting? Lust, like pugnacity, is a fleeting passion, and may vanish when its object has been attained. Paradoxical though it may seem, love's endurance depends, not upon its foundation, but upon the superstructure of emotions which it raises—upon the associated impulses of admiration, affectionate sympathy, and gratitude. These will preserve a constancy of feeling which the crude sexual impulse could never maintain. They transform it into aspirations and link it with feelings that are the happiest, and may be amongst the most elevating, in human experience. More remarkable still is the effect of self-consciousness, which (as will be shown hereafter) produces in us a sense of duality—makes us think of our bodies as our antagonists—and calls into play the combative impulses which prompt us to subdue an antagonist if we can. Hence arises the desire to overcome oneself, which may chasten love into self-sacrificing romanticism. This curious interaction between love and other impulses is forcibly illus-

trated by its effect in heightening courage. One who is in love will face dangers which ordinarily would appal him.

So also with *maternal love*. In defence of her child a woman loses her timidity. This is the impulse of all impulses that we admire. It may be absolutely independent of personal credit : a mother may love a crippled child more than one which is admired by her neighbours. We should like to believe that her affection was drawn towards its object by an instinctive attraction—that she could unerringly distinguish her child from another's. Not so : her love is blind. She will cherish another's baby—a changeling—as her own if she is unaware of the change. Unassisted by recollections her impulse is a force acting in darkness : it is only in the light of memory that it can see.

The impulse *to rest*, manifesting itself in fatigue, is almost universal. It becomes overpowering in sleep, that daily relief from the toils, the cares, and the disappointments of the day, when, as we may figure it, the current of feeling is cut off and we sink into the quietude of apathy. Rest being so complete we cannot be said to enjoy it : for we are unconscious of its delights. But in our conscious states it is so pleasant as to tempt us, not only to take repose, but to be idle : and it is in never-ceasing opposition to the impulse of constructive activity.

In the feeling of surfeit or ennui we experience the promptings of a desire for *change*. A jaded appetite is resuscitated by new dishes : there are few men who do not like occasional changes in

their dress, if only in the matter of a necktie ; while the fashions of woman's dress are illustrated by a kaleidoscope. It is rare to be insensible to the excitement of travel. Change of scene is so agreeable as to benefit the health as well as the temper ; and there are few families of the better classes who do not feel obliged to indulge in it at least once a year. These may appear trivialities. But there is reason to believe that the desire for change, which is stronger with some individuals than with others, has been a potent force in preventing mankind from sinking so deeply into the grooves of habit as to be unable to strike forward into new lines of behaviour. The weakness of this desire amongst Asiatic peoples may explain 'the immobility of the East.'

There are cases of revulsion which strikingly illustrate this propensity. Pleasure may produce a disgust for itself. Sensual gratification of any kind, if carried to excess, will generally end in a fit of revulsion, which disposes a man, especially if a lead be given him by others, to seek change by asserting his self-control or by submitting himself to authority. Roués enter the cloister : drunkards become bigoted priests of temperance : sinners repent in sackcloth and ashes. There is, indeed, a popular impression that the sowing of wild¹ oats in youth conduces to sobriety in middle life.

The names which we give to these impulses—hunger and thirst, lust, fatigue and ennui—

¹ And dare we to this fancy give,
That had the wild oat not been sown,
The soil, left barren, scarce had grown
The grain by which a man may live. (*In Memoriam*).

express their character when accompanied by feeling—that is to say, their emotional effect upon us. Feeling apart, they may be styled the impulses of replenishment, reproduction, recuperation and reinvigoration. They may actually affect us in these emotionless forms. We can be moved by the need of food, or by the promptings of the reproductive impulse, when asleep, and in certain conditions of unconsciousness. And we have reason to believe that during our conscious moments these propensities may be active, so to speak, below the plane of consciousness and may endow us with a subconscious life of which we are unaware. The incidents of insanity afford us terrible glimpses of elemental passion that has lain below the surface of the quietest, most modest dispositions, suppressed yet active, finally to break loose as a maniacal spirit, distracting the life of a victim to whom its existence was unknown.

When accompanied by feeling these impulses of function are disagreeable : hunger, thirst, lust, fatigue and ennui are all painful : they are stimulated by physical deficiencies and excesses that occasion, so to speak, bodily disorders. In satisfying them we enjoy the most reliable, if not the most exhilarating, pleasures of life—pleasures upon which we may count each day for some relief from the griefs and anxieties that our experiences and recollections may inflict upon us. Food, rest, change are, moreover, doubly enjoyable. Not only do they dissipate the pain of hunger, fatigue, and ennui ; they also appeal to other susceptibilities—those commonly

known as "sensuous"—which will come under review in the next chapter.

Impulses of Development

We now turn to impulses the existence of which cannot be detected by introspection because their activities lie below the region of our consciousness. Their onset is attended by no such feelings as those of hunger or fatigue which manifest to us the promptings of the impulses to take food and rest. If the impulse to eat was not made known to us by the cravings of hunger we should be unaware of it, and should believe that we eat simply because we were attracted by the taste of food. We actually make this mistake in regard to the impulses which we are about to consider. We ascribe their effect upon us to our like or dislike of their consequences. Our likes and dislikes do of course influence us—influence us very greatly—just as our fancy for particular dishes stimulates us to eat of them. But these feelings are a subsidiary influence: behind them lies the pressure of a more fundamental energy, which is made known to us, in the case of impulses of function, by feelings of distress, but in the case of impulses of development is hidden behind the veil which screens our subconscious activities. Their energies are concealed from us: they move us with no conscious desire; and their existence can only be inferred from the consequences which they produce. But they are of vital importance to our behaviour, and a system of psychology which ignores them cannot reach convincing conclusions.

A statement which we can confidently make regarding life is that it is incessantly engaged in *constructing*. Growth and nourishment are in effect the construction of living tissues out of materials that are taken into the body for this purpose. Our existence results from a primordial impulse to grow, or to construct, which energizes the internal functioning of the body. It impels external activities also. The coral zoophyte builds up a reef of lime as a scaffolding to support its community. The caddis-worm gathers morsels of fibre and sand with which it constructs a protective mantle for its body. Birds build nests with fragments of stuff which they shape to their particular purpose. The materials of which the constructive impulse makes use may, then, be obtained by disintegrating chemical compounds, as in the process of digestion, by extracting substances that are in solution, as the lime of the coral zoophyte, or by collecting things and shaping them. And it is clear from these illustrations that the impulse, as already stated, affects external conduct as well as internal processes.

It may appear that the constructive genius of man has nothing in common with these instinctive propensities—that there can be no similarity of origin between a factory and a beehive. The one is the outcome of a long series of improvements devised under the pressure of a wish for pleasure or profit: the other represents activities that are unchanging and are guided by no conscious purpose. We must distinguish between the impulse to construct and the recollections that guide the impulse. It is the latter which

give the impulse the form in which it presents itself. Man's constructive propensities are guided very strictly by his recollections. When these have been unchanging, methods have become stereotyped: witness the continuance, through centuries, of the grotesque conventions of Egyptian Art. The inflexible methods of insects may, then, be ascribed with some confidence to inherited recollections. But in both cases the energy to construct is given by an impulse which underlies the recollections. Memories of pleasure or profit may determine the *forms* of our constructive activities, whether, for instance, we shall take to violin-playing, mechanics or cricket. But we are assured that these activities exist independently of the influence of our recollections by the varying degrees in which different men possess *energy*, whether for business or games. And how are we to account for the restless constructiveness of children, if recollections of pleasure are the only influence whose existence we will admit?

We think of constructiveness as a capacity of the hands. But it is evidently a mental process. If a carpenter, for instance, desires to make a table and is not content to imitate existing models, he summons recollections of different tables, or other objects that can afford suggestions, and, by combining them, constructs a new design. To this his hands merely give effect. Clearly, then, recollections are our constructive materials: they are the bricks with which we build, and our constructive ability must be limited by the number which we can recall. Unless assisted by imitation, the development of industry must accordingly be slow.

Such being the materials which are used by the impulse to construct, by what is it stimulated or set in action? Of our subconscious constructings we can say nothing: but in conscious life constructiveness appears to be stimulated by difficulty in satisfying desires and emotions—and amongst them the pressing demands of curiosity. Life is full of difficulties—difficulties of *How* and *Why*—How can I do it? Why did it happen? We may be in doubt how to earn our livelihood, how to express our feelings in writing a letter. Or we may be anxious to know what causes changes in the weather, what will be the end of the war, what are the factors which determine human conduct. Difficulties of the first kind we term practical: they are met by constructing methods of conduct or sentences of language. Difficulties of the second kind are theoretical. They are settled by the formation of conclusions or beliefs: by piecing together properties that are discerned by our intelligence. Our constructiveness is then concerned with conduct, with expressions, or with conclusions: its fruit may be a plan of action, a phrase, or a belief.

Our conduct, our expressions and our beliefs are very generally shaped by imitating others,—so generally, indeed, that we are apt to overlook the immense importance of the constructiveness that has energized the minds of those who have led the way to new inventions. But however imitative we may be, we can borrow from others only some of our methods. Imitation will not assist us to make the intricate muscular adjustments and combinations which

are necessary to perform the most trifling actions. We must elaborate these for ourselves. When we walk, write or speak, we are constructing, if we are not repeating, since each movement which is new involves a novel co-ordination of muscular efforts. In popular language, we construct when we make things. But the difference between making things and doing things is merely that the one impresses a mark upon our surroundings, whereas the other does not apparently affect them. A stroke at cricket is essentially as constructive as the handiwork of a mechanic.

So also with the formation of conclusions. In playing bridge or chess we are incessantly engaged in recombining recollections in order to construct a forecast of our adversary's game. Thought is then as constructive a process as carpentry, and we recognize this in the phrases which we apply to it. And, since the process of digestion is also constructive, there is a similarity between the function of the brain and that of the stomach. One recombines substances, the other recollections.

The acquisition of recollections is then an object of paramount importance in our lives. We amass them by practice—that is to say, by the repetition of efforts at construction. We have only to watch little children to convince ourselves of the actuality of an innate propensity which urges them incessantly to practise their senses and muscles, whether seriously or in play.

The principal function of the constructive impulse is to enable us to accomplish the promptings of other impulses. These are apparently of the nature of nervous thrills that impel us to act in

certain directions—produce muscular movements of an elementary type—but afford us no guidance as to the details of the conduct by which their promptings may be achieved. We are left to elaborate these by practice and memory. Anger, for instance, produces an instinctive movement to strike: it is left to constructiveness, practice and memory to educate us in the various methods of striking—to graft on to this elementary movement not only (let us say) the art of boxing, but all the various means which civilized man employs of causing pain or loss to an adversary. We are born in a condition of the most utter helplessness, unable to walk, speak or even feed ourselves, and it is only gradually that we acquire the dexterities which enable us to accomplish our desires. As children, we laboriously taught ourselves to combine impressions of sight and touch, to use our hands for feeding and dressing ourselves, our legs for walking and running in an erect position. As years advance, our capacities for giving effect to our impulses become more and more elaborate. The naive movement to outrun may develop into the complicated schemes of ambition: the child's cry of pleasure may grow into a song of triumph: a box of toys may teach dexterities which lead to the complicated business of an engineer.

The action of this impulse is, for the most part, subconscious; we all of us have had experiences of the subconscious constructiveness of the brain, which will suddenly present us with a conclusion that no conscious effort has been able to form. Constructiveness becomes conscious

when it is employed under the influence of an emotion, as, for instance, when we work under the stress of ambition or love. We also become aware of it when the recollections with which it works are tinged with feeling—are agreeable, that is to say, or disagreeable.

If, when confronted with a difficulty, we have a stock of appropriate recollections, we can devise—or construct—a way out of it, provided that we are able to combine them effectively. For effective construction intelligence is required—a talent for apprehending the ‘properties’ of things, which, as we shall see hereafter, is possessed by men in extraordinary varying degrees. If we have no recollections appropriate to the occasion, we must either experiment for ourselves, or imitate others. This reflection introduces us to two other impulses which are essential to our development.

Experiment. An impulse to make experiments when in situations of difficulty seems to be inherent in life: it is a distinction of living as opposed to lifeless matter. Bubbles of air, prevented from rising in water, press themselves vainly against the obstacle. But animalcules will by trial find a way round it. By experiment a plant finds a way for its rootlets through the particles of the soil: it is by experiment that man has made most of his mechanical and chemical discoveries. Lifeless things, on the other hand, cannot co-operate with the forces that attract or repel them: a rock, poised over a precipice, passively awaits the hour of its release.

If we have no recollections to guide us, all

trials must be such as the bitings and scratchings of a dog who wishes to uncover a basket, or our frantic efforts to open in haste a railway carriage door. In fact, we make blind guesses at the solution of a difficulty. These may, however, on occasions lead us to great discoveries. Was not gunpowder invented by mixing nitre, sulphur and charcoal together in order to 'see what would happen'? But as with increasing experience our stock of recollections increases, our experiments become more intelligent: they take the form of an experimental combination of recollections rather than of random effort. Reasoning, as we shall see, is the combining of recollections: and in making these combinations we work experimentally, so long as we do not repeat combinations which have already been tried by us.

By experiment, then, as by practice, we develop capacities for meeting the practical and theoretical difficulties of life—the difficulties, that is to say, that we encounter in achieving our impulses, or in satisfying our curiosity. And we may dignify this process with the name of 'free will,' since our inclination is not forced by any liking or predilection, and is really free to take any course that is open to it.

The earliest of our trial ventures are undoubtedly subconscious—random efforts like those of an animal in distress. And it appears that throughout life these subconscious experiments are of more importance to us than we suspect, especially in the operations of the brain, which frequently present us with ideas that have been worked out unawares. But, so far as conduct is concerned,

from early years our trials become conscious. They may be elements in the conduct which is suggested by an emotional impulse: one who acts courageously, for instance, makes conscious ventures. Or, by creating recollections that are pleasant or the reverse, they may bring venture-some—or ‘sporting’—conduct before consciousness as an object of choice.¹ We may, in fact, *choose* to act experimentally: and may, indeed, contract a habit of so acting. This, under the name of resourcefulness, is commonly displayed by those who are compelled by their livelihood to take risks. So the sailor has gained his reputation as the handy man.

It is to this experimenting, or venturing, capacity that we refer when we speak of ‘initiative’ and ‘originality.’ The majority of mankind are moved but feebly by it. They are content to follow others in sympathy, reverence or obedience, and welcome any suggestions that may relieve them from the trouble of experimenting for themselves, if it be only in the selection of a hat or a necktie. But in men of originality, who are not averse from standing alone, adventurous initiative becomes a force of much greater potency. It constantly stimulates them to revise the current opinions of the day. They may bring neglected impulses into prominence, as by preaching kindness to the warlike, courage to the faint-hearted, sobriety to men who are immersed in luxury. Or by selecting and recombining memories they may initiate new movements in religion or

¹ The problem of consciousness will, of course, be discussed particularly later on.

morality, new theories in science, new processes in manufacture. So St. Bernard preached the Crusades, Rousseau conceived the idea of human equality, and Darwin combined facts and theories to set the doctrine of evolution upon a consistent footing.

To the initiative energy of such men human society is indebted for its progress. They have led, and the crowd has followed. They have generally owed their success to the support of authority, of a ruler or a priest, who, impressed by their teaching, has used his influence to enforce it upon the masses. When such support has not been forthcoming they have, as a rule, been neglected, derided or persecuted. And it is fortunate for mankind that their innovations have not always been accepted. For their ideas have not uncommonly been absurd and even pernicious. Their initiating energy has been greater than their intelligence. Nevertheless, it is only when guided by men of originality that a community can progress. Democracy is progressive because it allows some scope to individual inventiveness, not because it transfers the leadership of a nation to the multitude. For the masses have no wish to change, and can, moreover, hardly be trusted to choose their leaders, since they admire dexterity more than wisdom and may be misled by flattery.

Imitation. A young creature, startled by a new experience, must imitate its mother, if it does not make a venture for itself. As children we were incessantly occupied in imitating our elders, so preserving some continuity of manners

and tastes from one generation to another. To this propensity the family and the nation owe most of their external uniformity in dress, manners and culture. Children mimic the trifling as well as the important, and accordingly we find that tricks of manners and of facial expression will run through the members of a family as though they were hereditary peculiarities. Imitation is, in fact, a substitute for heredity and, as such, its influence appears to grow as we ascend the scale of animal life. With increasing years we become less prone to copy the behaviour of those around us, although the tyranny of fashion in dress shows clearly enough how reluctant we are to be unlike our fellows. But throughout life the propensity sways our behaviour very potently by inclining us to one or other of two courses that are before us. How often does the example of a friend lead us astray or confirm us in virtue! It is indeed to the force of imitation that law, morality and fashion owe most of their influence.

It is an extraordinary fact that we can copy not only the manners but the recollections and beliefs of another, when they are displayed to us by his words. And in copying recollections we are affected by the feelings which are attached to them, and thereby (in a manner to be hereafter explained) become liable to be moved impulsively should a stimulus be presented (through our senses or in memory) that stirs an impulse with which the borrowed feelings are naturally associated. We may take from a friend the information that there has been an

earthquake in Sicily : we may also take from him the belief that it was connected in some way with an abnormally low barometer. Further, we may become infected with his pity for the sufferers, as described by him, and resolve to contribute for their relief. We may gather from a lecturer—or a newspaper—not only knowledge as to the history and manners of another people, but also an active dislike for them. How many of those who clamoured for the blood of Louis XVI would even have given him a thought if left to themselves? Two or three slanderous words may change our opinion of a friend, and convert an impulse of esteem into one of contempt.

This transfer of ideas and impulses is really a form of hypnotism in which some powers of objection and resistance are left to us. It is analogous to the process of grafting : ideas and stimuli are carried by words (how aptly styled by Homer 'winged words' !) and grafted upon us. Its real nature is most inadequately indicated by the terms we employ for it, such as 'intercommunication,' 'persuasion' and 'suggestion.' Any addition to the formidable vocabulary of psychology is to be deprecated ; but we really need a special term in this case—one which will not mislead us by inappropriate associations. The word 'enthematism' may be suggested, meaning *grafting*.¹ Enthematized information, beliefs and emotions will mean recollections and susceptibilities which are not the outcome of our own actual experience, but are acquired from others. We are indebted to enthematism for almost the

¹ From *ἐνθεμα*, a graft.

whole of our knowledge—all which we derive from the store that is preserved for us in books, newspapers or tradition. In enthematized beliefs and susceptibilities have originated all the great movements—social, religious or political—which have from time to time revolutionized human society. What miracles faith has accomplished! What happiness it has given to mankind! What persecutions, bloodshed and cruelty has it not provoked!

We may choose to be or not to be enthematized with an idea or a susceptibility. This is the difference between acceptance and refusal—between ‘yes’ and ‘no.’ Some persons are far more easily enthematized than others: there are those who are so enthralled by the imitative propensity that their opinions are always those of the person whom they have last met: others are swayed by a ‘cussedness’ which prompts them to contradict every opinion they hear expressed. Taking, however, one man with another what are the laws of enthematism? In what cases, and subject to what limits are we content to be grafted with the ideas and emotions of others? There must be, in the first place, a disposition upon which the graft can be implanted. One who is idle can hardly be enthematized with industry: exhortations will not give much courage to a coward. The effect of enthematic influence will accordingly vary somewhat with individual and racial character. Generally the imitative propensity is at its strongest with men when it prompts them to adopt the views and conduct of the crowd around them. What is termed ‘the psychology of the crowd’

is the study of the influence of the imitative propensity upon masses of people. As has frequently been observed, the influence of subconscious imitation may be so strong as to overpower individual propensities, and render a crowd more cowardly, more courageous, more cruel or tender-hearted than would be the vast majority of its numbers in their individual lives. To follow the herd is undoubtedly one of the few guiding memories with which we are born. It is by virtue of this that we are instinctively gregarious.

But within the crowd we draw distinctions. Ordinarily we are disposed to accept what is offered by our friends, and to reject what is offered us by strangers. Children believe without question what is told them in the family circle, but are sceptical of the statements of those who are outside it. As we grow older, and our recollections become more definite, we develop a disinclination to accept anything which conflicts with a recollection. We should not dream of disbelieving an agreeable fellow-traveller who told us that a member of Parliament had met with an accident : but if he added that the gentleman was drunk at the time we should wish for some proof, since intoxication is not an incident which we associate with law-making. We are very easily persuaded by one whom we admire. Herein lies the power of the orator : we yield to his eloquence, even against our better judgment, because it is so attractive. But eloquence is by no means the only quality which impresses us. We listen respectfully to a nobleman or to a well-known cricketer. The speaker, or editor, becomes still more persuasive if he can arouse

such emotions as fear, jealousy, veneration or loyalty. Our critical spirit then dies away. We are ready to believe whatever our political leaders tell us—that Tariff Reform will enrich or impoverish the nation—that Home Rule will consolidate the Empire or break it in pieces. So also in matters of religion and science we accept the views of recognized authorities, and submit to any changes of belief that they may inculcate, provided that the new opinions be linked in some fashion with the old. The unanimity of the German people in the grossest misconceptions regarding the causes of the Great War, and its moral aspects, will be a classical illustration of the immense power of a government which studiously uses all the means available for enthematizing its subjects.

But, it will be said, these illustrations confuse imitation with obedience: men are persuaded by other men not because they imitate, but because they obey. Obedience, we shall see, is an emotional form of imitation. We shall realize this if we reflect how much more strongly we are affected by deeds than by words, how much more forcible is example than precept. The morale of a regiment depends upon the lead its colonel gives it; and the words of a preacher, or of a statesman, gain immensely in force if he clinches them by his behaviour—a combination so admirably depicted by Chaucer:

And Cristes lore and his apostles twelve
He taughte, but first he folwed it him-selve.

If we realize that enthematism has been responsible for the enslavement of men by

degrading superstitions, for wars and persecutions which have caused pain, misery and death to countless thousands, we shall be inclined to condemn it as an unnatural perversity. Dogs cannot be induced to attack bitches, or to hate dogs that they have never seen. Of the millions that have been brought under arms during the Great War how many would have ever dreamt of fighting with those that are opposed to them unless they had been hypnotized, unless they had been provoked by enthematized emotions of hate and jealousy? Indeed, judging from the rigour with which not only newspapers but private letters are censored in war time, and the baseless slanders which the Press of each side launches against the other, it seems that people should be kept in ignorance, or be enthematized with falsehoods, in order to support with firmness the horrors of war. But enthematism must also be regarded from another point of view. It is the foundation of the greater part of our knowledge, and is by far the most powerful instrument at the disposal of human society for counter-acting impulses that are pernicious, or appear to be so. By teaching to others such virtues as kindness and industry we fortify them against the temptations of cruelty and idleness and enable them to be virtuous, not for fear of punishment, but by sheer force of inclination. Entthematism provides, then, a foundation for the virtuous ideals. It may also, it is true, degrade human nature by instilling vices. Its guidance has often been woefully misleading; and it has been used from the beginning of time to set race against race. But to its influence man owes his progress:

by it each generation is grafted with the knowledge which has been painfully acquired by the generations that preceded it.

Having realized the nature and influence of enthematism we see that the phenomena of hypnotism—at first sight so mysterious—are easily explicable. They are the natural results of enthematism which is complete. It is interesting to note that in this case even the senses may be perverted: one under hypnotic influence will take water for wine, a walking-stick for a snake, at the hypnotizer's bidding.

In its primitive manifestations imitation is evidently subconscious: the mimicking of young children is automatic, and in later years we may easily contract tricks of manner (stuttering, for instance) from our associates. It is probable that this impulse is infinitely more potent than we realize. We cannot perceive the attractive force of a magnet: we infer that it exists because we see particles of metal attracted by the magnet: so we can infer the force of imitation by observing its marvellous results in producing a sameness of manners and ideas amongst the members of a community. But we may imitate—as we may experiment—consciously. This is so when we imitate by choice, because recollections of past imitations are agreeable, or when we are moved to imitate by the influence of admiration or reverence for our exemplar. And we may become so habituated to imitate—so accustomed to follow the example or precepts of others—that we lose all power of initiative, that is to say, of making trials for ourselves.

CHAPTER IV

IMPULSES OF ADOPTING AND REJECTING, OR OF SEEKING AND AVOIDING

EVERY moment of our sentient lives we are affected by the influence of one or other of two contrary tendencies—one to move towards, or adopt, an object, the other to move away from, or reject it, which may be compared in some ways with the attractions and repulsions of electricity and magnetism. When accompanied by feeling these tendencies make themselves known to us as like and dislike. We know very well that feelings of dislike involve an instinctive movement of shrinking : we shrink from pain or from a disgusting object or smell. On the other hand, in liking there is an impulse to reach out towards, or meet, as one kiss attempts to forestall another. We recognize these movements when we term one thing ‘attractive,’ another ‘repulsive.’ Little children stretch out towards and turn away from everything that pleases or displeases them. As memory grows we control such naive manifestations, but remain affected by the subtle activity which they express. This may move us contrary to a desire, or even subconsciously. If we are suffering pain in a foot, with however much resolution we can hardly prevent ourselves from limping. When asleep, or under

the influence of an anæsthetic, we shrink from touches which would be painful in our conscious state, although we do not feel them. And experiments have shown that such animals as frogs will withdraw their limbs from irritants after their brains have been removed.

A little thought will show that adopting and rejecting, and seeking and avoiding, are different stages in the same operation. The former are internal processes by which we respond to the effect that is produced upon us by the *impressions* of material objects. The latter are external processes that follow, and place us in connection with the objects themselves. When we decide to help ourselves to a dish we adopt internally the impression which the dish makes upon us. We then seek the dish itself by muscular movement. Seeking and avoiding are, then, the muscular realizations of adopting and rejecting.

In liking and disliking, it may be said, there is no question of impulse. We are passively attracted or repelled by outside objects. But this view will not bear examination. So far from being at the mercy of our impressions we can, very generally, render them agreeable or disagreeable by our attitude towards them. We can, that is to say, modify our susceptibilities. The great mass of our likes and dislikes are artificial: we make them for ourselves. Paradoxical though it may appear, we like things because we adopt them—because, in fact, we have acquired a taste for them, and dislike things because we reject them. In other words, it is not a stimulus which excites us but our susceptibility to a stimulus, and this sus-

ceptibility may be acquired. Only on this assumption can we explain the extraordinary diversity of human tastes. The dietary of man in various parts of the world differs so greatly that, were we dealing with beasts or birds, we should assume that the peculiarities marked different species. It is a literal fact that some men revel delightedly in food which other men regard with abhorrence. Our ideas of beauty are widely discrepant and strangely mutable. We wonder how the Chinese could feel that they enhanced woman's attractiveness by mutilating her feet: the Chinese marvel at our tastes in dress, in food and in music. The Parsis, a sensitive and intelligent race, can suffer without horror that their dead should be torn and devoured by vultures. The furniture which our grandfathers admired, seemed ugly to our fathers and comes again into fashion amongst ourselves. The evolution of modern music and of 'futurist' painting illustrates the bizarre caprices into which artistic taste may be led by the practice of mannerisms.

It appears, then, that the pleasures and pains of life are in great measure made for us by ourselves. Moved by the impulses to imitate and to make trials, we explore the unknown: we adopt some objects and reject others. The more things we grow to like, the more things there will be in life to attract us. A country walk, dull to the uninformed, abounds in interest to the naturalist. With truth Keats wrote that—

On every morrow are we weaving
A flowery wreath to bind us to the earth.

But there is another side to the picture. By cultivating 'fads' or prejudices—by 'taking dislikes'—a man may invest ordinary incidents of life with powers of torment, and may make himself miserable where another would be merely inattentive.

Certain of our susceptibilities are, however, natural beyond doubt. No one can bring himself to like a toothache, or the irritation of hunger. Food must be agreeable to a hungry man, provided that it is eatable; and we may suspect that one of the earliest developments of these impulses was the discrimination by an organism of things which were fit, and were unfit for food. The distinction, for instance, between vegetable and mineral substances must be apparent to the very humblest of creatures; and, higher up in the scale, animals are compelled by the exigencies of their bodily organization to accept some foods and reject others. Flesh is inherently distasteful to a horse, as grain is to a tiger. The pleasure of lust is instinctive. Sweet things are generally liked: bitter things disliked. Light and sound are agreeable so long as they are not glaring or strident. The movement of our limbs gives us pleasure: dancing seems to be universally attractive. But these natural susceptibilities vary with individuals. Some men have no ear for music: others are colour blind. And the fact remains that by far the greater number of our likes and dislikes are not inborn, but are acquired by conduct—imitative, experimental or chosen: we 'contract,' so it is said, likes and dislikes. The conduct which implants them may be of no more

practical value than the wearing of a double-breasted waistcoat. But it may be a means of meeting a real difficulty. There are millions in Eastern Asia to whom putrid fish is delicious, because it is the only nitrogenous food that they can obtain. By actual practice, modes of life which appear irredeemably repulsive become agreeable to those who pursue them: so society can count upon the willing services of men in such employments as coal-mining or the North Sea fisheries. That is to say, men like what they habitually practise: this is what is termed the 'force of habit.'

We may note in regard to these artificial likes and dislikes that they are aroused, not by impressions of the senses, but by recollections—that is to say, by the consequences of previous adoptings or rejectings. In this they differ from the few likes and dislikes that are instinctive. It is our recollections that give attractiveness to particular dishes, or fashions of dress: had we no recollections of them we should be as likely to reject as to adopt them. Another most important peculiarity of these acquired susceptibilities is that they vary with the humour or mood of the moment. Things that we like when we are exhilarated we may dislike beyond measure when we are irritated or depressed. Hence result the extraordinary fluctuations in individual behaviour. To one who 'gets out of bed on the wrong side' the breakfast table is set thick with stinging annoyances, and the crossing sweeper, ordinarily greeted with a penny, becomes a scandalous illustration of lazy fatuity. So our moods run

on, set in a major or minor key, until they are transposed by a striking impression from one into the other. A fit of ill-temper can generally be dissipated by a good dinner.

We seek and avoid recollections as well as objects. We strive for riches because we recollect the pleasures which they can yield us : we are deterred by punishment because we recollect its pain. These are the motives which Utilitarian philosophy regards as the mainsprings of our conduct. They influence us very greatly. But there are stronger forces, some of which lie beyond the apprehension of our consciousness. We eat primarily because we are hungry, only secondarily because we like the taste of food : we rest primarily because we are tired, only secondarily because bed is comfortable. Seeking and avoiding are, then, impulses, which, so to speak, overlie stronger propensities, and may endeavour to counteract them. But, as the Great War convincingly proves to us, their influence may be negligible when more violent passions are aroused. We do not, indeed, require so catastrophic an illustration. What calculations of profit and loss can withstand the passion of love ?

But over our ordinary conduct these impulses exact an influence which can hardly be over-rated. Desire, which in effect is seeking, leads us to indulge ourselves in such pleasures as are given by eating, drinking, and intoxicants, to gratify a liking for the beautiful by decorating our bodies, to seek for riches as a means of luxury, and to spend money lavishly

for the preservation and recovery of health. Desire is the origin of material culture. Man who in Oriental countries spends most of his time very pleasantly in idleness, becomes electrified with energy, and devotes most of his waking hours to unremitting labour as manager, foreman, or workman in a factory. The precise form which his labour takes is generally determined by imitation. A man works upon a lathe because he follows, or has been instructed by, others in this business, and his working is regularized by the force of habit. Imitation and habit are, then, responsible for the methods of his life. But behind them lies the impulsive force of desire, which in himself, or in others, is the ultimate cause of his industry. He labours because he desires things—food and raiment for himself and his family, the respectability of decent outward appearance, the relaxations of the cinema or the theatre, of drink or tobacco. Industry and commerce began on the day when a man desired something that was in the possession of another, and was unable to take it by force. He could satisfy his desire only by inducing the possessor to part with the thing which he coveted by the offer of something in exchange—of an article or a service—as a boy might negotiate for another boy's pocket-knife by the offer of a cake, or of his services in fielding at the cricket net. The negotiation could succeed only if the possessor desired the article or service; and accordingly the first step was to tempt by an offer,—to stimulate desire by arousing a liking. We see this process of temptation illustrated in the flam-

boyant insistency of commercial advertisements. Service, manufacture and trade are, then, the outcome of desire; and so long as desire is lacking, as is still the case in Oriental countries, no efforts of the State will galvanize them into activity. On the other hand, if desires are active, they will enable a people to recover from the effects of an earthquake, or a devastating war, with astonishing rapidity.

The impulses of seeking and avoiding are also the wardens of social morality. Through them we appreciate and are moved by rewards and punishments. They accordingly maintain home and school discipline, they assist us in preserving the orderliness of social life, and they provide the deterrent upon which penal legislation ultimately rests. Religion, in so far as it appeals to a future state of bliss or misery, is content to owe to them some elements of its authority.

The process which we term 'choice' appears to be nothing more than the effect of the impulses to seek and to avoid in cases when we are confronted with two or more objects of like or dislike. A glass of beer on a hot day may be almost irresistible to a thirsty man, especially if a comrade sets an example in drinking, or he is accustomed to refresh himself between meals. But recollections may arise which complicate the situation. There may be an unwillingness to spend money on the beer, reluctance to break a pledge, fear of a headache. There is consequently a swaying, a hesitation, which is finally resolved, so we say, by choice. This decision may contain

a spice of the adventurous—of the impulse to chance consequences, which is commonly termed ‘sporting.’ So far, it is a display of ‘free will.’ But, generally, in choosing we simply yield to habit or to the inclination which finally prevails after balancing our recollections, and in this case our action must be wholly ascribed to the impulses of seeking and avoiding. Our response to these impulses is hesitating and not prompt, simply because it takes time to summon recollections and to compare them. We may choose to go to a dentist instead of suffering toothache because the dentist’s chair seems to be the less repulsive alternative. We may choose to deny ourselves a glass of wine because the pleasure of self-assertion—of self-righteousness—is greater than that which the wine would give us. In neither case have we shown ‘free will.’ We have simply swayed towards the greater of two attractions, or away from the stronger of two things which we find to be repellent.

* * *

If we attempt to classify the impulsive passions which we commonly term ‘emotions,’ we shall find that they are in essence phases of like and dislike ; and it is impossible to resist the conclusion that they are more or less complicated evolutions from the primitive impulses of seeking and avoiding. Originating some from like, others from dislike, they are violently contradictory. They are as unstable as like and dislike, being dependent upon susceptibilities which are variable, and very

largely artificial, so that an experience may excite fear at one time and courage at another, a person may move us to anger or kindliness, according to our mood. The direction which they take is undoubtedly determined to some extent by influences that are innate: from early infancy children differ markedly in disposition. But it is also determined very greatly by the feelings or moods of the moment—that is to say, by emotional influences. Moreover, with one exception, the impulses are themselves emotional in that their uprising is accompanied by strong gusts of feeling. The exception is the impulse of fear, as manifested in sudden starts or shrinkings: these may occur involuntarily and before we are conscious of the cause of our alarm. Fear is the most primitive of all these impulses, and it is not surprising that it should affect subconscious as well as conscious life.

These emotional impulses resemble the likes and dislikes that have been classed as artificial in that they are aroused not by simple sensations, but by recollections, which require, moreover, to be appreciated intelligently. We hate a man, not as a man, but because we appreciate his qualities or his attitude towards us. Accordingly, their influence upon us results from our possession of a faculty which is more refined than mere sensation. This, we shall see, is the faculty commonly called 'intelligence,' which may be regarded as an evolutionary elaboration of sensation.

Being developed from the impulses to adopt or reject, these emotions may justly be distinguished as 'derived.' They may be grouped as

of self-effacement (or of escape), of self-assertion, of antipathy and of sympathy. They appear to have evolved in this order, a propensity to take flight being succeeded by an impulse to oppose, or to struggle, which developed strongly antipathetic tendencies. Finally, there appeared a propensity to assist others, as the organism became itself dependent upon others and contracted a gregarious mode of life. But as each of these different attitudes developed its predecessor was not eliminated: new and old propensities hold the ground together—so to speak, overlap one another; and, since the four attitudes of fear, self-assertion, jealousy and affection were, alternately, the outgrowths of seeking and avoiding, there arise the violent contradictions which are so remarkable a feature of human nature. Acute feelings of pleasure or pain accompany these impulses, those of attraction being pleasurable, those of repulsion painful. Fear and antipathy are inherently disagreeable: self-assertion and sympathy inherently agreeable. The facial expressions that accompany these emotions testify very vividly to the feelings which they produce. The agonized contortions of fear, the frowns of anger and malice, the bright eyes of courage and the smiles of affection express the feelings of like and dislike that underlie these impulses. And since these impulses, taken in the order of their probable evolution, alternately represent adoption and rejection, it will be convenient to discuss them in pairs—firstly, the impulses of self-effacement and self-assertion; secondly, those of antipathy and sympathy.

Impulses of Self-Effacement and of Self-Assertion

The leading impulses—or emotions—of these classes arrange themselves very strikingly in pairs of opposites, each pair representing the different responses which may be made to a particular stimulus under different conditions of susceptibility—natural or acquired.

Grouped in this fashion (as on the following page) these emotions display very clearly their nature as peculiar phases of seeking and avoiding—of like or dislike. We are afraid if we are painfully susceptible to danger, courageous if we are pleasurably susceptible to it. We are secretive if we dislike the activity of others, emulative if it attracts us. And we shall see that these ‘derived’ emotions resemble sensuous likes and dislikes in being influenced by imitative, experimental or chosen conduct, and in being determined very largely by the mood in which we meet their stimuli. Courage may be enhanced by training, by habit or discipline, and by the mood of the hour. A triumphant army will welcome perils that in the dejection of retreat would dissolve it in panic.

Moreover, as sensuous susceptibilities vary from individual to individual—one man, for instance, being more sensitive to alcohol or tobacco than another—so do these special susceptibilities affect individuals in very different degrees. Some persons are nervous, others courageous by inborn temperament: some are innately more secretive than emulative. Herein lies the distinction between optimism and pessimism.

DERIVED IMPULSES

STIMULUS.	PHASES OF SELF-EFFACEMENT		PHASES OF SELF-ASSERTION.	
	PRIMITIVE ACTIONS.	EMOTIONS.	PRIMITIVE ACTIONS	EMOTIONS.
The unknown	To tremble	Surprise, Suspicion	To examine	Curiosity
Danger or risk	To shrink back	Fear	To advance	Daring, Courage
An attack	To yield	Cowardice	To withstand	Combativeness, Antagonism
Another running	To run also	Panic	To pursue	The hunting passion
Another's success	To cringe before	Propitiation, Fawning	To emulate	Rivalry
The observation of others	To hide	Secretiveness, Dissimulation	To display oneself	Vanity, Conceit
Others generally	To follow	Submissiveness	To lead	Ambition
Objects generally	To throw away	Abandonment	To collect or hoard	Acquisitiveness

Suspicion and curiosity are the most elementary of our 'derived' impulses, the simplest of the instruments with which an animal must be equipped in order to protect itself by flight or by antagonism. They are stimulated by the new, or by changes that result from movement, and are, from the beginnings of childhood, our vedettes against the strange experiences of the outside world into which we are launched at birth. If we are absorbed in thought, our attention is aroused—we are 'recalled to ourselves'—by anything that is unusual, or by any change in our surroundings: so long as our impressions are of the customary order we remain unconscious of them. Whether we shall be suspicious or curious depends in great measure upon natural disposition, habit or mood. But the two impulses very often appear and alternate with one another in a quick succession of changes. If we watch the conduct of a puppy towards a beetle, or of a child towards a strange dog, we shall notice rapid interchanges of suspicion and curiosity. Timidity gives place to daring, and there results a double pleasure—that of relief and that which daring itself affords. Timidity recurs and the changes are rung over again. These successions are expressed in the phrase 'playing with danger.' They give a certain attractiveness to anything or any animal that might do us harm—including our neighbours. They draw crowds to the tiger house in the Zoological Gardens, and render 'scandal' so attractive a topic for conversation. To curiosity, unmixed with suspicion, we owe our inclination to the study of science

and philosophy. Our studies are in all cases efforts at construction, and are actuated fundamentally by the constructive impulse. But it is curiosity that stimulates them and gives them their direction.

Fear is the strongest of all our impulses. It may obliterate the pangs of hunger, or of physical pain, as easily as it obliterates fatigue: it will extinguish lust: it may even overpower the love of a mother for her child. One who is dominated by it is insensible to all other stimuli: for him the world contains but one object—the object of his dread. It is excited most acutely by the new. The experience of the Great War has illustrated the panic which may be occasioned amongst seasoned troops by a novel instrument of destruction, such as asphyxiating gas. When accustomed to a particular danger we ‘make the best’ of it, and do not find it so violently repellent. In a town which has been long bombarded children will play while the shells are falling: our ‘fear’ of the law is respect rather than cowardice: we are familiar with the prospect of death, and do not allow its inevitability to overshadow us. Still, when all is said, fear is the most powerful, as it is the most primitive of our ‘derived’ emotions.

To hide, when in fear, is as instinctive as to run away. Hiding is protective because it falsely suggests to the adversary that there is nothing for him to attack. It is, then, the beginning of deceit, which is, as we well know, primitively and typically the defence of one who fears, although it may be chosen as an instrument for accomplishing other impulses.

Self-assertiveness was first evolved on the day when an animal turned to meet its persecutors instead of flying from them. It is a heritage from the very beginning of the struggle for life, and we are moved by it as by no other emotion, fear, hunger and lust excepted. It protects us against our friends as well as our enemies, and even in these civilized days a man feels that he dare not run the risk of owning himself a coward. We are, indeed, always furtively bristling against those who are near us ; and by an extraordinary development of self-consciousness, we can even contrive to become antagonistic to ourselves. There is probably no one who in his heart of hearts does not believe that in some respect or other he excels his fellows—if only in his misfortunes or in a capacity for absorbing beer ; and there are few whose self-humiliation is so complete as to leave them no thoughts upon which they can pride themselves.

Self-assertion appears in the most diverse garbs. It may call itself patriotism : we pride ourselves upon the country to which we belong and cannot bear that its credit should be diminished. It may masquerade as religion, philanthropy, or self-sacrifice : we may detect it in the tone of religious discussions, and in the ambitions of those who pass their time upon benevolent committees. It dignifies itself with the name of self-esteem. We cannot deny that a growth of self-esteem may have a beneficial effect upon conduct. It is, nevertheless, a lion in the path of social reform. An evil such as drunkenness cannot be remedied unless its exist-

ence is recognized. But the classes whom it discredits use every effort to disown and conceal it. And in our hearts we sympathize with them. Self-assertion affords one of life's greatest pleasures. We refer to it when we speak of honour, or good name, the loss of which leaves us poor indeed. A word of appreciative praise—even if undeserved—can brighten the spirits as by a gleam of sunshine and inspire the depressed with fresh alertness. The manners and phrases of politeness are all little offerings made by us to the self-assertiveness of those whom we meet.

We need not then be surprised to find that many of our most serious institutions have been established to promote self-assertion, or accept its promotion as a condition of their existence. So it is with democracy. A monarchy or an aristocracy may rule by fear, or by the obedience which follows admiration. To a democracy only such measures are possible as involve no 'loss of face' to the most numerous of its supporters: if Labour members of Parliament need pecuniary assistance, salaries must be paid to all members alike: if drunkenness is to be repressed amongst artisans on the Clyde, the most particular of London clubs must be fettered with prohibitions. Self-assertiveness cannot be reconciled with compulsion, and a democratic government is accordingly deprived of the most potent instrument of control. It may persuade, cajole or deceive; but it cannot compel, without being false to the principles of its existence.

So far of the obvious effects of self-assertiveness upon behaviour. If we probe more deeply

into our motives we shall find that its influence pervades most of our activities—that the practical pursuits of our lives become conscious, and, so to speak, ‘voluntary,’ because self-assertive emotion colours them. A bee toils at its comb under the influence of a propensity to construct which is apparently subconscious, since it is unaffected by other competing attractions. Man’s creativeness, either as the fashionings of an artist or mechanic, or in the activities of sport, business or politics, is conscious because it is infused and guided by self-assertiveness. He toils, as it is said, ‘to express himself.’

Turning now to the various phases of self-assertion, we may make distinctions in *courage* according as it nerves one to take a risk, to attack another, or to resist an attack. The daring which seeks the chances of fortune is with many men a ruling passion. It is, in fact, a conscious phase of the elemental propensity to make trials or to venture. It gives fascination to Alpine climbing, and to the more dangerous forms of sport. But these are for the few: the multitude exercise this impulse in one or other of the hundred forms of gambling. To repress this propensity has been the object of much legislation: but it survives; and where public lotteries are forbidden and gaming houses closed, it will drive multitudes to risk their money at races and football matches. Gambling has, however, a more reputable side: in the form of speculation it gives an animation to commerce which could hardly arise from the desire for gain.

Daring is not so general a possession as is

sometimes supposed. Nations at war are at pains to insist that their soldiers are the bravest of the brave, since it is less humiliating to fail through incompetence than through cowardice. But generals in the field are constantly perturbed by doubts as to the proportion of their men who can be trusted to follow their leaders into the open—a proportion which is in some conditions much smaller than may be imagined. It may be observed here that a man may draw courage from a conscious self-antagonism, which will enable him to face danger that he actually fears. But in this case he is actuated by choice, not by impulse.

Fear is miserable and the emotions that are akin to it are all depressing. It is unfortunate for man that fear should be so generally the basis of his conduct—fear of misadventure, of punishment in this world or the next, of the disapproval of others or of himself. This nervous dread of consequences gives the anxious expression which is so commonly to be observed in the faces of those around us. If happy emotions—such as courage, kindness or obedience—can supplant fear, there comes a feeling of joyousness—a buoyant sense of what appears to be ‘freedom’—such as is expressed in Henley’s lines :

I am the master of my fate,
I am the captain of my soul.

Impulsive courage is the greatest of exhilarants. We may literally speak of the ‘happy warrior,’ and if we go by our feelings, we shall not wonder how Nietzsche, on a review of human emotions,

could have concluded that courage was best of all.

The propensity to *rival* or *emulate* strikes deep into life. How naturally does horse run against horse, dog against dog ! It stirs man to outpace his fellows in almost every phase of activity. We may not, indeed, attempt to surpass a poltroon in his cowardice : but emulation in cruelty is by no means impossible, and there can be no doubt that rivalry may stimulate sexual love, and increase the desire of a woman to become a mother. It seriously contributes to the advance of culture, stimulating the diligence of students, and industry in every department of business. But it also acts as a lure to the caprices of fashion, urging us, it may be against our inclinations, to be extravagant in dress or liberal in charity.

Not less far-reaching are the effects of *vanity*—the propensity to ‘show off.’ This is a naive desire for distinctiveness which may lead a man to display eccentricities, or even vices, that are condemned by public opinion, so long as they serve to render him conspicuous. Our craving for approbation is a form of vanity—a desire to display ourselves. It may not be the most respectable foundation of morality. But it is effective in the control of our conduct ; and it produces a cheerful, sanguine condition of mind—the opposite of the anxious apprehensiveness of those who are moral because they fear the disapproval of others, or that self-disapproval which is known as the ‘prick of conscience.’

It may be remarked in passing that we must be sincere in order to gain our own approval, or

avoid our own disapproval. But the approval, or disapproval, of others may be gained or avoided by appearances. So they may act as inducements to dissimulation and pretence, feeding the hypocrisy which grows like a fungus upon the tissue of society.

In the form of vanity, as in the form of emulation, self-assertiveness gives an emotional complexion to our propensities to construct and to venture. They become instruments for asserting ourselves. Creativeness may be figured as the soul of the artist: but it is egotism which gives him conscious expression. We recognize this in styling his motive 'pride in his work.'

The desire for leadership, or *ambition*, is possessed by most men: few do not wish to be masters in their own households. When allied with sympathetic propensities it has been one of the great moving forces of human progress: it has given to mankind its philanthropic statesmen and reformers, and, *salvâ reverentiâ*, we may also discern its effects in the history of many great religious teachers. When its object has been merely personal aggrandizement, it has seldom been useful and has very frequently accomplished itself through the misery and death of thousands of people. We speak of ambition as the 'last infirmity of noble minds.' But one may win the suffrages of a crowd by conciliation as well as by guidance, and men may push themselves into the front by very ignoble methods.

Influenced by our likings we may seek riches in order to indulge in the luxuries that they provide. But, apart from this influence, we

clearly possess an *acquisitive* propensity—an impulse to collect and hoard—which may show itself in the amassing of such objects as postage stamps, or the labels of match boxes. We have, then, a double incentive to get rich; and these two forces, each supporting the other, have woven the complicated web of money-making which clings to every feature of present-day life. The acquisitive propensity may seem out of place amongst our combative impulses. But its evolution may very well have been assisted by the struggle for life, and it is markedly self-assertive. Economists not infrequently claim that international trade has a beneficial influence in the interests of peace. This may be doubted. If one listens to the terms in which the merchants of one country speak of those of another, trade will appear to be so infected with jealousy as hardly to serve as an antitoxin against war. As a matter of fact, it not seldom directly provokes conflict.

Making a general comparison of the two sets of propensities it is evident that those of flight, or self-effacement, are the endowments of the weak as opposed to the strong, and a cynic might declare that they were peculiarly feminine attributes. If so, women's lives must be less happy than men's when they are passed in independance and are not solaced by the interests that crown the sympathetic emotions of love and affection. It seems probable that this is so, and that women who wish to enter into the arena of struggle pay a toll of unhappiness for the privilege of contending.

CHAPTER V

DERIVED IMPULSES—*continued*

Antipathy and Sympathy

WE pass now to two other series of emotions which should also be considered together—those of which the ground notes are respectively antipathy and sympathy.

The struggle for life bears sweet fruit and bitter. It exhilarates us with the pleasure of courage, emulation, acquisition. But it also depresses us with the irritation of jealousy, scorn and hatred. These are antipathetic emotions, and antipathy differs radically from self-assertiveness in its nature and its effects. It represents repulsion instead of attraction: it gives unhappiness instead of happiness. We can trace the course of its evolution. To introduce the note of antipathy we have only to desire that the exaltation of ourselves should come about through the humiliation of others. So natural is this process that our self-assertive emotions are rarely unadulterated: courage is generally poisoned with at least a suspicion of cruelty, ambition with jealousy, emulation with anger. We can detect another connection between self-assertiveness and antipathy. We become peculiarly susceptible to antipathetic promptings when our vanity, emula-

tion or ambition has suffered the reversal of disappointment.

If we look into our lives we shall find that it is antipathetic emotions—ranging from ‘crossness’ to jealousy—that render so many of our hours unhappy. Irritation with those around us would, indeed, render social life impossible were these tendencies not balanced by impulses of sympathy and sociability, which must have evolved with the beginnings of gregarious life. They represent mutual helpfulness, an exigency that is the precise opposite of the struggle for life, and has contributed to man’s development infinitely more than evolutionists commonly suppose. Touched by sympathetic emotions we are attracted instead of being repelled by our fellows,—feel exhilarated in their company and lose the irritation of antipathetic jealousies. The idea that the ‘struggle for life’ has been the sole origin of human impulse completely ignores the existence and influence of these propensities. It offers a striking—and correct—explanation of a number of very prominent features in human character: but it cannot account for such emotions as kindness, generosity and charity, except by twisting their nature out of all resemblance to truth. It is as absurd to think that gratitude is ‘a lively appreciation of favours to come,’ as that children like apples because they are good for rheumatism. This one-sided theory has harmed as well as misled us. It has induced us to ignore or suspect the most graceful of our attributes, and to believe that human history and institutions have been the outcome solely of egotism and

malevolence, whereas in truth they abound in illustrations of kindly feeling. And this pessimistic belief reacts upon those who hold it, and tends to feed the aggressive and starve the sympathetic elements in their character. So we may deprive ourselves of the most fruitful source of human happiness.

As is shown in the table on the page opposite, these contradictory emotions, like those of self-effacement and self-assertion, arrange themselves in pairs, if they are classified with reference to the stimuli which arouse them.

Jealousy is the type of our antipathetic emotions. It is as subtle as the Tempter in the Garden, insidiously striving to set us against every one we meet who is not indisputably our inferior. We cannot be jealous of children: they do not irritate us by any suggestion of equality. For them our kindly impulses are, accordingly, unchecked, and there are few of us who have not smiles for them. 'Little' has become an epithet of endearment because it waves jealousy aside. Nor are we jealous of the dead, since they have ceased to compete with us, and we may praise them—indeed over-praise them—unaffectedly. And we are not irritated against our fellows by this emotion if we view their superiority with awe, reverence or loyalty—that is to say, if the stimuli attract instead of repelling us. If these feelings are aroused, jealousy vanishes: if they cannot be stirred, jealousy holds the field. These are, respectively, the conditions of monarchy and democracy—of government through loyalty, and of government by means of expedients that enable

STIMULUS	PHASES OF ANTIPATHY		PHASES OF SYMPATHY.	
	PRIMITIVE ACTIONS.	EMOTIONS.	PRIMITIVE ACTIONS.	EMOTIONS
Others	To hold aloof from	Exclusiveness	To consort with	Sociability
Another's approach	To threaten	Anger	To embrace	Affection
Another's weakness	To ill-treat	Cruelty	To fondle	Kindness
Another's infirmity	To spurn	Disdain, Contempt	To stroke	Pity, Compassion
Another's need	To turn away from	Scorn	To turn towards	Charity, Generosity
A benefit received	To throw back	Pride	To requite	Gratitude
An injury received	To retaliate	Revenge, Indignation	To make allowance for	Mercy, Forgiveness
Another's rivalry	To overreach	Deceit, Fraud	To give law to	Fairness, 'Sportsmanship',
' Another's superiority	To hurt or kill	Jealousy, Envy	To prostrate before	Awe, Reverence
Another's authority	To dispute	Contradictoriness	To accept—agree with	Humility
A leader	To desert	Disloyalty, Treachery	To follow	Loyalty, Obedience
Property of others	To grab	Greed, Covetousness	To protect	Respect

¹ Asserted, for instance, by contradiction.

every voter to think that he is as good as his neighbour. This is, indeed, misnamed government. It may suffice to conduct in peace time the customary routine of administration. But in times of difficulty its impotence becomes apparent. It cannot induce the people to sink their private interests, to accept the sacrifices which the occasion requires. Only when it is admired can a government exorcise jealousy and command whole-hearted obedience.

Sociability, developing into *affection*, is a necessary attribute of gregarious animals. Something is needed to counteract the predatory impulses which tend to drive individuals apart. The stimulus that arouses it is simply propinquity, either actual or imagined. It may not be pleasant to think that our affection diminishes with distance, like the force of gravity. This is, however, confessed in the proverb 'out of sight, out of mind.' In its primitive form sympathy is limited to the members of our own immediate circle. Of this we are assured by the rules of ancient law and the practices of modern barbarism. Until comparatively recent years the 'stranger within our gates' had no rights, and might be ill-treated without compunction. Our sympathy has broadened, not so much by its extension to strangers, as by the inclusion of strangers amongst our friends. We bring them within our circle by imagining that they are near us, by applying to them recollections which suggest propinquity. Such are recollections of identities of interest in religion, politics or business. A Mohammedan is drawn towards another Mohammedan, a doctor

towards another doctor, a Radical in politics towards another Radical. Persons so brought within the range of our affection stimulate our sympathetic instead of our antipathetic impulses.

With the advance of civilization sympathies have widened from the family to the tribe, from the tribe to the nation. The ideal of nationality, founded upon little more than fanciful tradition, or a similarity of language, may weld a number of different races into a single society. But national union is continually beset by a narrower and more practical ideal—the fraternity of religious faith or of professional calling. This tends to fortify itself by marriage restrictions: so arose the hereditary caste system of India: and in England to-day we may find in Trade Unionism some¹ illustrations of this tendency. It breeds a particularity of interest which may add to the happiness of individual life, but, by subdividing a nation, fatally impairs its powers of defence. So India for a thousand years has been the prey of foreign conquerors. To fit a nation for war its unity must be impressed upon it by strong enthematic influence—the efforts of patriotic societies and the glamour of the flag. The extraordinary success of Pan-germanic teaching illustrates the immense possibilities of such mission enterprise.

A more recent, and fainter, ideal is that our sympathy should embrace the whole of humanity. This expansion has resulted in part from the efforts of trade and intercommunication, for (as

¹ The rules of the plastering trade, for instance, refuse admittance as apprentices to all who are not the sons of plasterers.

we have seen) attraction is generated by contact. It has also owed much to the teachings of philosophy, and in particular to Christian doctrine, which during the last nineteen centuries has held philanthropy before us as a guiding star of conduct, often very dim and at times obscured by the vapours of war and persecution, but never entirely forgotten.

We are as naturally *kind* as we are naturally *cruel*. This strange contrast is admirably illustrated by Burns :

And man whose Heaven-erected face,
The smiles of love adorn
Man's inhumanity to man
Makes countless thousands mourn

The kind-hearted are beyond doubt happier than the malevolent. Yet how often cruelty prevails ! We need not look back upon the past—upon gladiatorial shows, and the brutalities of slavery. We need not seek evidence from the ferocities of the battlefield. It suffices to look into our own hearts. Why are the best-natured of us sometimes impelled to say things which needlessly hurt a friend's feelings ? Not, we may be sure, to gain pleasure, for there is none : we act upon the sudden promptings of a cruel desire which by the usages of society has been disarmed of all offensive weapons but the tongue. By children cruelty is displayed more naively : they can hardly refrain from teasing animals and one another. As they grow older they are influenced by ideals of kindness, and they learn to conceal the promptings of this impulse. But it lies in their hearts,

and will uncoil itself and strike should the restraint of convention be loosened. So it happens that during war we read with a glowing satisfaction of the miseries which are suffered by the enemy soldiers. Yet kindness is also innate in us. In the cruellest of tempers man is unable to steel himself against all softenings of heart : they need but a touch to overcome him, as when the bloodthirstiness of conflict is suddenly exorcised by the pitiful sight of the enemy's wounded, or even by memories of Christmas Day.

In ancient philosophies we find little mention of kindness as a governing principle of behaviour. In the teaching of Christ it was the fountain head of morality—a spring whose streams could dissolve distinctions of race and class, and could unite the Greek with the barbarian, the Samaritan with the Jew. From the psychological point of view this doctrine is of extreme interest. Experience shows that the rule of kindness is the only guide for our behaviour which is trustworthy—that is to say, unchangeable ; which benefits others and that can be relied upon to give happiness to oneself. To go by Duty is to accept a weathercock as a compass. Its directions vary with the period, the nation, and the individual, almost as much as if they were purely conventional. The path of Pleasure is less ambiguous : but it does not lead to happiness : regard the faces, we will not say of sensualists, but of young girls at the end of a London season. Self-assertion, if successful, is delightful : if, however, it fails, it is miserable in the extreme, and disposes us antipathetically towards others. But the golden rule

'to do to others as ye would they should do unto you' is an absolute standard, which can never fail or mislead unless perversely construed. Those who observe it—who develop to the utmost their sympathetic emotions—arrive as near happiness as mortals can. Indeed we cannot think of the good-natured as unhappy.

It is, then, remarkable that Christianity should not have done more to assuage the bitterness of human nature. Man is a plastic creature, easily enthematized, and Christ's teachings have been in the hands of influential priesthoods, endowed with ample facilities for spreading them. The savagery of the Great War has been a terrible disillusionment: it is an open reproach upon Christianity. But who can say that, from the time of Constantine till the present, Christian peoples have shown much trace of Christ's influence in their treatment of conquered nations, or of the poorer classes of their own society? For this we must blame the teachers, not the teaching. Christianity is, in truth, very far from the teachings of Christ. The Master's words have been belittled by a mass of traditions, definitions and ceremonies the intolerance of which is calculated rather to strangle kindness than to cherish it. What can be more discordant with the Rule of Love than the doctrine of eternal punishment for errors of belief, or the un pitying vengeance of the Old Testament?

Akin to kindness are the emotions of *pity*, *mercy*, *generosity* and *gratitude*: they are forms which kindness takes when aroused by particular stimuli. We may add to them the inclination to

treat a rival, or an inferior, generously or fairly, which is the essence of chivalrous or 'sportsman-like' behaviour. This it may be urged is an artificial ideal, the result, pure and simple, of education. But no ideal can be built up unless there is a propensity which can be used as its foundation, and we may assume without great rashness that the British liking for fair play is a peculiar reaction to the stimulus that is given by a contest—the result of a special susceptibility which is commoner in the British Isles than elsewhere. There can hardly be a better definition of sound morality than a willingness to subordinate ends to means in the interests of fair play—to qualify a desire to win by a desire to win fairly.

We pass to the emotion of *awe* or *reverence* which is evoked by the great, the forceful or the mysterious, and inspires us with the desire to worship—a desire that is the kernel of religious feeling. But with the incense of worship a number of other emotions rise into activity—admiration, obedience, the loyal affection which goes out towards a protector—which may unitedly produce a rapture of happiness. To these must be added our curiosity in regard to the causes of happenings—curiosity which religion alone can completely satisfy. Whilst it could enlist all these forces religion exercised over mankind unquestioned authority. Science has undermined the support of inquisitiveness, by its explanation of things which to a simple faith appeared mysteries of the Divine. But science can offer no comfort in trouble, no relief in distress. The mother who has lost her child can forget her grief in rapturous contempla-

tion of the Bambino : the sinner, stricken with repentance, may be comforted by the very humility in which he prostrates himself. So we find that in times of trouble men take refuge in emotions which science may have ignored. Amidst the first anxieties of war, the churches are well filled.

We may trace our respect for greatness of size, and for power, to the impressions which, as children, we gathered of our elders. Our attitude towards the mysterious, in which fear is mingled with attraction, appears to be a more serious form of the mixture of suspicion and curiosity with which children meet a strange, unaccountable experience. But the objects upon which we bestow our reverence are not entirely dependent upon our past experiences. As gregarious animals we instinctively respect, not only our leaders, but the crowd around us—a propensity which contributes a corner-stone to the foundations of democracy.

Loyalty to a leader is akin to reverence. But there are no essential qualifications which a leader must possess. He may be a hereditary king, an elected president, a bishop or a popular orator. He may even be an alien official : in India and Nigeria, British Magistrates attract the confidence of thousands to whom their habits and motives cause endless wonderment. Age is perhaps the most universal title to respect. The leader of a troop of monkeys must, it seems, be old ; and amongst dogs and horses the eldest is generally conceded some measure of deference. We acknowledge the virtues of age in the styles of ‘ Sir ’ (senior), ‘ senator,’ ‘ presbyter ’ and ‘ alderman.’

Here again, it appears, we are influenced by impressions gathered during childhood, when submission to one's elders is a protective necessity. But our respect may be given to a baby if it represents an ideal which our admiration has enthroned.

Loyalty includes *obedience*, an impulse which gives restful happiness to millions of mankind, however strange this may appear to those who sing in self-confidence the praises of liberty. Cheerfulness goes with the discipline of a convent, a trade's union, or a regiment: and it would be a mistake to believe that the Germans have been unhappy under a military regime, unless their obedience has resulted from fear, not from admiration—has been the fruit, not of attractive, but of repulsive influences. The nun is, perhaps, the completest type of admiring obedience: are not her features typical of perfect serenity? To those who think that progress counts for more than happiness, this emotion will not commend itself. For it is incompatible with liberty of thought, and subjects those whom it affects to the hypnotic influence that we have termed enthematism. Men who are loyal, accept the emotions and ideals of their leaders, and will be progressive only when their government fosters progress. They lose initiative. But they gain an extraordinary forcefulness. When the impulses to obey and to imitate act together, they exert an influence which completely overshadows man's ordinary propensities. Those who can follow a leader in implicit obedience are untouched by the hesitations which come from fear, or the balancings of self-interest. They will

face anything—sacrifice anything at his behest. An army so actuated is almost irresistible, unless it can be subdued by starvation, or overwhelmed by missiles from afar. It is by habits of obedience that trained soldiers are imbued with disciplined courage. From the rule of obedience the Jesuits drew almost supernatural strength. By a refinement of self-consciousness we are able, as we shall see, to turn this impulse upon ourselves—to be impelled to obey ourselves. We are then driven by the spirit of duty, which, like obedience, will render us capable of wonderful things.

We have an instinctive respect for the possessions of our friends—a propensity that may be noticed in the behaviour of two dogs over a bone. On this foundation have been built up our laws of property. In early days these took no account of strangers. Criminal law, it may be observed here, appears to owe its primitive origin to the antipathetic emotion of revenge: and even at the present day, we feel that something essential is lacking in endeavours to reform criminals, not by punishing, but by educating them. The wholesome feeling of indignation is in its essence revengeful. This much society owes to an unsocial, or antipathetic, impulse. But, for the rest, the impulses of this kind have been destructive forces, setting individual against individual and nation against nation, and postponing, perhaps for ever, the day when men can live with one another in the tranquil good-fellowship of a community of beavers or a flock of penguins.

Some phases of fear excepted, the 'derived' impulses affect our relations with men, not things, and act upon us only when we are confronted by another individual. They imply the existence of an adversary or a companion. But by an extraordinary elaboration of self-consciousness we can replace him by ourselves. Remembering with pleasure the conduct which self-assertiveness or sympathy has actuated, we are inclined to repeat it—may *choose* to repeat it—even on occasions when we stand alone and have no one to excite our antagonism or affection. Thus we may oppose, or control, ourselves, pose before ourselves, admire ourselves, obey ourselves. We have not yet reached the stage when we can discuss these strange refinements of our self-conscious life. But it may be remarked here that from the recognition of duality which is inherent in these impulses, there appears to have sprung the idea of our own duality—the existence of mind apart from body.

The most primitive phase of this antagonism is to be seen in 'forced attention'—attention, that is to say, which is independent of any like or dislike for its object—as, for instance, when we deliberately fix our eyes upon the pattern of a bedroom wall paper. We compel ourselves to do this—in opposition to our natural inclination, which is to seek only those things which we find to be attractive. And we may be enthematized with this spirit of antagonism, as when a child fixes his attention upon his lesson under the influence of his teacher.

We have noticed already the effect of *mood* in determining the view that we shall take of a particular stimulus—whether to respond to it attractively or repulsively, in fear or courage, anger or affection. An emotion which holds possession of us will change our susceptibilities, will render us peculiarly liable to other emotions of its own class, and may reinforce their influence. In a mood of irritation trifles annoy us: when cheerful we can smile at the crosses of life. Fear, as we well know, enhances the bitterness of anger and the sharpness of cruelty. Veneration, loyalty and affection, similarly increase the firmness of courage: man fights well when he is devoted to his leader, is surrounded by his friends, or feels that he is defending his home. He will dare anything to rescue a wounded comrade. If in love, he is attracted by danger, as by his mistress: love will infuse courage¹ into the most timid of dispositions. The extraordinary successes of the French Revolutionary army were due to its devotion, at first to a philosophic ideal, and later to the ideal of Napoleon. A democracy is, then, inherently at a disadvantage in making war: its party leaders cannot command universal respect or admiration, and, even if chosen for their capability, can infuse no such life into their armies as comes from the indiscriminating loyalty that is felt for a King. The Jews sought a king when struggling with the

¹ Give a man a girl he can love,
As I, O my girl, love thee,
And his heart is great with the pulse of Fate
At home, on land, on sea (James Thomson)

Philistines ; and this is typical of the origin of kingship generally. History is eloquent upon the virtue of a religious ideal in giving heart to the courage whether of aggressive armies, or of tortured martyrs. In the bond of ' comradeship '—a stronger tie than brotherhood—affection is strengthened by the self-assertive emotions : it is a partnership¹ in meeting danger, maintaining credit, or in overcoming others. It is this combative element which gives to Trade Unions and political parties their solid strength. Such a spirit of comradeship—or *esprit de corps*—unites a school, a club and a regiment, actuated by the desire to maintain a reputation that is a credit to all its members. But the most striking illustration of this process of mutual reinforcement is afforded by the passion of sexual love. Lust of itself is capable of the most devilish cruelty. But normally, its concentration upon a particular individual arouses extraordinarily strong emotions of affection and admiration, and may even excite the antagonism of self-control in the form of a spirit of chivalrous respect.

* * *

We habitually draw a sharp distinction between the pleasures of sense and those of emotion—between such pleasures as those of eating and drinking, of comfort and luxury—and those which

¹ Surely never better expressed than in Newbolt's lines :

“ Draw near together none be last or first ;
We are no longer names, but one desire ;
With the same burning of the soul we thirst
And the same wine to-night shall quench our fire.”

accompany (for instance) the emotions of courage, ambition and affection. The former come to us through the simple propensities of seeking and avoiding: the latter through the emotional impulses which are derived from these propensities. These two sets of pleasures are of different qualities and it is remarkable that our admiration should go out to one set and our allegiance to another. The self-assertive and sympathetic emotions are universally admired. Courage and ambition, self-control and self-sacrifice, affection, generosity and charity are all 'heroic' virtues: at a theatre there will be few amongst the audience whose hearts are not warmed by the mere pretence of them. Yet the pursuit of comfort and luxury becomes so engrossing as to neutralize the attraction of the finer feelings: there is no room for them in a life which is devoted to sensuous pleasure or to gain.

The explanation of this curious paradox appears to lie in the insistency of the temptations that are offered to us by material enjoyments: in a civilized society they are ever before us and we cannot rid ourselves of them if we would. Wealth and its advantages flaunt themselves in the foreground and obscure the happiness which we can derive from our emotions. The temptations of comfort and luxury have increased immensely with the invention of money. One can refrain without much difficulty from coveting the ox or ass of a neighbour, since the usefulness of these animals is limited. But one's neighbour's money is an irresistible attraction. It represents possibilities which are almost limitless: one who possesses

a sovereign is master of the world to the value of a sovereign. Wealth, moreover, brings at least one emotional pleasure in its train: its power is respected, and its possession gives us the dignity which is so dear to our self-esteem. Accordingly, with untiring energy, we tempt our neighbours to part with money by the offer either of goods or of services in exchange. The poor have but little to offer that is tempting: they have no such hopes of obtaining riches as would eclipse the attractions of emotional pleasures, and it is a truism that they enjoy¹ these pleasures more fully than the rich. Money is then not unaptly described as 'the root of all evil' in that it lessens the charm of the pleasures of the heroic—of what we term 'virtue'; and there may be some truth in the idea of a long-past 'golden age,' in which emotional pleasures ranked higher than sensuous, owing to the lack of compelling material temptations. We may draw from these reflections a practical conclusion—that the young should be brought up in hardship if they are to be encouraged to seek happiness in the heroic emotions.

* * *

We may observe again, before concluding our review of these 'derived' impulses, that, although they are essentially phases of like and dislike, they are also closely connected with the impulses to construct, to make trials and to imitate, and appear

¹ It is only amongst the poorer classes that the theatre can afford to present the heroic—in tragedy or melodrama—the fashionable world prefers musical comedy or *revues*.

in some degree to owe their evolution to these propensities. The creative impulse, which is of such immense importance in our subconscious life, rises into consciousness when it is associated with a 'derived' emotion as the means of its achievement. We become aware of the contrivances by which we evade danger, assert ourselves, and injure or assist our fellows because our efforts are linked with the emotions which actuate our conduct. Conscious constructiveness reaches its zenith in the inventions of art and industry. We speak of an artist's 'creative talent,' and we like to believe that he exerts it for Art's sake. But he creates consciously only because he employs his talent as an instrument for achieving an emotion : and a study of his life shows convincingly that his creativeness is in reality a means of asserting—or, as it is sometimes phrased, of 'expressing'—himself. Vanity is his foible.

So also with the impulses to make trials and to imitate. In the panic of fear we may make random struggles to escape—or we may be swept along in imitation of those around us. Self-assertion and antipathy may express themselves by tentative efforts, tinged with like in the one case, with dislike in the other. Daring is an emotional form of venturesome experimenting. Imitation is plainly the key-note of sympathetic conduct : indeed, we are sympathetic by imitating the feelings of those who attract us. And obedience—perhaps the strongest of the sympathetic emotions—is the most striking illustration of imitative behaviour.

CHAPTER VI

IMPULSES OF MEMORY

WHEN we remember we repeat. Memory is, then, a repetitive force. But so many of its repetitions lie beyond the scope of our consciousness that it is difficult to realize how immense is the part they play in our lives. We think of memory as a process of the mind—as a process which recalls to us impressions of the senses, presents to us echoes of past sights and sounds, and of the feelings which accompanied them. But, in fact, it affects the whole of our bodies. By means of it we repeat muscular movements as well as sensory impressions: there are, so to speak, muscular remembrances as well as sensory remembrances. Such are the acquired dexterities (termed ‘ideo-motor’) which not merely enable us to walk, speak, eat and dress ourselves without consciously thinking of every movement, but guide our hands in the various technicalities of sport, industry and art—dexterities by which the carpenter automatically directs his chisel and the artist his brush. We are ordinarily unconscious of these repetitions: they serve us without acknowledgment, although by an effort of attention we can become aware of them, and endeavour to analyse them. So also escape our attention vast numbers of the recollections of sensory impressions

which stream through our brains : we have all had experiences of subconscious remembering. The workings of memory—like those of imitation—are, in fact, so largely subconscious that introspection alone will not enable us to appreciate the sphere of their activity. We must supplement it by the observation of results.

It seems that by memory we can repeat any condition through which the body has passed, whether of movement, sensation or even secretion. Repetitions of movement are convincingly illustrated by the condition of a pianist who is rendering a piece of music by heart. His fingers move automatically, whilst his thoughts may be far away from the piano. It is not merely that his muscles respond to visual recollections of the appearance of the notes. In this case it would suffice to commit the notes to memory in order to learn a piece by heart. But, as a matter of fact, this is not sufficient. It is necessary to practise the fingers, and play the piece over several times, in order to acquire automatic dexterity, exactly as we memorize impressions by repeating them. Of the same order are the 'ideo-motor' dexterities of every-day life. As children, we acquired them by practice, exactly as we may learn a piece of poetry. And it has been proved by pathological experiences that if a man's memory is completely shattered he loses all his acquired dexterities, becomes as helpless as an infant, and must learn afresh to perform the simplest actions.

That memory may repeat internal bodily conditions is brought home to us by the feelings of hunger and fatigue. If we change our meal-time,

or bedtime, if only for a day, we change the hours at which we shall feel the need of food and rest. Hunger and fatigue, it may be objected, are manifestations of the physical needs of replenishment and recuperation, which must be quite independent of memory. This is true. But it is memory which gives them the periodic intermittancy with which they affect us, by repeating the conditions which arouse them. And from the close correspondence between the periods at which we feel hunger and fatigue, and the periods at which we are in the habit of taking food and rest, it appears that memory can take account of time : it can, so to speak, reckon the intervals at which it renders us hungry or fatigued. There are some persons who possess a remarkable capacity for waking at a determined hour : memory brings before them conduct which they have chosen, or upon which they have resolved, on the expiry of a definite period which was included in their choice or resolution.

Memory, then, not only repeats highly complicated series of movements without the assistance of consciousness, but can reproduce such conditions as those of hunger and fatigue at regular intervals of time. Such movements and conditions are characteristic features of the internal processes of growth, nutrition, circulation and secretion. If we can believe that recollections—to start these repetitions—can be inherited at birth, we may attribute to memory the growth and functioning of our bodies, and also the instinctive conduct of the lower animals. In this case there would remain no place for constructive-

ness, so far as subconscious action was concerned. Life would be simply a series of repetitions,—an idea which has commended itself to some philosophers. This theory, however, merely pushes the problem a step back : in what did these repetitions originate ? But we must not wander into the domain of metaphysics. This much may be remarked here—that memory appears to be the most *material* of our impulses. Its repetitions may be compared to the vibrations which pervade the inorganic world ; and there are occasions on which material substances behave as if they were influenced by it.

It is, however, the repetitions of sensory impressions of which we ordinarily think as ‘recollections.’ These impressions may relate to our own bodies, or to persons or things that are outside us. We have vivid recollections of physical pain and pleasure : and we remember our actions and courses of behaviour, as, for instance, that we rose early yesterday, and also our choices. We also, very fortunately, can recall courses of future behaviour upon which we have resolved : it is memory which enables us to keep promises and adhere to resolutions, whether formed by our own choice, or accepted enthematically from others. If they are firmly implanted, memory keeps them ever before us. Dominated by war fever we are reminded of our adversaries by the most ordinary experiences of every-day life. We also remember the mental creations which are termed conclusions, judgments or beliefs, as that fire burns, two and two make four, or that our favourite political leader is a reliable guide. These (as we shall see

when treating of Reason) are formed by connecting together properties, or characters, of persons, things or happenings—the properties being discerned, rightly or wrongly, by intelligence, after the same fashion as, in simple matters, we decide that a piece of music is a fugue, or that it has begun to rain. Intelligence is, in fact, a highly elaborated form of sensation, and we remember its results just as we remember what we have apprehended by our senses.

Our recollections, or repetitions, of sensory impressions that reach us from the outside, may be exceedingly vivid. We stare at an object, shut our eyes, and perceive it, reproduced in the brain and still before us. Speaking generally, this faculty of vivid recollection, or visualization, is peculiar to youth and weakens with advancing years. We lose it because we lose faith in its reality. But among uncultured people it appears to continue through life, and is a fruitful cause of illusion. It is not limited to the sense of sight. There are those to whom notes of music that are recollected sound almost as clearly as when they first struck the ear: the recollection of an odious taste or smell may be so vivid as to cause nausea.

The recollection of a sensory impression, whether of a happening within us, or outside us, brings with it a recollection of the feeling which attended the impression. We remember a toothache as a disagreeable incident, we recall a course of behaviour with pride or shame, a decision or conclusion with satisfaction or the reverse. So also with the repetitions of outside impressions. Each

of them, when it occurred, was noted with some amount—however small—of pleasure or pain, and when it is repeated in memory, this feeling recurs with it and may be expressed as forcibly as when it first touched us. We smile in our reveries—may, indeed, laugh aloud—blush, frown or may shed tears of sadness. We can recapture the delightfulness of orchards in flower, of Alpine pastures, and fresh spring days: we may even recall the enjoyment of a good dinner. Our triumphs exalt us again, our social successes, our acts of courage. And our failures depress us with feelings of shame and mortification which lose no vividness in repetition.

Upon this revival of feeling in memory depends the whole course of our reflective life, since it is by the recollections of feeling that we are influenced in our choices, whether to repeat or avoid an experience. Upon it also depends the continuance of our moods, our ideals and our habits. A mood is a feeling which is kept alive by recollections of the stimulus which arouses it. If something has irritated us we are in an angry mood so long as we recollect it. Moods play a part of immense importance to us, since they determine very largely our susceptibilities—the views, that is to say, which we take of happenings: if we are in good spirits we are not easily annoyed: if we are annoyed the veriest trifles disturb us. Pleasurable or painful moods, in fact, incline us respectively to pleasurable or painful emotions.

An ideal is a feeling of admiration which is nourished by memory. If one admires Handel's

music he may be said to idealize it. But we usually limit the use of this word to the admiration which particular conduct arouses in us. Thus do we idealize courage, self-restraint, mercy, gratitude. Habit, as we shall see in Chapter VIII, is an inclination to repeat conduct that has become agreeable by usage. We owe to memory the feeling of satisfaction which keeps us from leaving the track of our habitudes.

We can hardly be said to remember *impulses*, apart from the stimuli which aroused them or the conduct to which they led us. But memory may indirectly resuscitate an impulse by repeating the stimulus which originally excited it. Visions of food, thoughts of bed, will arouse a desire for eating or sleeping. The recollection of a slight may make us tremble with rage—indeed, so strongly may such an impulse be repeated that in the absence of the offender we may be irresistibly impelled to wreak our vengeance upon the innocent, or even upon the furniture.

How do we ‘acquire recollections’—that is to say, do we stamp impressions with sufficient force to ensure their repetition? Some may be ingrained in us at birth : this hypothesis, as we have seen, could explain the automatic functioning of our bodily organs, and the machine-like regularity of instincts which need no experience whatever to become efficient. But recollections which are acquired are implanted under the stress of iteration (practice) or of feeling. The complicated co-ordinated movements of the mouth and limbs, which run so easily, were learnt by us during childhood by laborious practice, stimulated partly

by the constructive, partly by the imitative impulse, or by our propensity to experiment, and in later life by the deliberate application, or attention, that results from pressure which one applies self-consciously to oneself. So were the words of our language 'committed to memory,' exactly as pieces of poetry may be learnt by heart. Iteration will make its mark upon us subconsciously. We may learn the Psalms without effort by hearing them repeated in church. Recollections so acquired can, however, hardly be summoned deliberately, although they will present themselves automatically in certain connections. Conscious attention can, it seems, only recall what it has itself acquired. The amount of iteration which is required in order to fix a recollection increases with advancing years: which of us has not envied the facile memorizing of childhood? But when sights and sounds are associated with a strong emotion, a single experience will suffice to implant them. Stirred by love or grief we grasp little particulars of dress and surroundings as tenaciously as if we had spent hours in studying them. If we recall such events as a declaration of love, an anguished parting, the hearing of news which was delightful or crushing, it comes back to us, not alone, but mounted as on a theatre stage in a scene of elaborate detail. Ordinarily, when we desire to fix an experience in the memory, iteration is the method we employ. But a boy who is caned for using false quantities will have emotional reasons for recollecting his errors.

What are the stimuli which arouse or start the

repetitions of memory? They may be (1) sensory impressions, or (2) other recollections, for memory may, so to speak, be stimulated by itself. Recollections may also be summoned by (3) emotion or feeling; and we may compel their appearance by (4) a deliberate effort of attention.

The connection between memory and sensory impressions is of the very closest. Indeed, our faculty of *perceptive* sight results from an intimate combination of sensory recollections with sensory impressions. Memory apart, sensation would mean nothing to us: it would merely involve us in a series of ever-strange kaleidoscopic experiences. There is no sensation that can be appreciated without recollections: there is no sensation which does not call up recollections. Unassisted by memory, the eyes would not enable us to see things in the sense of perceiving them. Our visual impressions of an object vary with our position: a round table, for instance, generally presents itself as a more or less elongated oval, and its colour will depend upon the light that falls upon it. Moreover, all objects appear to us in flat perspective. How do we recognize their real shapes and colours, and their solidity? By a rapid combination of previous recollections of sight and touch. Dissociated from memory, sight would be entirely misleading: to an animal which possessed sight without memory, the world would appear to be a mosaic of colours, bounded by lines which shifted with each change in its position. Such has been the experience of each one of us in early babyhood.

Memory and sensation are thus complementary processes, and it is often difficult to decide where one ends and the other begins. The images which we receive from both are alike in being creations of the brain: we term them 'sensations' when they arise from thrills that are transmitted by the sense organs, 'recollections' when they arise from the repetition of these thrills. In the one case we are affected by something which is outside us: in the other, not. An image will appear to us to be sensory or memorial, according as we believe that it is, or is not, caused by this outside influence. If we believe in ghosts we shall see them. And a memorial image may be as effective as a sensory image in arousing emotion. We may hate the absent as fiercely as the present. From one point of view memory is, indeed, more influential than sensation: perceptive sensation is impossible without recollections, but recollection is possible without sensation. We may, in fact, live in memory a life apart.

The recollections summoned by sensory impressions may be muscular repetitions which arrange themselves in sequences that fit in with the impressions of our senses. To a pianist, playing from notes, the sight of the notes and the practised movements of the fingers, form a continuous chain which passes without effort. In walking, our movements vary from moment to moment according to the difficulties which present themselves, each new difficulty, as it impresses us, evoking the appropriate muscular remembrance in the movement which has been associated with it in time past.

Language is a similar association of muscular remembrances with sensory impressions, or with sensory recollections. In its origin, speech is simply an expression of feeling—of like or dislike—to be classed with smiles, frowns or tears. Such are the first utterances of childhood. The first step in its development is the use of a particular sound to express the feeling caused by a particular impression. This is, in fact, the naming of things—the association of a muscular movement, as a symbol, with an impression or recollection, whereby we give to the impression or recollection a label which renders it visible or audible to others, as by the use of luminous paint we may render an object visible in the dark. Speech is a series of muscular remembrances which is interlaced with a series of sensory impressions or recollections, so as to form a single sequence with them, exactly as the movements of the pianist's fingers are interlaced with his impressions of the notes. The connection is so close that a run of speech may be subconsciously started by a current of recollections, as when one 'talks to himself.' But since, in our conscious life, we can, if we please, control our 'ideo-motor' activities, we can elect to speak or be silent. When we learn to write we associate with sensory recollections muscular remembrances which are of the fingers, instead of the throat and mouth.

When memory is stimulated by recollections it may repeat a long series of impressions, arranged in the same order as that in which they were implanted. So we may call to mind a passage of poetry, or play 'by heart' a piece of music,

each word or note summoning the one which follows it. But it may also introduce a series of changing pictures, each melting into its successor after the fashion of the dissolving views of a magic lantern. It appears that a stream of such recollections is constantly passing through the brain. So far as we are aware of them they appear to float, like clouds, before us, each one connected with its predecessor by some recollection or 'thought,' which is common to both. Thoughts of Paris may, for instance, be connected with thoughts of Napoleon by the link of the Invalides, or with thoughts of some friend by the link that we once met there. These groups of recollections—'memory chords,' as we may call them—generally awaken but little feeling, and we are hardly conscious of them: it is impossible to seize and scrutinize passing thoughts without deranging their natural progress. Chord, it seems, follows chord, each being called into existence by the sounding of one of its notes in the chord which preceded it. This note is repeated by memory and is accompanied by notes which have been chorded with it in the past. Thus the chord C E G may give rise to the chord G B D. So there passes through our brains a succession of harmonies, which is independent of any effort on our part, and, as our dreams testify, may not be altogether interrupted during sleep. This procession is sometimes styled the 'memory stream': in its automatic character it may be compared with our 'ideo-motor' activities.

But its course is interrupted should a feeling intervene, should a recollection be accompanied

with such an emotion as anger or love, or bring before us a choice or resolution—as, for instance, to write a letter. This has the effect of summoning only such chords as contain notes which are connected with the feeling, or arise out of the matter in hand. A vague series of chords, improvised by memory itself, is replaced by connected harmonies strung together by a theme. It is a procession of recollections, so selected and co-ordinated, that inspires us when speaking or writing: our words express the chords which present themselves. The procession may pass rapidly or haltingly: at one time recollections come to us as fast as we can express them: at other times the stream will not flow: we sit down to write a letter and ideas fail. It is a curious fact that the memory current may be hastened if we produce a parallel current of muscular remembrances—if we employ our muscles in the ‘ideo-motor’ activities of speaking, writing or walking. Some men can only think with a pen in their hands; and it is generally the case that thought is quickened by speaking. So in the course of a walk, or a ride, ideas will present themselves that would never have been conjured out of their retirement by dull persistency at a writing-table.

It is exceedingly difficult to grasp the processes of the mind. We can only comprehend them by likening them to things that we have actually seen or heard. We have compared recollections to chords: we may also compare them to clouds ordinarily floating vaguely across the sky, but driven in a definite line should a wind arise—

the wind that is caused by a purpose. Should one of those that pass be tinged with feeling—should it, so to speak, be charged with the electricity of an emotion—the line is violently disturbed. The emotion becomes a vortex towards which there set currents of recollections, repeating impressions that have been associated with it: and our memory may be likened to a sky across which clouds are hurried by the whirl of a cyclone.

Recollections that are summoned by the stress of an emotion we term ‘imaginative.’ So a hungry man may be tortured by visions of delicacies, a coward by visions of danger, one who is ambitious by visions of triumph. But recollections are most justly termed ‘imaginative’ when they are evoked by an impulse which has still to be described—the impulse to express feeling. Poetry, painting and music are the fruits of imaginative recollections that are evoked by strong feeling and assist us to express it.

In a poetic mood we may fancy that some light clouds about a sunset are as a flight of angels homing to the gates of Paradise. How comes it that clouds may suggest angels? What is the connection between the two? They are linked by a resemblance in quality or property. This introduces us to the *analysis* of recollections—the discernment of properties—which will be examined more fully when we treat of Reason. Under the influence of our intelligence, our recollections, like puzzle pictures, may be broken up into fragments, any one of which may be transferred from its original grouping and be used to

amplify another group of remembrances or impressions. Such are analogies between life and nature. A storm-driven sky illustrates the gloom of angry passion. The flight of the swallows gives a natural picture of man's swiftly turning thoughts. Without metaphor, language would be as cold as arithmetic: a metaphor illustrates or explains a thought by associating it with a recollection with which it has no actual connection. When we speak of the bitterness of grief, we link to an emotion an experience of taste, both having the quality of painfulness. This recombination of recollections is imaginative when used to express feeling: it is a process of reasoning when its purpose is the achievement of an impulse or the solution of a difficulty.

Pursuing our reflections, we shall realize that what we call 'thoughts' are, in fact, recollections—simple or recombined. It is a simple recollection if we think of our meeting with an interesting acquaintance at the club. It is a recombined recollection if we think how nice it would be to go round the British Museum with him. Into a mental picture of the Museum we insert, so to speak, a picture of our acquaintance. There are, of course, a variety of elements which we may recombine—elements of time, of condition, of necessity—which are also in themselves simple recollections. Thinking is, in fact, a process in which we solve puzzles by piecing together recollections: and we think correctly when the pieces fit.

Recollections may, then, be summoned by sensory impressions, by other recollections, or by

emotions. They may also be summoned by an effort of attention—by what is termed an ‘effort of will,’ as when, for instance, we endeavour to recall the address of a friend, or the botanical name of a flower. What is the nature of this process? If we are under the influence of an emotion—as of kindly affection, or curiosity—it is this emotion which actuates our effort, which expresses itself as our *will*. But we may set ourselves in cold blood to recollect something—for the mere purpose of exercising the memory. In this case we appear to be self-consciously constraining ourselves—‘forcing attention’ as the condition is termed—under an impulse of self-assertion which we direct against ourselves. Memory may respond to the call, but not very readily, and there are few to whom it has not occurred that a recollection which they were unable deliberately to summon, presents itself later on as a link in a subconscious train of remembrances.

It is, then, memory which gives dexterity to our limbs, ideas to our brains, language wherewith to express our ideas, and continuity to our purposes. It is an educative force raising us from the helplessness of infancy to such skill as no other animal can attain, however richly endowed with the intuitive recollections which have come to its species in the course of evolutionary progress. Memory should, accordingly, be classed as an impulse of Development, along with the impulses to practise, to imitate and to experiment—impulses which it resembles, moreover, in the continuity of its action. For it never rests, except

perhaps during sleep, and requires no awakening stimuli but those which it furnishes for itself.

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It is a truism that the memorial powers of different individuals are not of like efficiency—that some men enjoy good, others suffer from bad memories, and that generally speaking, the capacity of this impulse to repeat declines with advancing years. These differences may be ascribed to physical peculiarities in the texture of the brain: they resemble, in fact, such excellencies or deficiencies in structure as enable one man, for instance, to appreciate delicacies of sound or colour, and render another insensible to music or colour-blind. They are born with us, not acquired by us, and not infrequently pass from father to son. With however much practice, one man will not become so dexterous with his hands as another, just as he will not learn to repeat poetry so easily. Memorial efficiencies vary in their character: excellence of one kind may render a man a good cricketer, of other kinds may enable him to become a skilful violinist, or fluent orator. It appears, then, that the ‘talents’ of mankind are in great measure excellencies of memory: the accomplishments in which they bear fruit include nothing that is not remembered—is not, in fact, a repetition. In his choice of words the most eloquent of orators can hardly stray beyond the limits of the dictionary. The foundation of all art is conventional, and what we term ‘originality’ is not

creativeness, but the repetition of movements or words in new combinations, instead of in the combinations which use has rendered stereotyped. Genius appears when the novelty of a recombination is striking, when it is achieved by the perception of properties that in the past had remained unseen.

We may, then, inherit peculiarities which increase the efficiency of our memory. Can we inherit particular recollections such as those, for instance, which enable a bee to set about its duties from the moment it enters upon its active life? It seems so—in regard to the functioning of our internal organs; for the regular repetitive accuracy of their activities can hardly be accounted for on any other hypothesis. Is our external behaviour influenced by any such inherited recollections? How much truth is there in Wordsworth's lines?—

Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come.

We are confronted here with one of the most doubtful questions in psychology. It seems that we require no teaching to make the simple movements which are the primitive manifestations of an impulse—to reach out towards the pleasing, to draw back from the displeasing, to show anger by a blow, love by a caress. The primitive expressions of feeling are plainly instinctive: a baby need waste no time in learning to cry. We appear also to be born with recollections of holding ourselves upright, which urges an

infant, crawling on all fours, to stand up so soon as it gains the requisite strength. Moreover, we clearly inherit at birth some memories which give us an interest in our fellows—which are the foundation of the ‘social instinct,’ and are lacking in non-gregarious animals. What other recollections do we owe to our ancestors? Nursery influences apart, it is doubtful whether a doll is pleasing to a little girl, uninteresting to a little boy; and it is exceedingly difficult to assign anything in the manners of a child to inherited prepossession. Yet in some individuals, at all events, traces seem to remain of long past experiences. Persons afflicted with nervous disorders occasionally manifest the dislike of open spaces (agoraphobia) which makes the tiger and the deer so reluctant to break cover. Many have a horror of snakes, which seems to be instinctive. Some are uncomfortable if a cat is in the room. And the agonized delight with which little children ‘play at bears’ may be a vestige of the days when man disputed with the cave-bear the possession of his dwelling.

But whether or not we possess these relics of an ancient past, it seems indisputably clear that we do not inherit from our ancestors any recollections of the accomplishments which they acquired themselves in the course of their civilized, or semi-civilized, activities. The son of a skilful artisan is aided in his technical education by no inborn knowledge of his father’s craft. Men of quite uncultured races, when given the advantages of European education, readily acquire the manners and accomplishments of European culture. And

that civilized man may revert into savagery is shown by the rapidity with which the peoples of Italy and France relapsed into barbarism when the Roman Empire was overwhelmed by destructive German invasions. Civilization may be defined as the elaboration of recollections by the assistance of tools or machines under the pressure of desires. If recollections perish, civilization perishes also.

CHAPTER VII

FEELING

WE have discriminated between impulses and emotions, defining the latter as impulses which are brought before consciousness by the admixture of the element 'feeling.' What is the nature of this element? We must carefully distinguish it from *sensation*, or 'sensing.' For we may use our senses without feeling that we are using them. When we are walking, for instance, we should stumble at every irregularity of surface if we did not use our eyes and adjust our feet in accordance with their warnings. But we do not *feel*—or 'notice'—that we are doing this. If we did not 'sense' the movements of our lips in speaking, we could not direct them. But we are unconscious of their movements.

Feeling, it appears, is always pleasant or unpleasant—it is, in fact, identical with pleasure and pain. When we are conscious, we are always sensible, in however slight a degree, of something agreeable or disagreeable; and the more agreeable or disagreeable is the object of our attention, the keener does our consciousness become. We are acutely conscious when danger threatens, or when the object of our affection appears in sight. But, it may be objected, we *feel* when we are attentive, even to so uninteresting an object

as a bedroom wall paper, or when we move our limbs in purposeless exercise, although we are sensible of no definite pleasure or pain in these cases. There is, however, a certain element of the agreeable or disagreeable in nervous effort, akin to that which reaches us through our nerves of touch. There is a satisfaction in activity. We know very well that men of active and observant dispositions have a cheerfulness of their own.

Pleasure and pain are in essence like and dislike. One may not be disposed to give immediate assent to this. But a little reflection will make it plain that these feelings are respectively identical. We cannot feel pleased without liking, or feel pain without disliking. We must feel pleased when we like, and pained when we dislike. Like and dislike have many phases for which different terms are employed. Thus we like an orange, admire a sunset, are made happy by appreciation, love a friend, are irritated by pain, are made miserable by shame, hate an enemy, detest jealousy. These feelings have shades of difference which result from the nature of the stimulus that arouses them. But they all represent attraction or repulsion : they are, in fact, manifestations of the adoptings and rejectings of the impulses to seek and to avoid. The connection between the feelings of like and dislike, and the impulses of adopting and rejecting, is dramatically illustrated by the play of our features when we are thinking over a difficulty or making a choice. In this process recollections present themselves in succession for approval, but are rejected until

one appears which seems adequate to the occasion : this we adopt. So long as we are rejecting our brows are puckered by lines of unhappiness ; but they clear as soon as our course is to adopt. So also we may perceive, reflected in facial expression, the nature of the motive by which men are actuated in conforming their conduct to a moral standard. If they are moved by a fear of consequences—by an impulse to reject or avoid—they display the sourness of feature which we may notice in the criminal and in the puritan. If they are moved by vanity, kindness or obedience—by an impulse to adopt or seek—they illustrate cheerfulness, or at least serenity.

Pleasure and pain, like and dislike, are, then, the results not of bodily irritation or stimulation, but of the impulses to avoid the one and seek the other. A tooth-ache pains us, not in itself, but by arousing an impulse to shake it off, or get rid of it. If it was painful in itself, we should feel it during sleep. But when feeling is suppressed in sleep, the pain is suppressed also. So we do not feel hunger when greatly excited, or pain when under hypnotic influence—a fact of which Christian Science has taken advantage. Can we be said to ‘avoid,’ or ‘reject,’ a tooth-ache? We are certainly impelled to ‘shake it off’—or cure it ; and we may catch a trace of the impulse which makes a tiger claw and bite at a wound, and a lizard discard a lacerated tail. Indeed, as we have seen in Chapter II, the things which we seek or avoid are actually within and not outside us—nervous conditions of stimulation, exhilaration, irritation or depression, which are

brought about by things that are outside us, but would not be attributed by us to external objects were we dependent upon a single sense for our knowledge of them.

Feeling, as we have seen, does not necessarily attend upon the use of our senses. It is deadened by repetition, and, accordingly, we do not *feel* the continuous ticking of a clock, or the movements of our muscles in the ideo-motor processes of speaking or walking, unless by an effort of attention we awaken our susceptibility to them. The phenomena of dreams and delirium show that hosts of sights and sounds, which we do not feel, impress us sufficiently to create subconscious recollections. We may, indeed, adopt or reject without experiencing any feeling whatever. We blench from a sudden blow before we feel it. One who is asleep will shrink from a pin-prick without being aware of it: and during sleep we adjust ourselves from time to time in the easiest position. Hysterical patients will respond vigorously to stimuli, although they do not feel them. So also, when feeling is completely deadened by an anæsthetic, there may be movements of violent repulsion under the surgeon's knife, or the dentist's forceps. We ordinarily associate pain with irritation or depression, and pleasure with stimulation or exhilaration. But these conditions evidently do not cause pleasure and pain in themselves. Their direct effect is the stimulation of impulses to recoil from them or to court them, and with these impulses a feeling of like or dislike may come into existence.

What is this mysterious element which only

appears when the impulses of seeking and avoiding affect us, but is not part and parcel of them? We must permit ourselves to hazard a conjecture. Impulses, as we have seen, may plausibly be believed to be currents or vibrations. Feeling appears to be a secondary, or 'induced,' current that under certain circumstances is set up by the impulses to adopt and to reject. We cannot define the nature of these circumstances. They mark the difference between feeling and not-feeling, between consciousness and unconsciousness, between waking and sleep. We may suppose that the nerves of feeling—the wires, so to speak, of the secondary current—are located apart, so that their connection with the rest of the brain may be severed. This may be effected by the action of certain drugs, by a concussion of the brain, or by hypnotic influence. It comes about naturally when we fall asleep. But in this case the interruption may not be complete: we may feel the recollections which present themselves as dreams,—incoherently, but as vividly as we feel them when immersed in thought during our waking hours.

We have good proof of the actual existence of a current of feeling. For it manifests itself by producing special movements—those that are termed 'expressions of feeling'—which may reasonably be ascribed to currents or vibrations that pass along the nerves. Smiles and frowns are, respectively, the typical expressions of pleasure and pain, the one expanding into laughter, the other deepening into sobs, as the muscles of the throat and chest are touched by intensifying emotion. Trembling, blushes and tears are

usually connected with pain : but they are, in a measure, equivocal. So also are the movements of the throat and mouth which constitute language. These muscular expansions and contractions are not purely local ; they may affect the whole of the body. Dancing is an expression of pleasure, as well as a pleasurable form of exercise. Little children jump for joy, and cower when oppressed by grief. We are faintly conscious of movements within us, and have imagined that certain of our organs are centres of feeling. Thus courage is associated with the liver, compassion with the bowels. The heart in particular has been regarded as a fountain of sentiment. It may be uplifted or cast down : it radiates love that is suffused with tenderness ; and it has given shape to the most popular tokens of affection.

These movements become so closely associated with the feelings which they express, that by repeating them voluntarily we can artificially induce faint currents of pleasure or pain. It may seem absurd, but it is a fact, that by smiling we can dissipate something of the care which oppresses us, and by frowning we can, so to speak, transpose our mood into a minor key. 'Keep smiling' has been a favourite motto with our soldiers, and will be associated with a cheerfulness which all the dangers and discomforts of the trenches could not subdue.

Feeling, then, is impulsive : we are impelled to express it. And the expression of feeling plays a part of immense importance in our lives. Beginning with these simple movements and sounds, it is elaborated into the various phases

of Art. The ecstatic jumpings of childhood are systematized into dancing, cries of joy into song, ejaculations into words. Language, in its origin, is an expression of feeling. The first utterances of infancy are simply ejaculations of like or dislike. Words are formed when these ejaculations are uttered in particular sounds for particular objects: they then become symbols of these objects, and, becoming implanted in us as muscular remembrances, they flow in a current alongside the current of impressions or recollections which they express, as the fingers of a pianist follow the notes of his score. So elaborated, language becomes a means of expressing impulse as well as feeling: we may hurt or caress with the tongue as effectively as with our hands. But its original use was to express like or dislike; and if we analyse the speeches of many public orators, we shall find little else but the expression of these feelings in various degrees of dexterity.

The impulses to adopt and to reject, from which feeling appears to be derived, may affect us by themselves—independently of other impulses; or they may act, so to speak, side by side with impulses of function, both being aroused by certain bodily conditions which may stimulate them jointly into activity. Thus the cell-exhaustion which excites the impulses to take food or drink, or to rest, appears also to excite an impulse to recoil which generates the disagreeable feelings of hunger, thirst and fatigue. We may be moved to eat, or to rest, without experiencing these feelings: the impulses of function, that is to say, can affect us independently of those to seek and

to avoid. Hunger may, for instance, be deadened by anxiety or grief: in such a condition we eat 'mechanically.' In the same fashion, the replenishment caused by food and drink arouses an impulse to approach, generating a feeling of satisfaction, which is quite distinct from the feeling that we may derive from any particular food or drink taken by us. This is liking, pure and simple—the result of the impulse to adopt acting independently of other impulses. The feeling may, indeed, be painful, as when the food is displeasing: but we appease our hunger with it nevertheless. Hunger may be satisfied by eating earth: there is a tribe of Indians who are driven by extreme poverty to practise this economy. So the satisfaction of restfulness after fatigue is distinct from the pleasure we derive from the luxury of bed: we may enjoy it on the bare earth. We are, then, keenly aware of the pressure of our functional impulses upon us, since the stimuli which arouse them also arouse pleasure and pain. We have no doubt of their driving power, quite apart from the conduct into which we are urged by them. But we have no such intimation of the existence of our impulses of development—those to construct, to imitate and to venture. Their action arouses no seeking or avoiding, and we are unconscious of their influence, except in so far as it may be inferred by observation. The 'derived' impulses, on the other hand, force themselves upon our attention, since they are developments of the impulses to adopt and to reject, and attraction or repulsion is of their essence.

A current of feeling which is arrested may not be suppressed, but reversed. We arrest hunger by taking food : its pain becomes the pleasure of satisfaction. So also with all the pains of functional cravings : they become pleasures when the cravings are arrested. In like fashion, if the pleasure of adopting (or seeking) is arrested, it becomes the pain of disappointment. Dislike which is relieved is a real pleasure, sufficiently keen to induce us to court pain which we know to be reversible, as, for instance, the sadness of a tragedy, enjoyable because unreal. The effects of this reversal are particularly striking upon the feelings which accompany the derived impulses. Fear that is arrested is transformed into abounding relief ; antipathy which is proved to be baseless melts into kindness. The triumph of self-assertion that is mortified becomes the agony of humiliation, and the joy of love which is denied by separation or by death—or is repudiated by its object—is converted into sorrow. These reversed feelings are clearly the product of the original impulse : they are continuations of the feeling which arose with the impulse, not new developments. For, if we were not stirred by self-assertion, we should not feel shame ; nor would bereavement cause us sorrow had we not felt affection.

We must clearly distinguish these reversals of feeling from the effects of the impulse to change—from the incidents which we attribute to ‘revulsion.’ In this case we are concerned not with feeling, but with conduct : the change is shown by a revolution in behaviour, not merely by a trans-

formation in the expression of the features. We are driven to change by a propensity which we feel as ennui, or surfeit. This shows itself very simply in the boredom which may overcome us towards the end of a long concert: but in some of its phases it produces catastrophic changes. Temptations, once irresistible, arouse disgust, and we may repent, in sackcloth and ashes, of conduct which we enjoyed without a qualm.

Our theory of feeling attributes all phases of pleasure and pain to a single origin—to the action of impulsive tendencies to adopt or to reject. But pleasures and pains are of very different qualities. The pleasure given by chocolate, for instance, appears to have little in common with that of vanity, or with an enjoyment of the ludicrous: the pain of disgust seems far apart from that of sorrow. In the one case we are moved simply and directly through our senses: in the other the senses afford us, it is true, initial impressions, but our pleasure or pain results not from these impressions, but from a mental appreciation of their significance. We are gratified by the flavour of chocolate when we taste it. But to enjoy the pleasure of vanity there must be a further process. We should not, perhaps, be vain unless our senses informed us that there was someone to whom we could display ourselves. But we should not experience the emotion, did we not apprehend that the person was a fit subject for this display. When we are delighted by the ludicrous we have received impressions through the senses. But it is not these impressions which we enjoy: our pleasure results from a mental con-

dition that we detect otherwise than by the senses. We have already surmised that this faculty of inward apprehension, or perception, is that by which we perceive our recollections. In their case no sensory impressions reach us : but we are, nevertheless, aware of them. We may term this faculty 'intelligence.' It may be perhaps regarded as a refinement of sensation, for, as already explained, all sensation really takes place in the brain. When we desire an orange we are moved, not by the orange, but by our apprehension of it. The difference in quality between these two classes of feelings may, then, be ascribed to the effect of intelligence, and we must distinguish between appreciation through the senses and appreciation through the intelligence. From the former arise the pleasures and pains which we ordinarily assign to the senses : from the latter those which we speak of as 'mental.' But no sharp line can be drawn between the two : intelligence enters into our appreciation of some sensuous impressions, such as that of colour, form and music. One class of feelings has been evolved from the other, and our distinction is one of degree only.

These discriminations may be tabulated as on the page over-leaf. The analysis may appear to be almost grotesquely complicated. But we must not expect simplicity in a subject which has exercised intelligence since the first beginnings of speculative thought.

Before, however, proceeding with our review of pleasures and pains, we must turn our attention again to a peculiarity of feeling which brings it into harness, so to speak, for the regulation of

STIMULI.	FEELINGS.	
	PRIMARY.	REVERSED.
<i>Sensory</i> appreciations arousing an im- pulse to adopt or to reject—		
— conjointly with im- pulses of function	The pains of hunger, thirst, lust, fati- gue and satiety	The pleasures of satisfaction
— in satisfying im- pulses of function	The pleasures of food, drink, lust, means of rest, and variety	The pains of disappoint- ment
— independently of impulses of function	{ The liking for exer- cise, for certain touches and scents, for intoxicants and drugs, and for beauty, in sight and sound The dislike of physi- cal pain, of cer- tain touches and scents, of ugliness and discord	The pains of disappoint- ment The pleasures of relief
<i>Intelligent</i> apprecia- tions arousing an impulse to adopt or to reject—		
— simply or indepen- dently of other im- pulses	{ The enjoyment of the 'heroic' and the dexterous The aversion for the cowardly, the antipathetic and the awkward	The pains of disappoint- ment The pleasures of reassur- ment
— in the form of derived impulses	{ The pains of fear ¹ and antipathy in their various forms The pleasures of self-assertion and sympathy in their various forms The pain and plea- sure of the mys- terious	The pleasures of relief The pains of shame, humil- iation, sorrow and remorse
— conjointly with the impulse towards change	The pain of ennui	The pleasure of amusement, and of the ludicrous

¹ Some of the most elementary phases of fear (and curiosity) appear to be stimulated by *sensory* appreciations: this is to be expected since fear is the most primitive of the derived impulses.

behaviour. Feeling which has once been aroused by adopting or rejecting may be repeated by memory, and we shape our conduct in great measure by our recollections of it. In some mysterious fashion feeling electrifies our impressions of persons, things or conditions which we adopt or reject, and of the conduct which followed our adopting or rejecting, so that, when we recall them, they come to us charged with feelings of pleasure or pain. Thus, if we have eaten a dish with pleasure, we have agreeable recollections of it : if a man has offended us, we remember him with dislike : if we have purchased flowers for a lady whom we admire, the incident, as well as the lady, afford us pleasant reminiscences. The feelings that are repeated in this manner are certainly less poignant than the original emotions : we may think of them as reflections of emotions and may term them 'sentiments.' But their effect upon our life is immense. They are the objects of choice, which tempt us to incline one way or the other. Themselves the product of seekings and avoidings, they become the stimuli to seekings and avoidings of a more complicated nature. It may be observed that pleasurable recollections affect our choices more potently than those which are painful. For the latter are less persistent. They are not attractive : we do not dwell upon them and they fade more rapidly. So, as is often noticed, the recollections of travel may be more agreeable than its actual experiences. We are, accordingly, more likely to repeat that which we have enjoyed than to avoid that which has proved to be injurious.

The Pleasures and Pains of Sensory Appreciations

Taste and touch appear to be the most elementary of our senses—the detection of food and of physical stimulants and irritants. Tactile irritation gives pain its primary meanings: lust in some languages is synonymous with pleasure. We feel pain internally as well as on the surface of our bodies: the discomfort of hunger, of fatigue and satiety are seemingly tactile sensations: so also is the satisfaction which proceeds from their appeasement. The sense of touch has still more subtle developments. We must ascribe to it the pleasure which we derive from actively employing our nerves and muscles—the enjoyment of exercise, of perception and of speculation in themselves. For we are sensible of all these processes; and the nerves which introduce them to sensation must be of the kind which we ordinarily class as tactile.

In satisfying hunger and thirst there is great sensory enjoyment, quite apart from the relief of irritant hunger and thirst. Man's tastes are not limited, like those of the brutes, to foods and drinks which provide nourishment. By usage, or adoption, he has added to his dietary a vast number of substances the sole use of which is to give pleasure. He has so elaborated the simple enjoyment of eating and drinking that for many persons it becomes life's chief attraction: they live to eat; and it is interesting to observe how completely this pleasure dominates all other interests when men relapse into the savagery of war. To the soldier in the trenches his meals

become the pivot upon which the day turns : an army must be well fed in order to respond cheerfully to the general's orders, unless, indeed, the men are fired by religious or patriotic ideals into a glow of self-sacrificing fervour. In conditions of long-drawn war, men's tastes revert to the simplest forms, and (as letters from the front have amply testified) the greatest hardships may be alleviated by presents of cake and sweetmeats. The pleasure that is given by intoxicants, narcotics, tobacco, tea and coffee, is of a mixed description. It lies partly in their taste: this, however, must be acquired, illustrating our ability to create a liking for this or that by persistently inclining ourselves towards it. They have also the effect of physically stimulating the nerves, or in the case of tea and coffee, of relieving the irritation which is caused by wasting tissue—the irritation of fatigue. But it is an additional charm of alcohol, narcotics and tobacco, that they blunt the faculties of sensation and intelligence, and consequently diminish our sensibility to the irritations of choice. For we choose by carefully balancing recollections of rival pleasures and pains, and the less acute is our appreciation of them the less complicated do the balancings become. Choice is a painful process, since it involves the rejection of numerous recollections before we finally decide to adopt one of them, and anything which simplifies choice is accordingly pleasurable. Under the influence of alcohol we are swayed by impulse, not by choice. *In vino veritas*. In a less degree this is also the effect of tobacco. It diminishes sensibility to

worrying possibilities, and enables us to take a philosophic view of life.

It is remarkable that in man the sense of smell has become¹ of such unimportance. Judging from comparative anatomy, it is vital to the life of the lower vertebrates: amongst fishes and reptiles the brain throws out an olfactory lobe which is relatively of enormous size. With an animal so high in the scale as a dog, smell is a leading guide of conduct, and appears to be more useful than sight for identifying objects. The pleasures of scent affect man but little: there are few to whom the charms of beauty are sensibly increased by perfume.

Civilization has left the pleasures of touch simple and unelaborated, and has done little to embellish the pleasures of smell. Those of taste have developed, and have been developed by, the art of cooking. But these refinements are as nothing compared with the extraordinary elaborations which have raised from the pleasures of sight and hearing the complicated structure of creative and appreciative Art.

What is Beauty in sight and in sound? Between it and ugliness there appears to be an obvious gulf: but when we attempt to define its position, we find that it is not a boundary, but a shadow, which shifts as the course of fashion changes. A beautiful European woman will attract all men, of whatever race: but she appears to be the only common measure of beauty. The sun, moon and stars, the flame of fire, a fresh

¹ It is curious that in French *feeling* should be synonymous with *smelling*.

spring day, would appear to be fundamentally attractive. But they leave vast numbers of men quite unmoved. Savage man has the passion of the bower bird for glaring colours: he loves to adorn his body with them, and has also a liking for decorations the patterns of which repeat themselves in, so to speak, a rhythmical series. Not only does he work these patterns into clothes and implements: he tattoos his body with them. The taste for elaborate decoration subsists with advancing culture—sometimes, indeed, to the prejudice of Art: but in regard to colour there comes a change of view. Cultured taste dislikes violent contrasts, will tolerate brilliant hues only when they harmonize, sometimes, indeed, shows a preference for the subdued tints which, we may suppose, appeal to the feelings of a nightingale. With regard to beauty of form, we are left in no doubt by modern sculpture galleries that the attractiveness of the female figure survives all revolutions in Art. But the ‘futurist’ and ‘cubist’ schools of painting have presented for admiration designs which to the unaccustomed eye are frankly repellent. The features of Nature which we are most likely to admire, are those of our customary surroundings: the Arab is attracted by the desert, the Swiss by his mountains, the sailor by the sea; and it is only of recent years that we have learnt to appreciate scenery which is not that of our homeland. It appears, then, that the number of objects which are essentially beautiful, or ugly, is comparatively few, and that most of the likes and dislikes, upon which Art is built up,

are the result of suggestion or of habit—that is to say, are produced by enthematism or by usage.

In sound savage man seems to appreciate rhythm more than tone. The drum is his favourite instrument, and he elaborates rhythmical complexities which can hardly be surpassed by cultured Art. The tunes that delight him are generally crude. Music has been revolutionized by the discovery of the concordant intervals. These are connected by numerical relations, and should have placed the canons of harmony beyond the reach of the currents of fashion. But fashion has not respected them, and the most recent developments of modern music make free use of discords which to our fathers would have seemed utterly repulsive.

The Pleasures and Pains of Intelligent Appreciations

We are pleased by 'the heroic'—that is to say, by contemplating the effects of the derived impulses—the impulses that are emotional *par excellence*. We apprehend them by the use of intelligence. For our pleasure results, not from impressions of conduct, but from appreciation of the *meaning* of the conduct, and sensation unassisted by intelligence could give us the former only. Representations of fear or antipathy may please us because the dislike which they arouse can be reversed, and becomes the pleasure of relief. They are, after all, only 'make believe,' and do not affect us personally. Our dislike may

be reversed artificially: Shakespeare with consummate skill produces this effect by his comic interludes. Few, however, can bear a novel or play to end unhappily. Self-assertion and sympathy are naturally delightful in themselves, because they are associated in experience with abounding pleasure. The one is the essence of epic, the other of lyric poetry. We feel admiring pleasure when, gazing at pictures or sculptures, absorbed in poetry or romances, entranced at a theatre or cinematograph, we identify¹ and follow the course of emotions which might be our own. Their beauty is eternal because they do not change, however much taste in decoration—as to form or colour—may vary. They are the theme which Art employs whenever it rises above mere dexterity.

Art is, however, tempted to limit its ambitions to the dexterous, since this suffices to obtain it an ample reward. The dexterities of others are greatly admired by us, since we remember the pleasure with which we exercise such as we have ourselves acquired. We appreciate the technique of a violinist quite apart from the music which he renders, and we may observe at concerts that brilliance or rapidity of execution evokes more applause than the most vivid expression of feeling. The crowds which are drawn together

¹ We must distinguish between admiration and the enthe-matic influence to which we are subject when we are "carried away" by the performance and actually experience the impulses which are being counterfereted for our entertainment. It has happened that an audience has stormed the stage, and violently assaulted the villain of the piece. This, however, illustrates the force of suggestion, not the feelings which are aroused by beauty or ugliness.

by cricket and football matches bear witness to the reality of this enjoyment. Man's history has been affected very momentarily by his appreciation of the dexterous. For it renders him amenable to eloquence, and induces him to accept skill in speech as the distinctive qualification of those who should be his leaders. Speech may eloquently expound the conclusions of reason : but it may also be merely an artistic expression of likes and dislikes, and in this case must be ranked with such dexterities as music and dancing. Wisdom is the art of foreseeing the future, and this is no more likely to be possessed by a skilful orator than by a talented musician. Unfortunately for our democracy, wisdom does not attract the admiration of the crowd. The prophet excites dislike rather than respect, since his forebodings are seldom in accord with popular hopes ; and if he is honoured, it is not until his death silences the voice of jealousy. His ordinary recompense is to be stoned. We admire foresight only when it excites our wonder by posing as miraculous. Men and women will crowd to the consulting-room of a fashionable crystal-gazer ; and, however wise a statesman may be, if he does not possess attractive accomplishments, he must shroud himself in an air of oracular mystery in order to gain the suffrages of the multitude.

We pass to the pleasures and pains which accompany the *derived* impulses. These impulses, we have concluded, are phases of adopting and rejecting (or of seeking and avoiding) which have become elaborated in the course of evolution, and are aroused, not by sensory impressions, in

themselves, but by the meaning which is given to certain impressions by intelligence. Some elemental phases of fear and curiosity must perhaps be excepted: they can be excited directly by simple sensations of sight or sound. But, for the rest, sensory impressions do not arouse these impulses unless they are interpreted by an appreciation of their properties.

Fear is an extreme phase of repulsion, and its pain is, perhaps, the most intense that man can suffer. It renders its victims indifferent to any other afflictions. The various phases of antipathy all express *avoiding*, and the pain which they arouse marks itself unmistakably upon the features. That self-assertiveness contains the element of *seeking* is not quite so clear: but it obviously involves the approaching of comparison. Its pleasure is one of the very strongest that we can experience, and it infuses its influence into our behaviour during most hours of our lives. Vanity is so insistent an emotion as to have gained a peculiar name for the pleasure which accompanies it—the pleasure of approbation, which when reversed becomes the pain of disapproval. The pleasure of sympathy is more easily connected with adoption or seeking: we are clearly impelled to draw near the objects of our veneration and affection. It may give to life the purest and most enduring happiness. But love may be reversed into sorrow, as self-assertion into shame. By denial, the pleasures of self-assertion or sympathy are transmuted into pains: attraction is reversed into repulsion. Remorse is popularly supposed to

originate in misdeeds. But a wrongdoer would feel no remorse was he not moved by worthy ambitions: his depression is the result of his aspirations, not of his viciousness. So, again, sorrow for the absence or loss of a friend would not touch one who had no affection for him. Pain in an emotion may similarly be reversed into pleasure. To have successfully escaped converts fear into contentment. We are immensely relieved, should we discover that we have been frightened by a false alarm, or that we have been causelessly depressed by anger or jealousy. This feeling in many cases greatly enhances our delight in the ludicrous.

Under the influence of self-consciousness we gain a curious pleasure from self-assertion that is directed against ourselves. It is agreeable to antagonize oneself—to deny oneself—as it is agreeable to contend with another. We can thus obtain a pleasure which may rival, even out-rival—the pleasure of self-indulgence. Self-denial accordingly attracts us, and we have a force to set against the charms of sensuous pleasure. If we fail in our self-antagonism we experience shame or remorse, as keenly as if we had failed unworthily against another. We can, moreover, obtain from ourselves the pleasure of obedience. We obey ourselves when we are the servants of Duty—to be figured, not as the ‘stern Daughter of the Voice of God,’ but as Euphrosyne, irradiating hearts that might otherwise be joyless.¹ The conscientiousness that is accompanied by gloomi-

¹ The evolution of these pleasures of self-consciousness will be discussed more particularly in Chapter XII.

ness of feature and acidity of disposition proceeds, not from a sense of duty, but from fear.

The mysterious possesses a strange attraction. Of what nature is the pleasure which a ghost story affords? Apparently it springs from a rapid alternation of the timidity and the curiosity with which we instinctively regard the new or the strange—from the rising and falling of two contrary ‘derived’ impulses. Timidity is painful: but it gives pleasure when it is relieved by the conviction that the alarming incidents of the tale do not really affect us. Curiosity gives pleasure, which is reinforced by the fact that it replaces pain. Our frame of mind may be compared with that of little children who are ‘playing at bears’: they are alternately terrified and delighted: screams and laughter follow one upon the other in rapid succession. The pleasure of the mysterious is, then, substantially that of reassurement. Of those whom a ghost story delights, few would venture actually to encounter its incidents—to explore, for instance, a churchyard at night. They are pleased because, in the midst of apprehensions, they feel themselves to be safe.

The pleasure which we derive from amusements, and from the ludicrous, is also apparently that of relief—relief, not from timidity or nervousness, but from the ennui—the mental satiety—to which both memory and experience contribute. We live each day twice over, once in expectation—that is to say (as we may apprehend by a little introspection) in memory thrown forward into the future—and again in experience; and the

more nearly experience coincides with expectation, the more oppressive becomes the feeling of satiety—of boredom—which banishes cheerfulness and overclouds our features. Ennui is the natural product of the regularity of civilized life, and is a more pervasive infliction than is generally supposed. Judging by the faces of those who pass us in the streets, life's monotony is a burden to most of them. Any change, any occurrence that breaks the monotonous tenor of thought and conduct, affords us pleasurable relief, and may prevent the catastrophic onset of the impulse of revulsion—a consideration which Puritanism overlooks.

To many of these occurrences we give the name of 'amusements,' and it will be remarked that it is essential, for an occurrence to be amusing, that its events should not follow the ordered regularity of every-day life—that it should include an element of luck or chance. Amusements may afford other interests. In watching a football match we may be stirred by emulation: in playing cricket, or in dancing, the exercise gives us pleasure: at the theatre we are attracted by beauty of appearance or character, and may, moreover, experience a host of reflected emotions or sentiments. But the essential element is the relief from routine; and, when an amusement becomes habitual, it commences to bore us.

Of similar origin may be our appreciation of the ludicrous, which is, in fact, the relief which is given by the unexpected. Anything that is unusual pleases us, unless, indeed, it should arouse such serious emotions as suspicion, fear,

anger or pity. We smile at the confusion occasioned in a railway carriage by a sudden jerk of the train, at trifling misadventures, at children with 'grown-up' manners, at adults who behave like children, at want of connection between thought and language, or between the ideas which commence and end a sentence. Our pleasure is vastly increased if the effect of the unanticipated is to allay lurking emotions of fear, suspicion or jealousy, or to recall feelings that are associated with the indecent. We are delighted by a caricature which exhibits an enemy in a position that is at once eccentric and humiliating: good humour may be restored to quarrelsome conversation by a *visqué* anecdote. But these are embellishments. The essential charm of the ludicrous is an unexpectedness which dissipates ennui, and gives some relief from the tiresome regularity of every-day life.

We have still to touch upon the pleasure of hope and the pain of despair. These are feelings which are produced by the recollections of stimuli and of the feelings that these stimuli arouse. But, it will be objected, hope and despair are connected with the future, not with the past. All that we know of the future is gathered from the past: our ability to foresee the one depends upon our knowledge of the other: the future is a chain of recollections thrown forward in advance, as the light of a lamp is thrown forward by a reflector. This curious development of memory will be discussed in Chapter X. Hope and despair only come to us when we are moved by a specific emotion: they represent the exhilaration and

depression which are caused respectively by recollections (or realizations) of success and failure. We shall be exhilarated by meeting a friend : recollections come to us of the chain of events which will enable us to do so : hope is the exhilaration which is produced by these recollections. On the other hand, if our recollections show that the meeting will be impossible we experience a reversal, which is despair. It follows that the precise character of these feelings depends upon the character of the exhilaration or revulsion which they represent. If we hope to conquer, our exhilaration will be that of emulation : if to assist a friend, it will be that of sympathy. The despair with which we remember the impossibility of success will be the reversal of emulation in the one case, and of sympathy in the other.

CHAPTER VIII

CHOICE, RESOLUTION AND HABIT

WHEN we feel and reflect before acting we say that our behaviour is directed by 'choice.' Feeling is essential: there is no choice in such unemotional actions as the movement of our lips in speaking. Reflection is essential: we do not choose when we are swept away by strong impulses of love or jealousy. Reflection is the balancing of recollections. Choice, accordingly, is an inclination towards or away from pleasurable or painful recollections. Without recollections choice is impossible. We do not *choose* a strange dish on a restaurant bill of fare: we can only make trial of it. Choice is, then, entirely dependent upon memory. It is a development of the impulses to seek and avoid, which enables us to bring recollections into account. There may, accordingly, be no element of free-will in choosing. The process is, in reality, a hesitating comparison of recollections, ending in the mastery of the most pressing of, it may be, several inclinations. It results in the adoption of the course to which we are finally urged by our likes and dislikes—by the impulses to seek pleasure and avoid pain. And, since these impulses are instinctive, choice is instinctive also. But, except in cases of great simplicity, it needs

the assistance of reason in order to appreciate and weigh the possible consequences of various alternatives.

The objects of choice are the recollections¹ of things or methods of conduct, which have become tinged with feeling by previous experiences. If we have eaten an apple with enjoyment, the recollection of it has become pleasurable. If we have run away in fear, or have spoken in anger, these movements are associated with pain. Our methods of conduct, as we shall see, are purely artificial, apart from the simple primitive movements whereby we manifest impulses or express feeling: recollections of them present themselves to us as recollections of things that are outside ourselves, and we can choose between them exactly as we can choose between objects that are before our senses.

In choosing methods of conduct we evidently determine the course of our behaviour. That is to say, apart from the primitive movements of instinct, and of subconscious imitation and experiment, choice regulates the actions of our external life. Unreflective impulses may retain their hold over us: we may experience a rush of anger and be unable to check a trembling, a clenching of the hands. But we choose how to enforce our anger, and in some measure, indeed, we may choose whether to behave angrily or not. Moreover, since by repressing manifestations of anger

¹ We shall see in the next chapter that these recollections may be not simple repetitions, but combinations of recollections, such as present themselves when we are thinking over plans for the future, ways of expressing our feelings, or the solution of riddles that are put to us by curiosity

we may diminish our susceptibility to this emotion, choice may influence, not only conduct, but impulse. Unless it takes a 'sporting' complexion, choice must not, however, be mistaken for 'free-will.' If we master ourselves it is because control is associated with pleasanter recollections than is the self-abandonment of passion.

Industry consists of methods of conduct, and it is by choice that man becomes industrious. There is within him an impulse to construct which concerns itself not only with the building up of the body, but with the recombining of recollections so as to fashion new 'ideas' out of the repetitions of old impressions. But this propensity does not urge him to exercise his hands in any of the regular forms of labour. For these processes are all artificial. No one is born a violinist or a carpenter, and the methods of playing upon strings, and of carpentry, vary from country to country, and from age to age. We devote ourselves to any one of these practices of industry by imitation, by experiment, or by choice—by subconscious imitation and experiment during the early days of childhood, and by choice, as recollections accumulate with advancing years. But choice supersedes imitation and experiment only by adopting them. For we may *choose* to imitate or to experiment, that is to say, we may incline towards imitative or 'sporting' conduct, because it has become agreeable in recollection.

Our powers of choice are narrowly limited. We cannot choose things or methods of conduct which are distasteful, unless their painfulness is out-

balanced by pleasure, as when we go to a dentist to rid ourselves of toothache. We can only choose things that have been presented to our senses. We cannot, accordingly, choose impulses, as to be in love, to be afraid, or to be angry. But incidentally choice enables us to select the motives, as well as the methods of our conduct, since the feelings which have been associated with the methods in the past, and are reproduced in memory along with them, are the pleasures to which our choice inclines. If we choose to make a present in order to feel a glow of kindly satisfaction, or to snub another in order to maintain our feeling of dignity, we have acted as if we were swayed by the impulses of kindness or self-assertiveness. Choice may, then, be substituted for an emotional impulse, as a guide of conduct—even for an impulse of function: we are then moved, not by these impulses, but by the feelings which have accompanied them in the past—in fact, by the shadows of impulses instead of by the impulses themselves. Thus we may arrange to go to bed at a certain hour because we recollect the pain of fatigue, and are impelled to avoid it.

The likes and dislikes which we balance in the process of choice are, we have seen, in great measure artificial. They originated, in fact, as the consequences, not the causes of movements of attraction and repulsion. Our behaviour towards first impressions—toward the unknown—is determined by imitation, or experiment, and the genealogy of the process of choosing may in part be carried back to these propensities. The first problems of infancy are resolved by mimicry

or by trial: these involve adoption or rejection, and the uprising of like or dislike follows. Feelings may, then, be generated by conduct that is without feeling. Venturing and imitating, adopting, liking, choosing: these are the processes by which man has civilized the simple animal life from which he has developed; they mark the mental progress of each of us from babyhood to maturity.

When likes and dislikes have arisen, and under their influence the process of conscious choice commences, we may enhance the power of these acquired tastes by yielding to them—each act of choice, that is to say, increases our subjection, our susceptibility, to the taste which determined our inclination. We know that a liking for drink, or for golf, may harden into an irresistible fascination. So also with feelings of pleasure and pain that are instinctive, that are inborn in us. Each time that we yield to one of them, by adopting it as a determinant of a choice, we increase our susceptibility to the stimulus with which it is associated. If we *choose* to rest, we increase our susceptibility to fatigue: if we deliberately avoid a particular pain, its aspect becomes more formidable. By choosing to commit particular acts of courage, or of cruelty, we actually improve or injure our disposition by increasing our susceptibility to the influence of particular stimuli which may arouse these impulses.

As we all have felt, choice is a disagreeable process, and we are generally glad to free ourselves from its agitations by taking advice—that is to say, by adopting the suggestions of another. It is unpleasant because it involves rejection.

When we are unable to 'make up our mind' we are in the condition of rejecting the various recollections which occur to us. A person in this state of hesitation shows his distress in his features. Our pain becomes pleasure when we finally adopt a course of action. But we pay a price for this pleasure in the pain of deliberating; and it seems that the attractiveness of alcohol, drugs and tobacco is due in part to their efforts in emancipating us from the hesitations of choice. By blunting our perspicacity they incapacitate us from appreciating the *pros* and *cons* of a situation, and throw us back upon the simple directions of instinctive desire.

The more numerous and complicated are our recollections, the larger will be the part played by choice in the regulation of our lives. Its sphere accordingly increases with the complexities of civilization. When we characterize savage peoples as 'children of nature' we recognize that they are swayed more generally than ourselves by unhesitating impulses, and spend less time in balancing recollections of feelings. It is, then, not surprising that philosophers of the Utilitarian school, whose speculations have, as a rule, been based upon knowledge of their own social conditions, should have imagined that choice was the only determinant of conduct. This belief is untenable. For the recollections upon which choice is based would have no existence for us had we not actually experienced the instinctive impulses upon which they attend. And when these impulses arise, and we are storm-driven by passion, the process of choice fails us: we act directly and

unhesitatingly. Emotions of fear, anger or pity, may be so strong as to render any balancing of pleasure and pain out of the question: we 'let ourselves go' in transports of love or jealousy. And when we are acting with our eyes upon consequences we may find that some force is pulling against us—the force called 'temptation'—which is, in fact, an impulse which we may defeat, but cannot suppress. Could we by choice avoid the pain of fear, anger or jealousy, who would submit to these impulses? Moreover, the motives of choice are distinguished by their coldness from the hot gushes in which emotional impulse wells up. How passionless is calculated courage or kindness compared with the spontaneous emotions!

So, when we deliberately choose to imitate (or to be persuaded by) another, our imitative conduct will not have the overwhelming force which can lead individuals and nations to attempt the impossible: it will not be as the faith which can remove mountains. Imitation is capable of this when it is subconscious, and is reinforced by admiration or respect for the person who is accepted as the exemplar. It is, then, not choice but spontaneous impulse, and between it and choice there is the contrast which we perceive between Faith and Reason. Faith will make martyrs of those who would be terrorized out of convictions that were chosen. Choice, we may take it, is the ideal of a free democracy, whereas a people under monarchical rule are more generally actuated by the involuntary imitation which is directed by loyalty. This reflection will enable us to understand why democracies are less

effective than monarchies for purpose of war—and also, it may be, for the welfare of their citizens. For conduct that is chosen is subject to a number of previous choices, whereas an impulse goes straight to its purpose. If temperance is to be enforced by loyalty no considerations of detail will stand in the way: if its enforcement is chosen it will be hedged round by other choices as, for instance, that of dealing gently with vested interests. This contrast has been strikingly illustrated by the British and German methods of making war: the German simplicity of purpose entirely subordinates means to the end in view; whereas the British, in choosing to fight, have also chosen to fight, not only without violating rules of morality, but also without derogating from their political ideals. There have, indeed, been some who have maintained that victory is not worth winning if it involves the abandonment of voluntary service.

Choice affords a basis for morality of the calculated sort, for virtue which shrinks from the penalties of vice, or hankers for the pleasure of being approved by others or by self. But as an arbiter of conduct, we must feel that it is inferior to such sympathetic impulses as affection, gratitude or pity: we admire these impulses far more than calculated motives, however prudent: we term them ‘goodness of heart,’ and we must regret that, in educating the young, choice, under the name of ‘reason,’ is so often invoked as the securest guide of behaviour.

Resolution

When we choose in advance we are said to 'form a resolution': by an effort of memory we throw into the future the action to which we have inclined. If we resolve to reply to a letter to-morrow, we *remember* to-morrow and its occasion for letter writing, and we infuse this recollection amongst those with which we are confronted. This statement may at first sight appear paradoxical. But if we carefully examine what passes through our minds when we form resolutions, we shall find that the occasions to which our resolves are to apply are, in fact, supplied by memory. Our resolves for the future are based upon recollections of the past.

A resolution may, however, be something more than a choice in advance. It may be a choice which we should not make at all unless we made it in advance. A man may resolve to give up tobacco, or wine, at some time when these pleasures are not before his senses, whereas if tempted by them, not in memory, but in actuality, he would be powerless to turn aside. For recollected stimuli are less potent than those which reach us through the senses, and we may incline away from them towards a course which, under the pressure of sensuous temptation, would be hopelessly outbalanced.

How is it that a resolution may fortify us against the assaults of actual temptation? It does not guarantee us against a fall. We cannot avoid ill-temper altogether by good resolutions:

but they render us less likely to give way to it. In what manner do they strengthen us ?

If we realize the extraordinary effect of adopting and rejecting in bringing into existence likes and dislikes, we shall perceive that when we choose, or adopt, a thing or course of action we must strengthen any liking which we may originally have felt for it, and so increase our susceptibility to the stimulus which arouses it. Common experience proves that abstinence, for instance, becomes easier the longer we practise it, just as appetite may grow with eating. This truth is recognized in the proverb—*c'est le premier pas qui coute*. Accordingly, when we choose to adopt, or avoid, a course of action in advance, we increase our like or dislike for it, and may enable it to outbalance other courses in the hour of temptation. If we determine to spend less money in order to feel the pleasure of self-assertive abnegation, we increase our susceptibility to one form of this pleasure, and develop our self-conscious assertiveness: if our resolution was dictated by a desire to avoid the pain of bankruptcy we increase our susceptibility to this pain, and our disposition towards economy.

Resolutions, like choices, are concerned with the pleasures and pains of methods of conduct. We may resolve upon making an Alpine ascent because it recalls the joy of courage, upon purchasing a gift to obtain the satisfaction of benevolence, upon playing a particular tune because it is associated with agreeable feeling. By resolutions of this kind we lay out the course of our daily lives. Few of us commence a day without

forming some of them. We can then only engage ourselves to what is agreeable. There is no pleasure in the simple emotion of hate and we cannot *resolve* to hate, although the emotion once aroused may be kept alive by the repetitions of memory. Lissauer's hymn accordingly failed in its purpose. What then of resolutions to deny oneself sensuous pleasure? It is painful to give up smoking, or drinking, to mortify the flesh. Yet we may resolve very firmly upon these renunciations. Here we perceive the effect of self-consciousness in converting the painful into the pleasurable. It is agreeable to combat oneself, to display oneself to oneself, and above all to admire oneself. Self-esteem is so sweet that it can sweeten the bitter : it may render discipline more seductive than luxury, a hermit more cheerful than a sybarite. Self-consciousness changes the ordinary values of life and offers us possibilities of enjoyment in the most unpromising of materials.

It is the power of forming resolutions that endows man with the conscious stability of purpose which distinguishes him from the most intelligent of dogs, and enables him, although unassisted by hereditary promptings, to elaborate conduct as persistent and as complicated as the instinctive operations of insects. Our resolutions are beacons, lit by ourselves, as steering-marks through life's tempestuous voyage. We keep our eyes upon them. They set a course which seems to lead us to a haven. We may swerve from it sadly. But it gives a purpose to life, which would otherwise appear to be mere objectless drifting.

We may not be enabled to weather all the storms of impulsive desire. Most of us have learned that love, or a surge of anger, will sweep away all the barriers that our resolutions have erected. But we are steadied against the gusts of passing inclination. And, as explained already, choice, whether in the present or against the future, may in some degree enhance or lessen the influence of instinctive impulses. Choice is concerned with particular things or actions, and cannot affect the general strength of an impulse. A resolution against indulgence in tobacco will not, for instance, predispose us against wine: we may overcome nervousness on horseback, but in regard to other risks may remain as nervous as before. We may soften our feelings towards some persons, and be severely antipathetic towards others. It is only in words that we can resolve to be *generally* more temperate, more courageous, or kinder hearted. But it is something to have controlled a particular stimulus. It is open to us to increase the number under control. If, for instance, we can steel ourselves by resolution against each risk which can possibly arise, we shall have gained a very useful substitute for natural courage. Resolutions may, accordingly, assist us to withstand impulses by, so to speak, defeating them in detail.

We may resolve, as we may choose, to imitate. In doubt, for instance, over a particular course of action, we may resolve to take the advice of a friend. Imitation guided our childhood: as a rule we 'did what we were told.' In later years we submit ourselves to it whenever we resolve

to act in accordance with the counsel or suggestions of others. So large masses of men may act in unison. The pages of history are a record of waves of enthematic influence which have swept through tribes and peoples, like gusts of wind across a cornfield, swaying them with emotions of aggression, revolution or reform, which of themselves would have arisen in very few of the multitudes that enthusiastically adopted them. There is a common idea that these 'epidemic' impulses are the outcome of some subtle craving which is apostrophized as the 'spirit of the age.' So much is true that the suggestions of others gain force in their appeal to us if they are supported by 'common sense'—that is to say, by our recollections. The ideas which led to the Reformation were endorsed by recollections of priestly misbehaviour: those that energized the French Revolution were similarly reinforced by convictions of the misery that was suffered by the poor under a selfish aristocracy. But history shows that abuses will be suffered uncomplainingly by generations if no leaders come forward to fire the masses with their resolves, or if any leaders who appear are consistently martyred by the authorities in power. It shows, on the other hand, that resolutions which are urged by leaders of influence may be adopted by whole nations, although they are repugnant to common sense and unsupported by experience. The Crusades are a striking illustration. But we need not look back so far into the past.

We frequently apply the term 'resolution' to a purpose which is inspired not by choice, but

by a headlong impulse. When, for instance, one resolves to meet a woman with whom he is in love, he does not choose, he is drawn towards her. These purposes resemble resolutions of choice in affecting action which is thrown forward into the future. And we may undoubtedly choose the precise methods in which to carry them into execution. But they are energized by an unhesitating impulse—they are, in fact, impulses the sway of which is prolonged by recollections of their stimuli. They are far more effective than resolutions of choice. We may resolve to eschew self-indulgence from the fear of ill-health: but this inclination will not always support us. It is only those who are self-consciously disposed who can resist temptation by resolutions that are based upon the pleasure of self-assertion, by what is termed ‘strength of character.’ We stand firmer when we are actuated by an impulse other than the inclination towards pleasure and away from pain. Such is our condition when we are moved by the impulse to obey—and more especially when this impulse takes the form of the ‘grace’ which is, in fact, the spirit of religious submission. This will give us strength when resolutions of choice fail. So the impulse of revulsion may completely change a man’s life, manifesting itself in the feeling of satiety which is termed ‘repentance,’ and leading to the ‘formation of good resolutions, not by the process of choice, but under the stress of imperious dictation.

Habit

When, under the influence of memory, choice becomes repetitive, we term it 'habit.' It is evident that our habits result from choice: they are not inevitable and we can discard them if we choose to do so. We may be habituated to a morning shave. But we can dispense with it if we are suffering from face-ache. We cling to our habits because we like them: it may be because of their consequences, as with shaving: it may be because we have grown to like them in themselves, as when we follow a particular order in dressing, or in the serving of courses at meals. Why, it may be asked, should we find pleasure in a habit irrespective of its consequences? Because liking follows upon the adoption of a thing or an action, and is increased by its being adopted repeatedly. This peculiarity, as we have seen already, accounts for the contraction of a vast number of tastes which we are apt to consider instinctive.

We repeat a habit, then, because we like it: we repeat it regularly because it is brought before us by memory on certain occasions, or in connection with certain impressions. Liking it, we are conscious of it. In time a habit may become so settled as to move us no longer with feelings of like—just as the ceaseless ticking of a clock may deaden our consciousness of it. So stereotyped habit transforms itself into the mechanical repetitions which are styled 'ideo-motor' actions, memory taking the place of choice as the impulse to action.

The 'force of habit' is, then, a liking for a method of conduct, which has been generated by adopting it, and urges us to repeat it. This is the force that establishes trades, occupations and professions, and preserves continuity in the multitudinous phases of industry. For we may grow to like occupations which appear to be naturally repellent. To a novice the business of a scavenger or a slaughterer cannot be otherwise than disagreeable. But they arouse no disgust in those who pursue them. It is the pleasure of habit that infuses some enjoyment into a life of arduous routine. We commonly regard industry as thrust upon us by circumstances: we are compelled to labour to gain a living. But industry would not afford happiness were it simply urged by the lash of necessity. Yet we find that, in fact, the great majority of workers take pleasure in their occupation and are bored if they are released from it except for a short holiday—a feeling which contributes very potently to the settlement of strikes. Their work is pleasurable because it has become habitual. A millionaire may work as hard as the most straitened of his clerks.

With habits, as with resolutions, imitation may take the place of choice as the starting impetus. A vast number of our habits are enthematized. The fashion of our dress, the timing and constitution of our meals, or manners, are copied from others. What reason is there in the nature of things why men in Mediterranean countries should dress themselves so sombrely in black, or why the Americans, alone amongst races of Anglo-Saxon origin, should be a nation of coffee drinkers,

only just awakening to the charms of afternoon tea? Our ideals—that is to say, the impulses or motives which we habitually admire—are in large measure conventional. There is not one of them that may not be reversed by the particular prejudices of a community. Manslaughter, criminal in the citizen, under very grave provocation, is praiseworthy in the soldier, even when the cause for which he fights is trivial or unjust : to Quakers it is odious under any circumstances. Industrious money-getting, the practical aspiration of the business man, appears to be a blind infatuation in the atmosphere of a convent. At the present day we can scarcely understand the antipathies which constrained our ancestors to burn men because their religious opinions were peculiar, to torture women on suspicion of witchcraft, to inflict a death penalty for forgery and sheep-stealing. Such being the effect of enthematism in forming our ideals, we must regard with suspicion the claim that, in the interest of Art, no restraint should be imposed upon literature and the theatre. Authors naturally desire the fullest possible scope for their imaginative talents. But the press and the drama may debase as well as elevate : they may corrupt the tastes and poison the happiness of a people by holding up unworthy ideals for their admiration—such as, for instance, the pleasure of lust.

We may even contract a habit of choosing to imitate, and may thereby smother our natural propensity to venture for ourselves. Why are powers of initiative lacking generally in politicians and often in soldiers? Because the object of both

is primarily not to venture but to imitate—the soldier his superiors, the politician his party leaders and his constituents. It is a grievous feature of democracy that it should demoralize its leaders. The sailor, on the contrary, is quick in expedients: we recognize this in calling him the ‘handy man.’ His calling is attended by risks, and if he does not act promptly he may wreck his ship. So it has been found that to drive a motor-car is an excellent remedy for nervous weakness.

We may reiterate the great truth that by habituating ourselves to a method of conduct which has been the expression of an impulse, and is tinged with recollections of the feelings which accompanied the impulse, we increase our susceptibility to the stimuli that arouse the impulse, and enhance their influence over us. Thus one who acts in a cruel fashion, either to gain the pleasure of asserting himself, or at the suggestion of others, renders himself peculiarly susceptible to this impulse on similar occasions; and if his acts of cruelty are numerous and varied, he may, in fact, create for himself a cruel disposition. In this manner he may blight his own life with unhappiness. So, on the other hand, may a kindly disposition, with its attendant happiness, be acquired by the constant practise of varied acts of kindness. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the importance of this fact in determining the value of our life to ourselves and to others. And the power of habit to increase a susceptibility may enable us to explain the curious fact that we can in some measure influence our feelings

by the expression of our features—can conjure up cheerfulness by smiles and gloom by frowns. A smile, being the expression of happiness, increases our susceptibility to the bright side of life.

CHAPTER IX

THOUGHT, REASON AND IMAGINATION

WE have already touched upon the nature of thought. It is a constructive process, whereby, so to speak, pictures are built up in mosaic by combining fragments of different recollections. If we think that it will be nice to ask a friend to dinner on the thirty-first of the month, we construct a vision of the dinner which includes recollections of our friend and of this date. In order that the thought may be consistent, the pieces must harmonize. There would be no such harmony if our friend were out of England, or if there were only thirty days in the month.

In thinking, then, as in digesting, we construct. And for a similar reason both processes are very difficult to analyse. One is wholly, the other partly, subconscious. We are acutely conscious of our thoughts when they come into use as instruments for emotional purposes, as, for instance, when we think of our responsibilities, our ambitions or our enemies. And recollections which present themselves must arouse consciousness if they are tinged with feelings that were associated with the impressions which they repeat. But no one will doubt that thought can proceed subconsciously in some of its stages who has day after day fruitlessly sought for the solution of a

difficulty, has abandoned its search for a time, and has found it suddenly presented to him. In fact, the materials with which we build may often offer themselves without the assistance of consciousness. Our attitude may be that of a sorter in a factory. We may subconsciously adopt or reject ideas which stream past us uncontrolled. But, generally, it appears, the process of adopting or rejecting generates currents of like or dislike which make us aware of our cogitations. Thought which does not give harmonious results is exceedingly disagreeable. But there is triumph when we can arrive at a conclusion which settles our conduct or solves a difficulty.

What do we mean by 'harmony' in thought? We must revert to our illustration of a picture puzzle. Thought is harmonious when each piece which we introduce has a property in common with the pieces that adjoin it. There must be, so to speak, a blending of colour between them. If we are to ask our friend to dine on the thirty-first of the month, there must be a thirty-first of the month, and he must be within reach on that day.

This reflection introduces us to the consideration of *properties*. They are the essential links by which we construct our thought-pictures. Properties, or qualities, are, so to speak, detachable portions of our impressions and recollections: they are fragments into which our impressions and recollections can be broken up. Thus blueness is a property of the sky, elasticity a property of the air, frowning a property of unhappiness, constructiveness a property of

thought. Properties may be so simple as to be discerned by sensation. Our eyes may inform us that a man has the property of red hair. But our discrimination of properties would not go very far did we depend upon simple impressions of the senses. It is elaborated immensely by our analysis of recollections. To discern that red hair is a property which is detachable from a red-haired man, it would be necessary to observe two men side by side, for it is by comparison that properties are detected. But by using our recollections we can compare our visual impressions of one man with our remembrance of another. The possibilities of comparison are extended by the whole of our experience and education, and we may detect complicated properties which it requires a whole sentence to express. Thus it is a property of Hannibal that he brought elephants into Italy: it is a property of spring that it will come round again: it is a property of the weather that it may rain to-morrow. For, as we shall see when we discuss the matter more fully in the next chapter, properties may be past, present or future, potential or hypothetical. In fact, any statement which we can make regarding a subject expresses a property.

The faculty which enables us to analyse our impressions in this fashion (commonly known as 'intelligence') appears to be a development of sensation. It is the brain which perceives, not the sense organs, and the apprehensions of the brain are not limited to the impressions which reach it through these organs. It apprehends recollections as well as sights and sounds. By a

development of this susceptibility it becomes able to break up its apprehensions into the elements which compose them. We are no more able to explain this process than the process of sensation. But we can detect the lines along which it works. We are guided by similarities and differences, and we distinguish, as 'properties,' differences which exist between things which are in other respects similar, and similarities which exist between things which are in other respects different. Thus red hair is discerned to be a property because there are men who have hair of other colours. Elasticity is a property because it is common to such different things as indiarubber and air. So yellowness is distinguished because it is common to a sovereign and a buttercup: the oak tribe because it represents peculiarities which differentiate oak trees from all other trees. Our decorative ideas are all derived from the detachment of properties. A savage who compared a tiger with a leopard would realize that stripes were, so to speak, detachable from an animal of this kind, and might give him an idea for the decoration of his house front.

We may be confirmed in the idea that intelligence is a subtle development from sensation by the fact that it is subject to such variations of efficiency between man and man as occur in the organs of sensation. Just as a man may be obtuse of sense, colour-blind, or insensible to music, so may he be dull-witted, incapable of apprehending the properties of numbers, indifferent to scientific knowledge, inappreciative of the art of language. On the other hand, just as some

persons are extraordinarily sensitive to sound, or to colour, so some possess from childhood a phenomenal capacity for perceiving the properties of numbers : they are born arithmeticians. Others see connections between the events of life which make them brilliant or amusing speakers. Mechanical genius can discern in ordinary objects properties which can be turned to account in the construction of machinery. The poet seizes qualities in Nature which can illustrate his ideas forcibly and picturesquely, and appreciates the concords of sound that give finish to literary style.

Moreover, sensation and intelligence are alike in their liability to error. As we may mistake colours and forms, so we may mistake properties. The prejudices, fancies and superstitions which have encumbered, and encumber, human progress are all misjudgments of properties, ideas that persons or things are endowed with qualities which, in fact, they do not possess, such as that an old woman may be a witch, or that thirteen is a dangerous number to sit down at table. These notions sprang no doubt from accidental coincidences : a man fell ill after an old woman's curse : there were thirteen present at the Last Supper. But it is surprising that the misjudgments which were based upon these accidents were not corrected, as experience showed them to be baseless. Here we have a proof of the extraordinary power of the impulse to imitate. These erroneous beliefs, originating in the misjudgment of individuals, become current amongst mankind by enthematic influence, and against this force intelligence can rarely prevail. We can hardly be persuaded

against the evidence of our senses. But intelligence is weaker than sensation and cannot withstand the influence of others. This explains the continuity of human error.

There is another resemblance between sensation and intelligence. Both may be vastly improved by practice—a fact the importance of which educationists have hardly realized. To exercise the intelligence by forming independent judgments as to the properties of things is essentially necessary if we are to develop the reasoning powers: it yields in importance only to the training of character. Yet it has been neglected for the acquisition of knowledge—that is to say, of recollections—although, unless used as a means of reasoning, recollections are hardly more useful than a collection of postage stamps.

The process which we describe as ‘reasoning’ appears then to be the product of two energies. The constructive impulse fabricates: intelligence supplies it with materials in the form of properties which can be detached from one recollection, and added to another. The new recollections so built up are called ‘ideas.’

Thought may be distinguished as practical, expressive, or scientific, according as it is concerned with the determination of conduct, the expression of feeling, or the satisfaction of our curiosity—according as, for example, we are deciding upon a plan of action, or are writing a letter, or are solving a problem.

Let us suppose that we are thinking of conduct, and are planning a bicycle ride into the country. The question of lunch must be decided.

We have recollections of purchasing provisions, also of roadside inns, also of the fact, gathered from others, that our course will lie along a lonely strip of road about midday. We combine the first with the third, and decide to take provisions with us because they have a property in common—that a meal will not be obtained locally.

By such combinations have man's practical inventions been very generally conceived. We adopt the light of fire to brighten the darkness of night: its heat to dispel cold. The plough represents a combination of the form of a pickaxe with the drawing power of a bullock: the loom a combination of the interlacements of plaiting with the flight of a missile. And in the back-spring of a branch there is an elasticity which may have suggested to an inventive genius the use of the bow. It is possible to trace in this fashion the origin of vast numbers of our inventions. Many of them, it seems, may have had their birth in imitation of the lower animals. Man is extraordinarily imitative, and he is surrounded by living activities which are guided by inherited recollections, by instincts that are literally the 'wisdom of the ages.' The latest of his practical inventions—the aeroplane—was evidently suggested to him by the birds. Who shall say that he is not also indebted to them for his first ideas of melody, or of house building? But his imitations must have been guided by reason, for in all cases they have involved some novel combinations. Some inventions, it may be claimed, have originated in accidental discoveries. But in their case again reason was required to apply them practically.

Let us suppose again that our purpose is to express feeling. Language provides striking illustrations of imaginative reasoning. A very large proportion of our words are, in fact, pictures, which are transferred from quite another connection because they have a property in common with the feeling that is in our mind. Thus we speak of the 'bitterness' of remorse, the 'transports' of love, the 'ties' of affection. Similes and metaphors have become ingrained in our vocabulary. They vivify language by calling to mind something which we have actually perceived by our senses. The impressive force of Homer and Shakespeare lies in the recollections which they borrow from Nature in order to express human emotions or conduct—in words which are not merely words but pictures, setting before us, as in parables, vivid illustrations of the happenings which they describe. On the other hand images may be borrowed from human emotion to give a sympathetic interest to the workings of Nature. This form of imagination is illustrated in almost every line of Shelley's 'Cloud' and 'Ode to the West Wind.'

Thirdly, of scientific reasoning, when our purpose is to solve a difficulty that has aroused curiosity. In Euclid we have familiar illustrations of the use of properties to build up conclusions. Taking, for instance, the property of a line crossing two parallel lines to make equal opposite angles, he combines this property with a triangle so as to prove that its angles are equal to two right angles. If we come across a strange flower and are curious to know its affinities, we note its peculiari-

ties and compare them with those which we know to characterize various botanical orders. We conclude that the flower belongs to the order with whose peculiarities its own are in harmony.

Our conclusion is, in fact, the completion of a piece of mosaic which we have constructed by fitting together portions of a number of recollections. The fragments are linked by properties which we have, rightly or wrongly, apprehended by intelligence. It will be observed that each such conclusion is in itself a property, and can be apprehended as such by intelligence, and used as material for future construction. The fact that our flower belongs to a certain order of plants becomes a property of that order. In this manner the processes of intelligence work together in the closest association : intelligence provides materials for construction, and the results of construction become objects for intelligence.

A belief, as commonly understood, is less positive than a conclusion. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that intelligence may frequently mislead us, and we do not always trust it implicitly. Our discernment is particularly liable to error when it is coloured by any such strong feeling as fear, self-esteem, reverence or affection. We may believe that a comet causes war or pestilence : that the number thirteen brings ill-luck : that it is a desire for liberty, not jealousy, which makes men unwilling to be commanded by others. This misjudgment of properties has defaced law and morality with rules of ludicrous eccentricity, such as, for instance, those which prescribe trial

by ordeal. It is the origin of fancies and superstitions which have made man more cruel than the brutes, and have set him in blind antagonism against his fellows. The curious usages regarding such matters as marriage and taboo, which are the subject of so much ethnological enquiry, illustrate very strikingly the extraordinary aberrations of human intelligence. Each of them is, in fact, a misjudged attempt to assign a cause to a happening, an effort to fit into a puzzle a piece which, as a matter of fact, leaves a space unfilled or overlaps other pieces. Its imperfections are not realized until some individual of unusual intelligence perceives that it does not fit into the space—that its proportions are inadequate, or excessive, and shows them to be so.

How, then, are we to decide whether our intelligence is guiding or misleading us? It has been maintained that we are endowed with an intuitive, or instinctive, appreciation of truth, and we must admit that on occasions an idea may illumine the mind with a sudden flash of conviction—may ‘leap to the eyes’ according to French idiom—so that we feel it *must* be true. But we may be wrong nevertheless. Of this the history of human error is a convincing proof. The various contradictory philosophies which have attempted to explain life have all seemed convincing—indeed, self-evident—to those who originated and adopted them. What, however, has become of Rousseau’s ‘Social Contract,’ of Herbert Spencer’s doctrine of *laissez faire* in domestic politics? It may seem indisputable that the present condition of Mohammedan countries is due to their religion.

But there was a time when Mohammedans led the thought of Europe. It appears that, when we have been exercised by impressions or recollections that cannot be reconciled, we seize with pleasure an explanation which seems to reconcile them, and do not choose to risk a recurrence of our discomfort by examining its sufficiency — by ‘looking a gift horse in the mouth.’ The theory of witchcraft explained much that was unaccountable. It was accepted by the wisest men as convincingly established.

We are driven to believe that experience is, in fact, the only touchstone to which we can bring our conclusions. The unreliability of pure reason is practically illustrated in engineering procedure. Requirements in the way of amount, strength and disposition of materials are elaborately calculated : but the results are multiplied by the ‘factor for safety’ to provide against properties which have been overlooked, or cannot be appreciated. With the passage of time it has been discovered that in these matters reason cannot be trusted implicitly. We need not in all cases wait in uncertainty for the results of long experience. The conclusions of reason may sometimes be tested immediately by the artificial experience that is called ‘experiment’ — as, for instance, in verifying the conclusions of mathematics and chemistry, which are accordingly termed ‘exact sciences.’ But the generality of our conclusions can only be tested by an exhaustive analysis of past history, or by awaiting the course of events : and meanwhile we may be wandering astray from the truth. Indeed, the history of human thought in morality

and politics is a record of false reasoning slowly corrected.

These reflections will enable us to answer that old question—‘What is Truth?’ Speaking metaphorically, truth is a piece of recollection which fits the vacant space in a problem puzzle: the false is a piece which does not fit. In affirming, we recognize that the piece which is offered to us fits: in denying, we recognize that it does not fit. We can only assure ourselves of the fitting by actually adjusting the piece to the space—that is to say, by experiment or experience. If, for instance, it is asserted that the abnormal rainfall of the winter of 1914 was caused by the heavy firing on the French frontier, we test this statement by ascertaining from experience whether heavy firing is not sometimes without effect upon the rainfall, or whether there has not been an equally large increase when there has been no firing. In either of these cases the piece does not fit the space—in the first it is too large, in the second too small.

We may adopt enthymatically conclusions or beliefs that are offered to us by others: the vast majority of our conclusions come to us in this fashion. We may test them before adoption by using our intelligence to ascertain whether the pieces used in their construction really possess the properties which enable them to fit into their places, and we may reject them if we find that these pieces are misfits, not in fact possessing the properties which have been assigned to them, but invested with them by misapprehension, ignorance or prejudice. In the last case they

resemble the statements of a false witness, which present to us, not recollections of his observations, but fabrications, made by his imagination under the influence of some emotion other than that of straightforward curiosity.

In this connection it may be observed that the adoption of unreal conclusions may have conduced to the progress and happiness of mankind. Take, for instance, the idea of justice—the belief that success and failure are, respectively, the properties of well and evil-doing, that virtue is rewarded and that there is a punishment for vice. It is true that we may win happiness by being kind to others. But success and failure are in a different category, and the least observant of mankind must find it difficult to believe that they always come to those who merit them. Yet their connection with good and evil conduct is a useful argument¹ in educating the young: ‘honesty,’ we say, ‘is good policy.’ This seems, indeed, to be a necessary consequence of a Divine government of the world. But the exceptions are so numerous that the decrees of Providence must be accepted as inscrutable; and the doubting are reminded that it is in the next world, not in this, that we may confidently expect the redress of injustices.

Could properties be, so to speak, isolated without the use of language, or symbols, to express them? Should we have any idea of virtue unless we had a word with this meaning? We may believe that a cat has some idea of the squeaking of a

¹ So by an erroneous belief in a property we may fortify courage: this is the “moral effect” of a mascot.

mouse, apart from the mouse, since the mice which she sees are not always squeaking. But without symbols of some sort our realization of properties would be exceedingly limited. And we could not hope to discern the properties of properties—to appreciate that ‘four’ and ‘five’ are *numbers*, that ‘kindness’ and ‘courage’ are *virtues*, that three is the square root of nine. These abstracts cannot be perceived by us, and that we should be able to grasp them, they must be presented to our senses artificially. For this purpose we use symbols—words or figures. The extent of our powers in reasoning upon abstract ideas depends, then, upon our supply of symbols. When the language of a people is poor their powers of reasoning will be poor also.

We think of reason as a mental process. But it is generally exercised in the closest association with our hands or the organs of the mouth. Sensory recollections may, as we have seen, be linked to chains of muscular remembrances, or repetitions, so that the arousing of one arouses the other also. In the combinations which take place in the brain of a poet, recollections of sensations, and recollections of words go together: they may be accompanied by muscular repetitions of the movements of writing, as when he commits his thoughts to paper. These chains of constructive activity run alongside of one another like bands which are turned by the same pulley. So the fingers of a pianist who is improvising, or of an artist who is designing, follow in their new combinations those which he is forming in his brain. If the muscular remembrances are not in

exact accord with his mental recollections we may say that he is deficient in technique. When acute intelligence and great constructive activity are united to powers of technique, we have genius. This is what gives enduring charm to Homer and is appreciated in our frequent quotations from Shakespeare. Moreover, their art is 'universal'—that is to say, it seizes hold of properties of human nature, which are essential and do not change.

CHAPTER X

CONSCIOUSNESS, PERSONALITY AND LANGUAGE

WE have spoken of impressions as being received by us, of impulses as moving us, of feelings as touching us. What do we mean by 'us'? What is it which perceives, is impelled and feels? What, in fact, is personality? Does it exist as a soul, or spirit, burning like a flame within us? If so, its light is inexplicably intermittent. It is extinguished during sleep. We pass a third of our lives in mental as well as in physical darkness. It is extinguished by alcohol, by a blow on the head, by the bodily or mental derangement that produces a fainting fit. To the religious it has appeared to be the essence of our existence—a co-ordinative force which gives to the individual a unity of being which shall subsist throughout eternity. We may wish to believe this. But how can it be reconciled with the strange phenomena of dual personality—a condition in which an individual is obsessed by two widely different characters that dispute the governance of his behaviour?

One point seems clear—that personality, so far as we can detect it, only exists during consciousness. When are we conscious? Evidently when we are touched by feeling. When we do not *feel*, we may be moved by impulses—strongly

moved—and remain in complete unconsciousness. We may construct and may imitate unawares because these impulses, in themselves, are emotionless. Even the impulses to adopt and to reject may move us subconsciously: we may shrink from a touch when asleep. We are unconscious of the muscular remembrances which are, so to speak, the underground machinery of our conduct—the ‘ideo-motor’ activities by which we walk, speak and adjust our eyesight—because these dexterities, once acquired, arouse no feeling. The study of mental disease has revealed a substratum of unfelt impulses, forming what has been termed ‘the subconscious self.’ These—unperceived except, perhaps, in dreams—may influence us profoundly, may, indeed, on occasions break out with shattering force and distract the mind with the delusions of madness. But so long as they are unfelt they elude us: and the most virtuous of mankind may have within him vicious forces—temptations of St. Anthony—of whose existence he is unaware.

Feeling appears, then, to be the essential basis of consciousness. There can be no consciousness without feeling. It may be objected that we are conscious when we are attentive, and that in attention there may be no element of pleasure or pain. There are many phases of attention. In some cases it is obviously pleasurable or painful, as when we are attentive to an object which we like or dislike, or to a person who arouses fear, rivalry, jealousy or affection. But in other cases attention appears to be simply concentrated observation. This is, however,

generally actuated by suspicion or curiosity—impulses one or other of which is immediately aroused by sensory impressions of novelty or movement that turn us from our thoughts to the outside world—and in them feeling is inherent. And when our attention is given, not to external objects, but to recollections, feeling is also present, for recollections, as we have seen, attract notice, not in themselves, but by virtue of the feelings with which they are tinged. We may, however, give our attention to external objects when there is no question of suspicion or curiosity, or to recollections which appear to be devoid of feeling, as, for instance, to lessons in mathematics. But our attention is, then, of the artificial—or ‘forced’—description, which results from self-assertion against ourselves, as in cases when we compel ourselves to attend, or are enthematized with this desire by our teachers. In this condition we feel the pleasure of self-assertion, and are, accordingly, conscious.

It may again be objected that there is no feeling in thought that is purely intellectual—in considering, for instance, whether the nebular hypothesis sufficiently explains the origin of the solar system. Thought, we have seen, includes the intelligent discernment of properties by a process of comparison. In this process recollections, or recombinations of recollections, which present themselves, are adopted or rejected: we are, in fact, engaged in a mental process of affirming or denying. The one causes pleasure and the other pain; and that we really experience these feelings when engaged in thought is evident

from the expression of our features. When in doubt—when, that is to say, we are rejecting—they are overcast. But they clear immediately we ‘make up our mind.’ And in conversation a smile goes naturally with ‘yes,’ as a frown with ‘no.’

Is, then, consciousness identical with feeling? In its simplest form it may be so : but not in its higher phases—the phases which we ordinarily have in mind when we speak of it. These come into existence when recollections are added to feeling—and in particular the continuous series of recollections of oneself, termed ‘self-consciousness,’ which watches, like a guardian angel, over our behaviour, and insists that our thoughts and actions should preserve some continuity with their forerunners. Less metaphorically, ‘self-consciousness may be likened to a thread which stretches back through our recollections, and preserves continuity between the present and the past. If this thread be broken, we may be conscious in the sense of ‘feeling,’ but not conscious in the higher sense of the term. This is the condition of those who are oppressed with the delirium of fever, or the illusions of madness. It also seems to be our condition when dreaming. Recollections occur which arouse faint currents of feeling : but they are not brought into accord with past experiences and are therefore violently irregular.

We have already noticed the close connection between feeling and recollections. Not only can individual recollections be tinged with feeling. A feeling will call up the recollections that have

been associated with it. When moved by an emotion we are peculiarly impressionable: we notice details which would ordinarily pass unregarded. Emotions are, then, effective in implanting recollections: they are also effective in recalling them. If we cast our minds back to occasions in our lives when we have been deeply stirred by love or grief, we shall find a flood of detail come back to us. Feeling, then, brings our recollections together into groups—each, as it were, a little solar system in which recollections are the planets and the feeling is the sun. The subject of the feeling in each case is, in fact, the subject of an unexpressed sentence, and the recollections which are grouped around it are the various properties of the subject as they are known to us. If, for instance, we are thinking of Hyde Park, recollections of the Serpentine and of Rotten Row occur to us. Any one of these groups may be a property in another larger group: Hyde Park will, for instance, be a property if we are thinking of London. So feeling weaves recollections into an embroidered network—constructs of them a tissue across which we may travel in thought as a spider across its web.

We may also compare a feeling, together with the recollections of its subject, to a ground-note upon which may be built up a chord of remembrances. We are, it may be objected, multiplying similes instead of explaining. But we can only comprehend processes which are not perceptible through our senses, by observing their effects and likening them to perceptible processes of which the effects are similar. There are some

curious analogies between thought and musical harmony. Both are developed by the additions of notes to a root or bass. A child's consciousness of its mother—at first a simple feeling of pleasure associated with the sight of her—is developed by notes of her dresses, her acts of love, her admonitions, until it becomes a complex mass of recollections, kept together by the feeling, as if magnetized by it. It is true that upon sounding the ground-note—upon the recurrence of the feeling with a recollection of its subject—all the notes of the chord are not heard by us. We are aware only of those notes—of those particular remembrances—which are recalled by the last preceding chord, or thought, that crossed the mind. So at one time we may be thinking of the generosity of a friend: at another time of his large appetite, or his execrable French accent. But these qualities are all notes in the memory chord that we have formed respecting him, and will come to us, amongst a number of others, if we attempt to set out the chord—to state, that is to say, all that we know and think about him.

For most men the first-formed memory chord is that of their mother: but the loudest, and the most insistent, is that of themselves—the group of recollections of self which is styled 'self-consciousness.' This chord is seldom altogether silent. It is this which we think of as 'ourselves,' as our *personality*, since we find in it a representation of experiences, from childhood upwards, which is continuous and unbroken, except for lapses during sleep. We can, moreover, dis-

tinguish it from the body. For the chord of self exists apart from sensation, whereas the body makes itself apparent to us through sensation, and accordingly appears to be part of the outside world with which sensation is chiefly concerned. If we yield to the insistency of this chord it will fascinate us: so it becomes as the song of the Lorelei, tempting us from all other interests until we are engulfed in egotism. When it is at its loudest it silences all other remembrances, and may even interfere with the regularity of the subconscious muscular recollections which carry on the ideo-motor or automatic activities of our lives. The chain of these recollections is, so to speak, thrown out of gear by the intrusive influence of the chord of self—of our own personality—exactly as it is by strong emotion, such as fear or anger. So it comes, that in a fit of self-consciousness, a pianist's fingers may fail him, a practised orator may halt and stutter.

From early childhood we are continually building up chords, one for every person, place or object that may come within our experience or knowledge, and is of sufficient interest to become the ground-note, or 'root,' of a chord. So we accumulate a stock of chords, which are as numerous as the proper names and nouns in our language. Feeling alone may suffice to make us vaguely aware of impressions or recollections. But it is these memory chords which enable us to *apprehend* them, and the accuracy of our apprehension depends upon the richness of the chord which an impression or recollection recalls. To the uninstructed a fossil means very little

indeed: to a geologist it calls up a harmony of remembrances which enables him to apprehend its real significance. For the apprehension of abstract properties these memory chords are obviously essential. By intelligence, as we have seen, we are able to analyse our impressions and recollections, and to distinguish the various properties of an object, apart from the object itself. But intelligence could not make its analyses unless our recollections were connected in consciousness: it is conscious reason, and not reason alone, which enables us to conceive such abstractions as number, space, time and causality. Our ideas of space may be attributed to recollections of the muscular energy that it costs us to move from one place to another, or to reach from one object to another, associated with recollections of sight and hearing. Can we assign so simple an origin to our ideas of time? If memory is the seed-bed of all our ideas how did man grasp, in particular, the notion of *future* time? Can we have extracted the future out of recollections of the past? It appears so. For recollections are not only repetitions of impressions: they are repetitions of impressions in the same order as that in which they were received—that is to say, they are repetitions of *sequences*. In the regular alternation of day and night we have a natural measure of time which forces itself upon the memory. If we recollect yesterday,¹ we throw ourselves

¹ In Hindustani 'to-morrow' is expressed by the same word as 'yesterday'; and there is a similar ambiguity in the use of the French phrase 'tout à l'heure'

back to a position in which our recollections of to-day will be in future time. Moreover, most of our impulses involve the future. They are seldom accomplished without some delay. Food is not ordinarily procurable until some time after we feel hungry. Recollections of the hunger are followed by those of the food.

The future once realized, we are able to throw ourselves into it as expecting, hoping or despairing. For this we must be under the influence of an impulsive desire, as, for instance, to eat, to escape, to overcome or to love. We realize in the future the achievement or failure of the desire by recollecting the sequences which should end in one or other of these results, and we experience the pleasure or pain which success or failure produces: the pleasure of triumph becomes hope, the pain of failure becomes despair. Thus if we grow hungry in the course of a mountain walk, we despair of food because we can recollect no possibilities of getting it. If we hope to meet a friend, we recall the chain of events which should end in this, and we realize the meeting as its last link so clearly as to feel almost as much pleasure in the anticipation as in the reality.

From our recollections of sequences we have also derived the idea of causality which exercises so profound an influence upon our thoughts. The conduct of our lives depends very greatly upon our memory of sequences, upon such connections as burning with fire, death with illness, illness with exposure or imprudence, accidents with risks. We connect one event with the other as cause and consequence, linked together by the property of

causality. Our discernment of this property prompts us to call to mind something as the cause of everything that happens or has happened ; and, when our memory does not suggest this something, to accept enthematically anything which may be indicated by the words of others. In both cases we may be—and are, perhaps, generally—misled. When we rely upon the suggestions of our memory we are apt to imagine that an accidental sequence is a causal connection—to argue ‘ post hoc ergo propter hoc ’—an error into which we constantly drift in tracing the causes of our ailments. How greatly man has suffered from the misdirection of others is shown by the complicated superstitions in which he has entangled himself. Magic, witchcraft, the belief in amulets and mascots, illustrate erroneous connections as cause and effect. So also do a vast number of the arguments that are employed in political discussions.

Causality is a modulation by which we reconcile a discordant note with the chord into which it has entered. It supplies an answer to the question ‘ why ? ’ which we invariably ask when anything surprises us, when, that is to say, our impulses of wonder or curiosity are excited. We are surprised if we learn that a man whom we have always considered to be respectable has taken to drink : a note comes into his memory chord which is out of accord with the other notes. The discord is modulated if we learn that his father was the victim of drunken habits.

We can recollect no beginnings to our memorial chains. We speak familiarly of ‘ beginnings ’ and

'endings,' but if we think closely on the matter, we shall find ourselves quite unable to conceive them. We cannot imagine a real beginning—a beginning before which there was nothing: nor can we imagine an ending after which there will be nothing. Our minds are often stigmatized as 'finite,' so that the infinite is incomprehensible to us. But in fact we can realize the infinite very much more clearly than the finite. It is far more difficult to imagine a limit beyond which there is nothing—a wall to which there is no 'other side'—than to imagine an endless chain of causes and consequences which represents, in fact, the continuance of eternity.

When we describe ourselves as 'thinking' we may, it appears, be simply listening to a succession of memory-chords, each of which swells into sound, and melts away into another chord, like dissolving views on the screen of a magic lantern. In casual thought we exercise little control over this succession, and chord follows chord as though touched into sounding by the play of wind upon an Æolian harp. But each of them (as we have seen) is connected with its predecessor—or arises out of its predecessor—through a note which is common to both, which is incidental to the first chord and becomes the ground-note, 'root' or 'subject' of the second. Thus, in thinking of a friend who is in Italy, the incidental note of Florence may evolve a chord of Florentine recollections: these may include the name of Savonarola, which may call up remembrances of Church history that may meander to the Council of Constance, to John Huss and Bohemia, to the

rise of Czech nationality, to the rise of Irish nationality and to the prospects of Home Rule. Each of these memory-chords is linked by a common note to the chord preceding it: and it is interesting to remember that, in music, chords succeed one another most pleasingly when there is a note that occurs in both.

In this procession certain chords figure more frequently than others. These are those which interest us greatly, which have been fixed in the memory by having been associated, as stimuli, with strong desires or emotions. The more often they have been thus associated the more often will they recur. Thus the mind of a drunkard is haunted by the drink chord, that of a lover by the chord of his beloved, that of a philosopher by the chord of his studies. At the present time the chord of Germany has become an obsession which rarely quits our minds. By giving way to an impulse to drink, or to our dislike for another, we reinforce the recollections of drinking, or of the object of our antipathy, so that they recur to us on the slightest of introductions. To a lover almost anything will serve as a reminder of his mistress. It is to the continual recurrence of particular chords, reinforced by indulgence, that we owe the mastery of our conscious habits.

But in serious thought we control our memory more strictly, and compose new harmonies of our own by transferring notes from one chord to another. We have at such times a purpose before us—that is to say, we are moved by an impulse, it may be of curiosity, of self-assertive creative-

ness, or of love. Making use of our reasoning or imaginative faculty, we recall chords that are connected with this purpose, not by impressions, but by the *properties* of impressions, and may transfer any one of these properties into the chord which represents our purpose. If, for instance, it is our object to express poetically our appreciation of a sunset, we call up remembrances that include properties, words and phrases which are connected with the colours, or cloud-effects, that attend the setting sun : if we are concerned with a practical problem, such as the repelling of attacks by submarines, we summon to our assistance memory-chords that contain notes which bear upon the catching or destroying of things moving in water. We may believe that Newton apprehended the force of gravity by applying to falling objects the idea of attraction that was given him by his recollections of a magnet. The process is that of a musician composing new harmonies. He has but a limited number of notes to draw upon : so we are confined to the recollections which we have accumulated. But out of these materials may come an endless procession of new combinations.

It is, then, evident that what we term 'ideas' or 'original thoughts' are actually recollections analysed and re-grouped. A novelist composing a romance, ourselves making plans for the future, or hypothetical plans, are simply recollecting the past. Future time, hypothetical (or conditional) existence are in effect properties : it is, for instance, a property of a friend that he will arrive to-morrow or that he would come if he could. By inter-

polating these properties into a memory-chord—a process similar to that of inserting such words as ‘will’ or ‘would’ into a sentence—we give it a future or conditional complexion. Potentiality and necessity are also transferable properties. So, with the memory-chord of a friend before us, we can think of him as going, able to go, or as having gone to Switzerland, and picture to ourselves that he would have gone had he not a horror of the Channel crossing, that he might have gone had he pleased, or that he must go.

These elaborate transfers of recollections would for the most part be impossible were we not equipped with symbols, which we can employ as we employ counters in playing a game. Language is a collection of such symbols.’ In its origin a method of expressing emotion, as by ejaculation, it has been elaborated by our constructive talents into a marvellously complex arrangement of signs whereby we can set out our recollections in visible or audible form, just as a musician *scores* the music which he is composing. Our recollections become things outside us and we can transpose and recombine them with great facility. The procedure in which words are used for this purpose is obscured by the decorations with which language has been clothed by literary skill. But we can trace the process in tongues which, having no written character, have remained comparatively unadorned. In the Khasi language of the Assam Hills, for instance, past, present and future time are indicated simply by interpolating in a sentence the words *la*, *da* and

sa respectively: *lah* denotes 'can,' and *dei* 'must.' If we add such syllables on to a word, and modify them according to the person that is the subject of the sentence, we have the mood and tense endings of the Greek and Latin verbs. The Greek reduplication—the repetition of a syllable to express past time—is an obvious illustration of this process.

A sentence, or group of sentences, is, we may now perceive, the audible or visible expression of a memory-chord. The subject of the sentence, infused with feeling, is the ground-note of the chord: the properties of the subject are the notes that are strung into harmony. Indeed, rigorously defined, the fact which a sentence expresses is that the properties which it names have been connected in memory with the subject—that certain notes have been inserted into a chord. Language is not, of course, always cast in sentences. On occasions no recollections come into play at all, as when we use ejaculations to express fear, anger, joy, entreaty or command. To manifest emotion was the primitive use of language, and in the imperative mood we find the verb in its simplest form. But recollections are before us whenever we speak connectedly. They may merely be repetitions, such as occur in formulas of prayer, or in the stereotyped greetings of everyday life. But whenever we compose a sentence, as in ordinary speech or letter writing, we make use of recollections and rearrange them. To say that one feels unwell is to transfer the recollection of illness into the memory-chord of oneself. If we put a question,

we suggest a chord of recollections for acceptance by another: he accepts it by affirming, refuses it by denying. In conditional sentences, introduced by the word 'if,' we include in a chord recollections which we know to lie outside it—properties which we know to be imaginary—and proceed as if they could actually be harmonized.

A sentence may describe a co-existence or a sequence: we may say that 'John is kind,' or that 'John helps the poor.' In the former case the property is simply coupled with the subject as co-existent with it: in the latter there is a *happening*, which is expressed by a verb. The description may include a complicated series of properties which it requires many words, or even subordinate sentences, to express. It is conceivable that a single word should be used to state that 'John visits the poor in the East End twice a week.' But by breaking this statement up into separate words we effect an enormous economy of symbols, since these words will be available for us in quite other connections. Languages have developed by the subdivision of ideas (or recollections)—that is to say, by breaking up comprehensive, or 'portmanteau,' words into separate portions which may be connected with one another by prepositions or suffixes. There are languages in which this process is still very incomplete. An Indian people of Central America, for instance, possess no word to signify *washing* in the abstract: they use different words to express 'washing oneself' and 'washing one's clothes.'

Sentences are analysed by grammarians into *subject* and *predicate*—‘predicate’ having precisely the meaning which we have attached to the word ‘property.’ But this analysis omits the element of *feeling*, which holds the chord together, and brings it into consciousness. It may be objected that some sentences contain no feeling whatever—as, for instance, ‘three is the cube-root of twenty-seven,’ ‘thirty is not the square of six.’ But a statement which affirms involves adoption; one which denies involves rejection, and these two processes, as we have seen, are forces which generate a current of feeling. There is, in fact, an element of feeling in every exercise of our intelligence. But it is trivial: philosophical treatises are dull: and to render a thought, or a sentence, interesting one must introduce a stronger note. This, if not inherent in the subject, may be infused by the use of adjectives and adverbs. A statement that ‘the British soldiers again repelled the enemy’ hardly moves us: precisely the same intelligence energetically arouses our consciousness if it runs that ‘our indomitable soldiers again repelled their treacherous enemies.’ Herein lies the attractiveness of the ‘journalistic’ style.

The feeling with which a sentence is infused may be pleasurable or painful: sentences, in fact, affect us as major or as minor chords. To pass from pleasure to pain, or vice versâ, involves a disconnection which we denote by such conjunctions as ‘but’ or ‘nevertheless.’ When we say ‘he was born of poor but honest parents’ we rectify a feeling of contempt by one of admiration. On the

other hand such words as 'and' or 'moreover' are used to connect sentences which harmonize, or to introduce harmonizing notes. There appear to be remarkable analogies between musical harmony and conscious memory. Both result, in effect, from vibrations that are combined.

CHAPTER XI

THE DETERMINATION OF CONDUCT

WE have now reached a point at which we may test our conclusions by bringing them together into a connected theory, and judging how far this explains the various phases of human behaviour. Let us, in fact, endeavour to fit the pieces of our puzzle together. The task will not be easy, and will strain the attention, with however much interest we may pursue it.

To begin with, let us set out the various impulses which we have distinguished :

I. *Of Function.*

To replenish
(to eat, drink and
evacuate)

To recuperate
(to rest)

To reproduce

To reinvigorate
(to change)

II. *Of Development.*

To construct
To experiment

To imitate
To repeat (memory)

III. *Of Seeking and Avoiding.*

To adopt

To reject

Choice

Derived Impulses.

To assert oneself
(e.g. Courage)
To be sympathetic
(e.g. Affection)

To efface oneself
(e.g. Fear)
To be antipathetic
(e.g. Anger)

To these impulses we must add *feeling*, which is set up (or induced) by the impulses to seek and to avoid, but is itself impulsive in so far as it excites the various movements which are its expressions. But feeling does not merely move us to smiles and frowns, tears and laughter. As the object of choice it strongly influences our behaviour, electrifying us, as it were, positively or negatively towards our environment, towards other persons, and, apparently, towards ourselves. For feeling is in fact pleasure and pain. The latter, in its most primitive form, is that which we call physical pain, and the pain caused by extreme heat or cold: but it includes the irritations of hunger and thirst, lustful craving, fatigue and ennui. Pleasure follows these irritations when they are relieved, and we also derive elemental enjoyment from the taste of food and drink and from lust. The new or strange naturally excites either pleasure or pain: and there are some sights, sounds and tastes which are inherently agreeable or disagreeable. Pleasure or pain are inherent in the 'derived' emotions—self-assertive and sympathetic, fearful and antipathetic—since these emotions are developments of like and dislike. There is a natural pleasure in self-assertion and sympathy, and a natural pain in their quenching or disappointment: there is a natural pain in fear and antipathy, and a natural pleasure in relief from them, as from the irritation that accompanies the pressure of our impulses of function. But, for the rest, our pleasures and pains—the innumerable enjoyments and disgusts of taste, sight and hearing, which figure so largely

in our daily lives and seem so real—are in actual truth *fancies*, contracted by us in the course of our own activities—proofs of the curious paradox that likes and dislikes may be created by conduct, although conduct may be based upon likes and dislikes.

It is an anomaly of human nature that we appear to be able to control our actions but not our feelings: we may repress all manifestations of hunger, fear or anger, but we cannot prevent ourselves from feeling hungry, afraid or angry—that is to say, we cannot prevent these impulses from arising. We are confronted here with the distinction between method and purpose: over the former we have some power, over the latter none, except in so far as we may school ourselves in advance by resolutions and habits. We may apprehend a reason for this difference. Impulsive purposes are instinctive and natural, whereas methods are acquired and artificial. All methods, whether of dress, manners at table, or means of livelihood, are learnt by us, and are, in fact, memorial repetitions effected consciously. They may be compared to the tastes which we acquire by practice, such as those for tobacco or classical music. There are actions which are purely instinctive, just as there are tastes which are innate. But these are merely the elementary movements—the primitive manifestations of impulse or expressions of feeling—which would leave us below the level of the brutes were they not elaborated by the recollections which we amass and constructively recombine. The primitive movements of grasping, biting or swallowing,

which represent the instinctive promptings of the impulse to eat, become elaborated into the complicated manners of the table—which vary, be it noted, from country to country and have varied from century to century. By a similar development the ejaculations of infancy are worked up into the Babel of languages by which man delivers himself of his feelings, desires, recollections and beliefs, and communicates them to others. Our practices and manners are really as artificial as the tricks which we teach to animals. We adhere to them because we like them, and like them because we have adopted them. So does a dog come to enjoy retrieving, and a sea-lion to delight in balancing things upon its nose.

Methods may be classified, firstly, according as their object is to achieve an impulse or to express feeling: secondly, according as they depend upon movements of the feet, the hands, or the organs of the mouth; and thirdly, according as they are actions or fashionings—as they result in the creation of something tangible or not. The distinction between practical purpose and the expression of feeling is that which we recognize between Industry and Art. The artistic and the practical are usually combined. A man may walk gracefully to his office: we pay this compliment to his movements if they remind us of dancing, which is an instinctive expression of pleasurable feeling. So there are few of even the humblest domestic utensils in the designing of which some endeavour is not made to express the gratification which beauty affords. But we all realize the distinction between the useful

and the artistic, however closely they may be interlaced in practice. With respect to the organs of the body that serve us as instruments for our methods, it is to be observed that with advancing culture the importance of the feet has been steadily decreasing. Apart from them, means of locomotion have been discovered which have culminated in the extraordinary complexities of railway and motor transport. The primitive functions of the mouth have been marvellously elaborated: cries and ejaculations have been organized into speaking and singing, which not only enable us to communicate our ideas to our fellows—to enthematize and be enthematized—but are the fundamental origin of literature and music. But in the expression of feeling the hands have trespassed upon the domain of the mouth: they make words in writing and printing, which can speak to us from paper, and contrive and use musical instruments which can rival the voice. They have also, as we have seen, usurped very largely the province of the feet in enabling us to move from place to place. Handicrafts, gradually complicated by machinery, have developed into the intricacies of manufacture: they are still the methods upon which painting, sculpture and architecture depend. Civilization is poised upon the fingers of the hand.

It is doubtful whether any distinction of essence can be drawn between acting and fashioning. In one case no trace is left on the environment, as when we eat, walk or play the violin: in the other case there is a tangible result, as when we cultivate a garden, build a house or paint a

picture. These are all constructive activities, and one can hardly say that a pianist or a cricketer is less creative than an artisan or a maker of chocolate creams. Acting and fashioning may be likened to the effects of a wind in its passage across a tract of country : over the open fields its course is traceless, but when it touches water it leaves ripples behind it.

Our methods are constantly changing and we can observe the process of their development. The revolutions which have been effected by the bicycle, the motor-car, and the aeroplane are the fruit of a vast number of constructive experiments made by comparatively few individuals. So have all our methods of conduct been gradually formed—speaking, and writing and the manners of behaviour which are termed the ‘usages of society.’ It is due to the propensity to make trials—the propensity which is, perhaps, the most distinctive possession of living creatures—aided by a marvellous memory, that man has slowly won his way upwards from the apelike savagery of inter-glacial days. Novelties of conduct are spread through a community by imitation, any special muscular movements that they may require being learnt by practice, so that memory can repeat them when occasion arises. Evidently, then, our methods of conduct owe their origin to the impulses to construct, to experiment, and to imitate, which in infancy move us subconsciously, but become conscious when, in later years, they are associated with emotional impulses or we *choose* to give effect to them.

The methods of conduct which are so elaborated

are the means by which we achieve our impulses : without them we could hardly satisfy one of our passions, our desires, or our choices. All conscious *conduct* is chosen : even if it be imitated we have chosen to imitate. But it falls into two sharply distinguished classes according as it is *motived by choice*, or is motived by an unhesitating (or unreflective) impulse, and is chosen simply as a means of giving effect to this impulse. This is a distinction of capital importance. When we are motived by choice our conduct determines not only the methods but the feeling, or 'spirit,' of our behaviour. If I choose to relieve a poor man in preference to spending money on a new hat, I adopt a spirit of benevolence in place of a spirit of vanity. But if I am moved by the impulse of pity and choose to give him a sovereign, my choice has merely carried my impulse into action. Conduct which is motived by choice is, as we have seen, determined simply upon a balancing of pleasure and pain, and the spirit in which we act is that which accompanies the conduct that has seemed most pleasurable. On the other hand, conduct that is motived by impulse (in which choice merely plays the part of an instrument) is quite regardless of feeling : one loves although love may bring the pangs of disappointment or of jealousy : one hates although life may be embittered thereby.

We may then distinguish our conduct according as it is determined by visions of pleasure and pain, or motived by impulses to which pleasure and pain are unessential adjuncts. In fact, we lead two separate lives—the life of choice or of

self-interest, and the life of impulse. The one may be figured as the smooth upcurrent of a stream: the other as an undercurrent of swirls and eddies, which occasionally rise to the surface and disturb its placidity. It is the undercurrent which gives the stream its velocity. Impulse is the origin of choice, since the pleasures and pains which determine our choosings arise out of impulses, and are brought before choice by memory. Furthermore, choice is itself impulsive: it is a development of the impulses to seek and to avoid, and the distinction which we are endeavouring to draw should not be stated as between choice and impulse, but between choice and unhesitating or unreflective impulses. We may, then, conveniently consider the life of impulse before the life of choice, since it is the more primitive of the two, remembering, however, that an unhesitating impulse cannot achieve itself without conduct, and that conduct is chosen. If we hate another it is choice which may provide us with the means of injuring him.

The Life of Impulse

Our motives in the life of impulse are those which we term 'unreflective'—those which come from the effect upon us of any impulse other than the reflective development of seeking and avoiding that has been distinguished as *choice*. Thus we act impulsively when we are moved, unhesitatingly and uncalculatingly, by hunger, sensuous desire, or any of the derived emotions. The impulses to make trials and to imitate come

into this life—not in the form of alternative courses of action to be chosen or rejected—but as emotional forces—as elements in the derived emotions. It is random effort that converts fear into panic : venturesomeness is at its height in the ecstasy of courage : in the emotion of obedience, imitation becomes a conscious force of resistless strength.

What occasions the onset of an impulse ? Our subconscious life is in darkness, and we cannot follow the uprising of our impulses to construct, to venture, and to imitate. But, in the case of impulses that are conscious, we know that to arouse them a stimulus must be presented. We ordinarily think of a stimulus as something which acts upon us from outside. But we must enlarge this conception. We may be stimulated by happenings within us—by the conditions of our bodily organs. These may affect our nerves of sensation even more strongly than impressions which come to us through our eyes and ears, or our surface sensibilities of touch. We feel internal pain as keenly as that which is caused by a cut or bruise, and at all times our mental condition is affected very greatly by changes that are occurring within us.

A stimulus need not be presented to our sense organs. It may be offered to us by memory. The recollection of a pleasure may bring a glow of desire : the recollection of an insult may make us tremble with anger. It seems, moreover, that internal stimuli may also be repeated in memory. Only on this hypothesis can the fact be explained that we can vary the hours at which we feel

hungry or fatigued by changing our meal-times or bed-time.

But a stimulus will not affect us unless it is met by a susceptibility. If we do not care for tobacco we are not moved by the offer of a cigarette: if we are in a good humour we can easily tolerate persons or things which would ordinarily annoy us. Our actions, then, depend not only upon stimuli and impulses, but upon susceptibilities. We may, it is true, regard the susceptibility as part and parcel of the impulse, and speak of 'impulsive susceptibilities.' But this apparent simplification will actually increase the complexity of the problem before us. It is more difficult to conceive of an impulse than it is, so to speak, two-headed—that the same impulse, for instance, may at one time be love and at another time hate—than to conceive the existence of two contrary impulses, either of which becomes active only when it is sensitized—when it is mobilized—by an influence which, we shall see, is that of like or dislike.

Some of our susceptibilities are definite and unvarying—that is to say, we are invariably moved by the stimulus in a certain direction. In no circumstances can one like extreme heat or cold, or accept a mineral diet as agreeable. But these unvarying susceptibilities are not always active. They may be dormant, so that the stimulus leaves us unmoved. After a long rest we are not impelled to sleep, and the impulse to take food may be annihilated by extreme fear. But the majority of our susceptibilities are varying, and lead us one way or the other—in the

direction of attraction or repulsion—according to our temper, mood or ‘frame of mind’ at the time when the stimulus presents itself. That is to say, they are influenced by feeling or by habit—and habit is the result of feeling.

To revert to *stimuli*. These, as we have seen, may be distinguished as internal and external. Those which arouse the impulses of function are internal¹—conditions of exhaustion or irritation, such as those which come before consciousness as hunger, lust, and fatigue. The impulse to change is, it appears, also stimulated (it may be subconsciously) by the internal effects of the unchanging course of sensations and recollections which form the dull monotony of daily life—by the satiety which, in consciousness, is the feeling of ennui. Internal stimuli may also arouse impulses of seeking and of avoiding. Indeed these impulses are commonly excited by the same stimuli as those which excite impulses of function. Lack of food stimulates an impulse to eat: it also stimulates an impulse to avoid—to recoil from the physical conditions of exhaustion—which generates the painful feeling of hunger. And the relief of hunger or fatigue stimulates an impulse to seek—to revel, so to speak, in the physical conditions of repletion and recuperation, generating a feeling of satisfaction that is quite distinct from the pleasure which is aroused by the taste of food, or by the comfort in which we take rest. We may satisfy hunger by the coarsest of food, and fatigue on the roughest of couches.

¹ These may be repeated by memory, and we can, then, understand the well-established fact that by indulging impulses of function we strengthen their subconscious hold upon us.

There are other internal stimuli which affect the impulses to seek and to avoid. Such are those which produce feelings of bodily comfort and discomfort, and of physical pain. We court the well-being which makes us 'quite ourselves,' and recoil from irritation of our internal tissues. But the characteristic stimuli of the impulses to seek and to avoid are external—those which present themselves through our sense organs—impressions of sight, sound, touch, taste, and smell, and recollections of these impressions.

We pass now to a more detailed consideration of *susceptibilities*. It is clear that those which affect the impulses of function are unvarying. The conditions which arouse an impulse to eat, or to rest, will in no case impel us to fast or to take exercise. But these unvarying susceptibilities are at times inactive or dormant. The conditions which result in the cravings of hunger need a certain period before they move us. If they are not satisfied, susceptibility increases for a while but finally dies away. After a certain point in starvation the desire to eat is extinguished. Susceptibility is deadened by the long unbroken repetition of the stimulus, as when we cease to hear the incessant ticking of a clock.

The susceptibilities that affect the impulses to seek and to avoid are also unvarying when the stimuli to which they respond are internal. No one can like hunger or a toothache. So also are some of those which respond to external stimuli. Practically all men are repelled by extremes of temperature, by strident sounds, glaring light, by things which are bitter to the tongue, and by the

taste of most minerals, salt being one of the most notable exceptions. All men are attracted by the pleasures of lust, by the taste of sweet things and by beauty in woman. These susceptibilities, ordinarily definite and unvarying, may, however, be reversed by the action of the impulse to change that is accompanied by a feeling of satiety or ennui. Towards the close of a concert attractive music may begin to bore us. We may come to dislike a favourite dish because we have grown tired of it. In some phases of repentance we have striking illustrations of sudden revulsion: drunkards or debauchees reject with horror their pleasures of the past. The immediate cause of their conversion may be religious influence, or the suggestions of another. This, however, is only as the shake by which a supersaturated solution is crystallized: had it not been supersaturated no agitation would have changed it.

But for the most part our susceptibilities to external stimuli are indefinite, or varying, because they can in greater or less degree be moulded by feeling, or by conduct as the origin of feeling. They may be quite indefinite—altogether plastic under the influence of feeling, or conduct, which may develop them as attractive or repulsive tendencies. Or they may be inherited by us as decided, but alternative tendencies, one or other of which may be strengthened by feeling, or conduct.

Susceptibilities that are quite indefinite, or plastic, result in such likings as those for particular methods of dress, or manners—as, for instance, to the wearing of a kilt in preference to trousers.

Here there is no question of any innate predilection. Our liking is the result of habit, pure and simple. Habit is also the origin of a vast number of our tastes in food. But it is to be observed that many of these tastes are undoubtedly influenced by peculiar predispositions with which we are born. The character of the nerves of sense varies greatly from individual to individual. We have no means of ascertaining the precise quality of the impressions which stimuli make upon others except in the light of their behaviour. This shows that sensitiveness to physical pain, to sound and colour, to the swaying of a ship at sea, is by no means alike in all men. We may infer that there may be innate peculiarities of the sense nerves which give different aspects to stimuli, which we wrongly assume to be the same for all mankind. So we may account for the many eccentricities of individual tastes—the extraordinarily strong attraction, for instance, which some men feel in alcohol. But these eccentricities, we must remember, are only *tendencies* and may generally be overcome by choice. Most of those who are devoted to tobacco loathed it after their first pipe.

The susceptibilities which are indefinite because they are alternative include some that are purely sensuous. For instance, music that is enjoyable at one time may annoy us at another. But they are illustrated most typically by the susceptibilities that are associated with the ‘derived’ impulses, or emotions. These, as we have seen, being phases of like and dislike, may be grouped in pairs of opposites, both impulses of each pair

being capable of responding to a particular stimulus. But, just as some of our sensuous tastes—that for alcohol, for instance—may be affected by hereditary predilections, so our ‘derived’ emotions may be swayed one way or the other by a hereditary predisposition in the direction of attraction or repulsion. It is clear that individuals may be born with a definite inclination towards one or other of the trends of an alternative susceptibility. There is not a nurse who would deny that from their earliest years some children are more timid or more courageous, more secretive or emulative than others—that some are naturally inclined to jealousy and others to affection. One might suspect that this difference of temperament resulted from physical conditions: that children were timid or jealous because they were continually irritated, perhaps subconsciously by irregularities or disorders in the functioning of their bodies. Ill-health may certainly predispose one to nervousness or crossness. But it is difficult to believe that physical irritation is the only cause of timidity or ill-temper. For, apart from the fact that violence of temper is often associated with exceedingly good health, we must note that one may be of a timid disposition and yet be not inclined to anger or jealousy, and be affectionate and be still lacking in courage. Evidently, then, these inborn peculiarities do not produce attractive or repulsive dispositions *generally*, but only affect certain susceptibilities, producing tendencies which may indeed be overcome, but naturally incline their possessors to one or other of each

pair of contrary impulses—to be affected self-effacingly or self-assertively, antipathetically or sympathetically.

We may digress here to observe that the peculiarities of character which are termed 'racial' may be due to innate hereditary trends of susceptibility. These would not only render a people peculiarly sensible or insensible to the stimuli of certain impulses: by their influence upon likings they would profoundly affect the course of choice. Those who are peculiarly insensible to stimuli of courage, for instance, would not choose courageous conduct, since they would be inappreciative of the pleasure which it affords. So the difference between French morality and our own may be the result of a more acute sensibility to the pleasure which comes to us through the senses, rendering it much more attractive than the pleasure of self-control.

We start, then, in infancy endowed, firstly, with some sensuous susceptibilities that are definite and *instinctive*; secondly, with a capacity for acquiring other sensuous susceptibilities *artificially* by habit, influenced in many cases by hereditary predilection; and thirdly, with *alternative* susceptibilities—chiefly in regard to the 'derived' emotions—that are influenced by a hereditary tendency towards one or other of each alternative. The agency by which these alternative susceptibilities can be trained or swayed, positively or negatively, as it may be expressed, is feeling¹—that influence which we have likened

¹ Feeling is most far-reaching in effect when it becomes the object of choice: it then introduces inclinations which may altogether supersede an unreflective impulse. But we are now

to an induced current of electricity. The feeling which sways our susceptibilities in this fashion is very frequently a general disposition towards adoption or rejection—a mood of exhilaration which inclines one towards self-assertion or sympathy, or a mood of depression or irritation which inclines one towards self-effacement or antipathy. Or it may be a feeling (or sentiment) that has become associated with the particular stimulus which is before us, either because it was aroused by a previous experience of the stimulus, or because it has been instilled into us enthematically in regard to the stimulus. We may, for instance, view a dog with apprehension instead of liking because it has bitten us, or because we have been warned against it. The feelings that determine the trend of alternative susceptibilities may, then, be distinguished as moods or sentiments; and these may again be distinguished according as they are derived from experience or are enthematized.

A mood affects our relations not with a single individual, but with persons and things generally. It is a continuing state of irritation or stimulation—the result of a continuing stimulus. This may be a condition of the body, such as gout or indigestion. It may be the weather, whose influence upon our spirits is sufficiently strong to provide us with an unfailing topic of conversation. It may be a stimulus which is repeated by concerned with the workings not of choice, but of unreflective impulses—with the action of feeling in swinging these impulses attractively or repulsively, quite apart from any prospect of pleasure or pain. When a passing mood of irritation renders a man cross instead of kind towards a friend no question of pleasure or pain affects him.

memory. If we are in an irritable temper things which ordinarily give pleasure may become nuisances, and annoyances become burdens too heavy to be borne. A persistent feeling of crossness, the after effect, it may be, of anxieties, a snub to our self-esteem, or a spasm of jealousy, will set us in a mood of prickly sensibility against our dearest friends. On the other hand, in a mood of exhilaration we make light of troubles, and find reason for happiness everywhere. Moods are as coloured glasses—yellow and rose—through which we view the passing show. The glasses are shifted, but not so frequently as we may imagine: good or bad temper may become almost chronic. Or we may compare our moods to minor and major keys which determine the setting of our impressions and recollections. With some it requires acute pleasure or pain to modulate from one key into the other. With others the change can come about easily: they possess, we say, a mercurial disposition. Fortunately for most of us, our meals are such masterful pleasures that they can change minor into major three or four times a day.

When the feeling which influences us is not general but particular, is definitely associated, that is to say, with the stimulus before us—is, in fact, not a mood but a sentiment—it may have been derived from experience or received enthematically from another. The experience is that of adopting or rejecting, which has left a feeling of attraction or repulsion behind it. The adopting or rejecting may have been instinctive, as when we have shrunk from a blow or an insult, acquiring a feeling in respect to the aggressor

which will render us repulsively susceptible to him when we next meet him. Or it may have resulted from an acquired like or dislike—which, as already explained, is ultimately traceable to an act of imitation or of experiment, although it may have been reinforced very greatly by choice, resolution or habit. Every time that we adopt or reject a stimulus, whether instinctively or in virtue of an acquired like or dislike, we strengthen our attraction or repulsion for it. This fact is, as we have seen, the foundation of habit, which plays a part of immense importance in determining the trend of impulsive susceptibilities. A child which runs away from a dog becomes predisposed to run away from other dogs, and acquires a timorous susceptibility in regard to them. If we behave rudely to another we shall be likely to behave rudely to him again, acquiring, at the same time, an angry susceptibility towards him. In regard to other persons we may remain indifferent enough. But it is obvious that if our rudeness of manner becomes general, the stimulus will become not the individual, but man generally : and we may endow ourselves with an ill-tempered disposition. So we may increase our susceptibility to courage, to ambition or to affection : one naturally inclined to generosity may become miserly under the stress of circumstances : a miser may in some degree cure himself of acquisitiveness.

These reflections will throw light upon the mysterious process by which we can acquire feelings by transfer from another. We receive, through his words, an 'idea' ; that is to say, his

words call up in us a recollection which is identical with his own. This recollection brings with it the feeling which has adhered to it, and the feeling renders us susceptible—in one direction or another—to the influence of the recollection as a stimulus. Suppose, for instance, that he appeals to our purse for a charity. His allusions to distress recall memories which are tinged with feelings of pity, and his description of the persons in distress presents to us a vision which acts as a stimulus to our sympathetic impulse. We imitate his feelings by imitating his recollections, and are moved impulsively by a stimulus which is grafted by him upon us. It is quite unnecessary to enlarge upon the effect which these transferred feelings exercise upon our life of impulse. They have been the origin of all popular movements. They are the missionaries that have spread the influence of religion: they are the hypnotists that infect us with party feelings in politics. We can borrow feelings from a crowd as easily as from an individual. As gregarious animals we are impelled to imitate those around us, and there are, indeed, few who can isolate themselves from the spread of a submerging flood of popular excitement.

It seems, moreover, that we can acquire enthematically not merely a feeling, or sentiment, in respect to a particular stimulus, but a general mood of exhilaration or irritation, which will determine our attitude towards a stimulus that may be presented later on. We can gather this mood from the facial expression or gestures of another: we imitate these, more or less sub-

consciously, and so induce a current of feeling, just as we may generate for ourselves some faint measure of cheerfulness by making ourselves smile. It is common experience that one who is in a temper of irritation or gaiety infects those around him with irritability or cheerfulness; and the gestures of an orator may so exhilarate an audience which cannot understand his words as to predispose them to acts of extraordinary daring or self-sacrifice. Of this remarkable phase of suggestion St. Bernard's preaching of the Crusades is a striking illustration.

Music affects our susceptibilities in a curious fashion, and it is not altogether fanciful to use musical terms, such as 'major' and 'minor,' in describing our moods. A war tune such as the Marseillaise actually excites the ardours of courage: a Miserere overclouds us with feelings of sadness. There is no question of previous association: the tunes produce these effects by their own direct influence. Major keys are cheerful: minor keys depressing: a change from one to the other affects us as does good or bad news, or any other actual stimulus of joy or sorrow. The body, with its network of nerves, resembles, in fact, a stringed instrument which vibrates in sympathy with the sounds that reach it. The tone of a regiment may be improved by its band.

* * *

Such appear to be the influences which determine the *motives* of our conduct, so far as it is unreflectively impulsive and not regulated by choice—which account for the uprising of such

emotions as love, fear, emulation and anger. The *methods* of our conduct are, as we have seen, decided by choice when they are more elaborate than the primitive movements by which impulses and feelings instinctively express themselves, or the subconscious imitations and experimentings of childhood. Amongst the methods, so chosen, may be conduct which involves imitation or experiment, and so it comes about that, through choice, these impulses retain a hold upon our conscious life. When a man engages himself in marriage we may be almost sure that he will present a ring to his fiancée. He makes his offering by imitation: he follows the practice which is ordained by his community. In selecting the ring he will imitate again if he submits himself to the advice of the jeweller. For one may copy another's ideas or recollections as well as his manners. He may make a random selection in despair of 'making up his mind.' Or he may choose for himself, that is to say, he may be influenced by his feelings of like or dislike for particular rings. This is the process which is ordinarily termed 'choice.' But he has also chosen if he imitates or ventures, since he adopts these lines of conduct because he recollects them as hopeful ways of evading a difficulty.

CHAPTER XII

THE DETERMINATION OF CONDUCT—*Continued*

The Life of Choice

CHOICE, which primitively, it seems, is concerned with methods, usurps jurisdiction over our motives, holding up before us a single purpose in place of a number of impulsive propensities. This purpose is to seek pleasure and avoid pain—the pursuit of self-interest. The life of choice characterizes civilized as opposed to savage societies, and matured years as opposed to youth. It is safer than the life of impulse: it may not afford the rapturous pleasure of strong emotions, but it does not expose us to their pain. If we do not love we are secure against the pangs of bereavement. But we all admit that it is the less heroic—that is to say, we admire it less. It is from the life of impulse that Art chooses its themes. Its heroes and heroines should be young. Crises of unreflective emotion entrance or desolate the days of childhood: in youth they are frequent and vivid experiences: with advancing years they become overlaid by the recollections that are their vestiges, and conduct loses unhesitating directness.

It is with a community as with an individual. Its progress in civilization is accompanied by the

substitution of choice for impulse as the motive of conduct. When manners are simple there is no great scope for choosing, and emotion is not stifled by material temptations. As comforts grow more numerous they are more esteemed. In the course of civilization methods of conduct, comforts and luxuries—the various objects of choice—become so greatly multiplied that choice, or self-interest, engrosses most of our active hours, and we come to regard it as the mainspring of our behaviour. Recollections of previous actions, and of accompanying pleasure and pain, are ever before us; and the impulses of seeking and avoiding, stimulated by them, provide a steady current of energy which can run the most complicated activities as smoothly as machinery.

Not only is the scope for choice immensely enlarged by the growth of the various tastes of cultured life. Its objects are multiplied by law and the customs of society, which attach rewards or punishments to methods of behaviour, and so bring them within its domain. We come to avoid theft, not because it is contrary to a sympathetic impulse, but because it is punishable with imprisonment. With a respect for law antipathetic feelings are relieved by litigation instead of by violence. 'Respectability' becomes our Promised Land.¹ Thus a community settles down into the tranquillity of culture. Material progress is rapid since the adoption of new ideas is not tempered by reverence for custom or ancient authority. Peace

¹ The poems and tales of Rudyard Kipling transport us from the calm, hazy atmosphere of choice to the storm-washed vehemence of unreflective impulse, and respectability is disposed to look askance at them

appears to be the greatest of blessings: the miseries of war become so repulsive that it requires imminent danger to force us to accept them. But something is lost. There is the decrease in national vitality which we recognize as 'decadence.' By nothing is the influence of choice illustrated more strikingly than by the fall in the birth-rate which is stunting the growth of the nations of Western Europe and their cousins overseas. So long as men and women are swayed by impulse—whether it is by natural animal promptings, or by veneration for religious precept—they regard a large family as a privilege of which they are unreflectively proud. But judged by self-interest, child-bearing and children have much against them, and fertility is repressed,¹ with results that appear to doom the most intelligent families to extinction. Choice is as a queen without arsenals and without nurseries: emotion bears a sword, but has children at her knees.

The objects of choice, we have seen, are pleasures and pains—or rather the recollections of pleasures and pains—('sentiments' we may call them)—that are associated with objects or methods of conduct. We choose between recollections that are coloured by feeling. Behaviour which is dictated by the coldest self-interest is, then, in fact sentimental. We term it 'calculated.' But its calculations are the appraisalment of pleasures and pains which may be difficult to value because

¹ The artificiality of the life of choice reaches its climax in suicide—an act which is wholly unnatural. It is the last despairing inclination of choice—an effort to snatch the satisfaction of self-assertion against oneself, when hopelessly overborne by all other antagonists.

they are possible, not inevitable, properties of conduct. Fire will always burn : but a lie is not always detected, and in choosing to lie, we allow for the possibility of escape in appraising the pain of discovery. Throughout our hesitations our concern is, simply and inevitably, to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Feeling is in fact the main-spring of all conduct that is not crudely impulsive, or subconsciously imitative or experimental. How great is the error of Materialist philosophers who, unable to explain the existence of feeling, have belittled its effect, regarding it as a superfluity—an ‘epiphenomenon,’ an unessential adjunct of sensation—which may be likened to the sparks that are thrown off by an electrical machine but do not contribute to its effectiveness !

In choosing methods of conduct by our liking for the feelings—or sentiments—that are associated with them, we may determine not only the manner, but the spirit of our behaviour. We may choose to perform a kindly action because our recollections show that it will give us pleasure : but, having chosen it on self-interested grounds, we act as if we were moved by a kindly impulse. The pleasure which altruism affords us, as social animals, has the effect of inducing us to act altruistically upon egotistical grounds. Our kindness will not be so warm as if it welled up impulsively : it is cold-blooded, calculated and may be pharisaical. But we shall *feel* kind, and we shall benefit others as greatly as if we were actually kind—perhaps more so, for impulsive charity lacks discrimination. Nevertheless, our admiration goes out to the impulse more than to

the choice ; and we prefer the sympathy of emotion to that of sentiment.

We have already attempted to classify the pleasures and pains that influence choice. They may be distinguished as sensuous or emotional according as their stimuli are apprehended by simple sensation, or by the elaboration of sensation which is termed 'intelligence.' They may also be distinguished as instinctive or acquired. There are very peculiar pleasures and pains which arise from the workings of self-consciousness. These have so far been merely indicated : but our enquiry has now reached a stage at which they should be considered in more detail. Pleasures and pains may, further, be classed according as they are the essential, or merely possible, properties of objects or methods of conduct. Pain is an essential property of a wound : in the form of punishment it is a possible property of a theft. To many men pleasure is an essential property of dancing, but only a possible property of a dinner-party. In choosing from amongst pleasures and pains that are of the class of possibilities, it is necessary to weigh not only the pleasure or pain in itself but the chances of its occurring. Thus if, finding myself sitting in a draught at a concert, I think of leaving, I put into the scales, against the pain of losing the music and forfeiting the price of my ticket, not simply the pain of a cold (in which case I should leave immediately) but the pain of catching a cold modified by the chance of escaping it. If this chance is five to one, and I leave notwithstanding, it follows that the pain of a cold is five times the pain of losing the music

and forfeiting my ticket. The difficulty of estimating comparative values in this fashion causes hesitation, and, owing to the imperfections of intelligence, our conclusions may, not infrequently, be absurdly wrong. But when we have finally appraised values, our choice follows inevitably. Between pleasure and pain we must choose the former: of two pleasures we must choose the greater, of two pains the less.

But, it will be objected, what if we choose to deny ourselves? Is not this the choice of pain instead of pleasure? Only in language. In reality voluntary self-denial is attended by great pleasure. We do not term the feeling pleasure because it is of a very peculiar kind, not arising naturally and directly, but produced by the curious involutions of self-consciousness.

Self-conscious feelings produce a peculiar set of values, which profoundly influence the direction of our choices. Self-consciousness enables us to feel, in communication with ourselves, pleasures and pains which are, in their origin, the outcome of our relations with others. For instance, as social animals we like the good opinion and dislike the bad opinion of those around us. But the approbation, or disapprobation, which may turn our choice may be not of our fellows, but of ourselves. In fact man, in the solitude of his own thoughts, is still a social animal, and creates a companion out of himself—a critic to whose praise and blame he is keenly sensitive.

To approve or disapprove of oneself is to impose two characters upon oneself—to be at once the critic and the criticized. How is it possible for a

single individual to form the idea that he is two-fold? This is the greatest problem in psychology. It is possible that in the processes of choice we may find some clue to its explanation. For this doubling of oneself is evidently effected by some elaboration of consciousness, and consciousness is at its strongest in the processes of choice, inasmuch as these are entirely dependent upon feelings, and feeling, as we have seen, is consciousness.

To have any hope of understanding the processes of consciousness we must liken them to something that our senses have perceived. We have figured the consciousness of self as a chord that is capable of sounding notes—of presenting recollections and feelings—which establish a continuity between our present moments and the early days of our childhood. Let us pursue this image. The process of choice will consist in the successive intrusion into this chord of different notes, each of which represents one of the courses between which we are hesitating. If it is a question of going to a *matinée*, or taking a walk, each of these attractions will occur and reoccur to us during the stage of hesitation, until we finally incline one way or the other. Now it is only when one of these attractions is of a particular description that we become aware of an antagonism between the ‘Spirit and the Flesh.’ The attraction must be a pleasurable feeling of a kind which involves the existence of another individual besides ourselves. This is the case when it has originated in an impulse of self-assertion or of sympathy. For we cannot oppose unless there is an antagonist: we cannot love

or pity unless there is someone upon whom we can direct these impulses. Feelings of self-assertion and sympathy are amongst the most pleasurable that we experience, and should they present themselves as the objects of a choice we are driven towards them very strongly.

Suppose, for instance, that we have to choose between getting up and lying in bed. The pleasure of asserting ourselves may very well triumph over that of indulging ourselves: in this case we compel ourselves to get up. But we have adopted a feeling which is inseparably connected with the presence of another individual—an antagonist—and we are forced to take as this antagonist the feeling of self-indulgence which we have conquered. But this is, in fact, a part of ourselves. Why do we conceive that the triumph is of the mind over the body—that it is the body which represents sensuous temptation? Because self-indulgence is stimulated by impressions of the senses, and it is also through the senses that the existence of the body is perpetually brought home to us. In this respect the body resembles an outside stimulus; and this strengthens our idea that it is something external, of which our mind—that is to say, the memory chord of ourselves—may be the antagonist or the companion.¹

It is difficult to unravel these strange complexities of self-consciousness, and we may rehearse our endeavours to elucidate them. The feelings which accompany the self-assertive and

¹ *Hostis comesque corporis*—to change a word of Marcus Aurelius.

sympathetic impulses inherently imply the existence of two individuals—one who is impelled by them, and another towards whom impulsion takes place. Conduct which these impulses have inspired is recollected with pleasure or satisfaction, and may be chosen by us when there is no question of the existence of anyone but ourselves. Thus we may antagonize ourselves, pose before ourselves, respect ourselves, obey ourselves, and, so acting, we are compelled by the very nature of our feelings to regard ourselves as playing two characters—that of him who acts, and that of him who is acted upon.

Self-consciousness in choice has an extraordinary effect upon conduct. For it may reverse the ordinary trend of susceptibilities by developing entirely new sources of pleasure which may become more attractive than sensuous enjoyment. By persistent self-antagonism men, who by nature are self-indulgently disposed, may come to regard bodily enjoyment as a thing to be shunned. Hence arises the passion for self-repression, or asceticism, which may appear to be the most extraordinary of human proclivities, with its ramifications in penance, self-mortification and celibacy. The effects of this impulse may also be noticed in the trivial round of everyday life, in petty acts of self-denial, which conduce very greatly to the happiness of others, but have their own reward in the gratification of self. That this is so, is often appreciated: and acts of self-denial may be resented by those for whose benefit they are performed, as puritanical attempts 'to save one's own soul.' But the world would

be a poorer place without them. And the passion of self-sacrifice touches some other emotions with a transfiguring effect. It will give courage to the timid : it will endow the brave with hearts of adamant : and it crowns the verdures of love with the flower of chivalry.

The idea of liberty is another notable evolution. This is essentially an impulse to assert oneself before oneself, and not, as is sometimes supposed, a natural animal craving. Wild animals when caged strive to regain their freedom because captivity is strange and out of accord with their recollections. When accustomed to it, they appreciate the unwonted regularity of their meals, and, if released from their cages, will contentedly return to them. If born in captivity they show no signs of resenting it. Reformers, it may be observed, that have urged the masses to strike for liberty have appealed, not to the pleasure of independence, but to their feelings of self-esteem. And, as soon as some measure of political liberty has been gained, its grantees, instead of making use of it, have generally submitted themselves to some new form of authority, whether of a dictator, a clique of politicians, or a Trades Union. For most men it is pleasanter to follow others than to think for themselves ; and their self-esteem is satisfied by the feeling that they have chosen their leaders.

But it must not be supposed from this somewhat cynical conclusion that liberty is of no real account. For the masses it may be a phantasy : but it is a reality for those who aspire to lead them, and has enabled reformers to initiate new measures—

religious, social, moral and political—which would have remained unattainable under absolute rule.

It is often claimed for liberty that it encourages self-respect. Here we have another curious achievement of self-consciousness: it twists our respect and affection for others into a respect and affection for ourselves—can even enable us to pity ourselves. We become entangled in the meshes of an engrossing egotism; for respect and affection grow, as we have seen, with propinquity, and no one can be as near us as we are to ourselves. Self-respect is the converse of respect for others, or reverence for others, and one hears little of it amongst those who are strongly moved by religious, loyal or patriotic ideals. But it is seldom absent from the utterances of democratic orators.

The desire for approbation is (as we have seen) a form of vanity. It is when we seek the pleasure of our own approbation that we are moved by 'conscience.' What is the standard that we approve in our hearts? Evidently conduct which we admire; and, since our susceptibility to admiration is determined very largely by enthematic influence, the actions which we approve will generally be those which are favoured by the community to which we belong. Thus to one who has been brought up in military circles, cowardice—the acceptance of an insult—would be the bitterest shame, whilst a Quaker would be pained—his conscience would be troubled—if he struck another, upon whatever provocation. If we observe the popular codes of law and morality, we are complacently content

with ourselves : if we break them we are pained by a feeling of self-reproach. 'Conscience' is a desire to stand well with ourselves. Let us not belittle it on this account. For it possesses the touchstone of truth and is not misled by appearances. We may win the approval of others by hypocrisy, but our own approval must be deserved.

Amongst the canons which are strongly safeguarded by this desire for approval are those of modesty and chastity. We should like to believe that these virtues arise from propensities that are innate. But against this view is the extraordinary diversity of the rules in which they are expressed. Modesty may be the fruit of our admiration for the beautiful, which shows itself naively amongst uncultured people by fondness for bodily decoration. And since one's notions of the beautiful are in a great measure artificial, the rules of modesty are fantastically diverse. There is an Indian hill-people amongst whom to discard a ring excites scandal. Chastity may have a more substantial basis in the repugnance with which a woman who loves one man regards the advances of another. But it owes very much to the idea of proprietorship, which has infected the attitude of men towards women. Its observances, like those of modesty, are liable to arbitrary variations, and admit of polygamy amongst some peoples and of polyandry amongst others.

We are also moved to obey ourselves. What is 'duty'—the 'gospel of the day's work'—but an impulse faithfully to discharge the business

which we have set ourselves? Our task is enjoined by the action of other impulses—it may be to stand firm in courage, to show our loyalty to the King or our reverence for religion, it may be to work industriously under the bidding of our impulse to construct. But in the light of self-consciousness the performance of this task appears to be an act of obedience¹ which we owe to ourselves: and when we fail we are oppressed with such sorrow as would be the penalty for disobeying an authority that we revered.

We may digress here to speculate upon the effect of this notion of duality in generating ideas which have exerted the profoundest of influences upon thought and history. One of the parts into which we divide ourselves, is, as we have seen, sharply distinguished from the body of physical sensation. Existing apart from the body, it may not be involved in the material consequences of death. Moreover, the duality which we recognize in ourselves may be imagined to exist in others—to be an attribute indeed, not only of humanity, but of all animals, even of inanimate things. There may be a soul in every thing. There may be a spirit world in which these souls subsist after the decay of their material ‘doubles’: or they may return, and haunt the scenes of their bodily activity, infusing into us the suspicion—the curiosity—with which we regard the unknown, and introducing into life

¹ A sense of duty is often called ‘conscientiousness,’ and if this theory is correct conscientiousness should accompany a disposition to obey. Is not this the case with women, who are naturally disposed to obey, and are generally more conscientious than men in the performance of their duties?

the element of mystery which is at once so alarming and so attractive.

Does, then, our belief in immortality rest upon nothing but a fallacious duplication of ourselves? In the repetitions of memory it has another more substantial support. For us, the dead are alive¹ when we recollect them: we can see their features, hear their voices, are drawn to them by the very attraction which we felt for them during life. These, it will be urged, are mere impressions, not realities. But for us reality and impression are identical: apart from impression there is no reality. The real distinguishes itself from the unreal by manifesting itself, not by sight, by hearing or by touch alone, but by two or more of these sensations, or by awaking an intelligent conviction that it is able so to reinforce itself upon our senses. We assume that a sudden flash of light, or crash of sound, is not a hallucination because we conclude from experience that there is something visible or tangible behind it. If we had not this knowledge we should take it to be the illusion of a dream. We appreciate the power of memory to grant us immortality, and supplicate its favour by every conceivable device. Men long for a son that he may be offered as a hostage: they work and they spend with the hope of leaving something behind them—a public building, an invention, a book or a picture, or a bequest—which will keep them in the recollection of those that come after. Gratitude recognizes that immortality is the

¹ An idea charmingly illustrated in Maeterlinck's "Blue Bird."

finest return it can offer for public service, and may endeavour to secure it by setting up statues, or by the naming of streets.

Morality, it is clear, has its reign in the balancings of choice. No rules can affect the sudden onset of primitive passion, or the subconscious workings of imitation and experiment. They fall within the domain of the 'unwritten law.' We think of the rules of morality as obliging us to forgo pleasures. Not so. They substitute certain pleasures for certain others. There is no conflict between Duty and Pleasure. Duty is pleasure—distinct in quality from sensuous pleasure, but differing from it no more widely than the pleasure afforded (let us say) by classical music differs from that given by wine or tobacco. In all these cases pleasure is so far artificial that it may be acquired by practice—that is to say, by actually adopting the conduct which produces it, by moulding our susceptibilities through imitation, choice, resolution or habit. We need be in no doubt as to the object of life, so far as it is the life of choice. It is, and must always be, the pursuit of pleasure or happiness, and the question for moralists to decide is which of the varied assortments of pleasures should be cultivated. Mankind will always be attracted by pleasure, as the magnetic needle points north. We cannot deflect the needle, but we can shift the compass card below it, so as to give the north point different significations. Certain pleasures will come with more difficulty to some individuals than to others: one who is born with a nervous or cruel temperament must be at pains to become sus-

ceptible to the pleasure of courage, or kindness. But man is extraordinarily plastic—influenced immensely by education, and the tendencies of the society to which he belongs. The acquisition of new pleasures is hindered, is limited, but is not entirely obstructed, by the individual and racial peculiarities of susceptibility with which he is born.

Our concern in this treatise is philosophical, not moral. But we may permit ourselves to consider in the most general outline what would be the rules of morality which our enquiries endorse—what are the pleasures at which mankind should aim in order to secure the greatest and most enduring happiness. Those which are afforded by the sympathetic emotions—the latest to be developed in the evolution of emotions—certainly appear to be the most reliable for ourselves and the most profitable for others. These, then, should be taken as the fundamental basis of our conduct—in other words, we may find in the teachings of Christ the most enduring basis for a life of happiness. The sympathetic emotion of obedience is specially fruitful when, turned upon ourselves, it takes the form of duty. But we need not deny ourselves the pleasures of self-assertion, especially in phases of this emotion which conduce to the happiness of others. This is so when it is directed against ourselves, as discipline, or when it inspires creativeness in conduct or in fashioning,—in schemes for the promotion of happiness, or in the constructions of art and industry which add to the pleasures of mankind. Nor need we abjure the cruder forms

of self-assertion when they are untainted by jealousy, or when they are coloured by sympathy for others, as for instance, a courageous patriotism, and a willingness to strike for the self-respect of the community.

And what of pleasures of the sensuous kind? The more we cultivate them the pleasanter will be our lives, so long as they do not conflict with those higher, or heroic, forms of happiness, that are to be the basis of our conduct. Subject to this condition each taste that we acquire is a legitimate addition to our pleasure—and each taste which we can promote amongst others increases the sum of human happiness. But if we would avoid the decadence which comes from the habitual pursuit of comfort and luxury, it is essential that sensuous pleasures should be subordinated to those which arise from the higher emotions. Otherwise they will assuredly demoralize our inclinations, forcing them into channels that can draw nothing from the springs of our more spiritual feelings. The young should accordingly be brought up in such acquaintance with hardship as will lead them to see that the luxuries of civilization are passing enjoyments, not the essentials of happiness. Spartan discipline infused stern resolve into a Mediterranean race. In the interests of the community they should be incited to take every suitable occasion of practising courage, and so increasing their susceptibility to this impulse. Self-discipline should be encouraged—if possible by example as well as by precept: the extraordinary devotion of the Japanese may be attributed very largely to the

not less extraordinary self-denial which teachers in schools and colleges are expected to display on behalf of their pupils. These are, of course, mere truisms: the only novelty is that our enquiries appear to have ascertained and tabulated the facts upon which they rest.

* * *

A naturalist, searching for the innate mental characteristics of man would find little that specifically distinguishes him from the apes. They possess some intelligence, and can apprehend the properties of a large number of things. They are actuated by impulses that are substantially the same as those which arise within man. They exercise choice, and apparently lack only its self-conscious developments. Whence then comes man's extraordinary pre-eminence? It arises, we may conclude, from excellencies of memory. Man is unfettered by hereditary recollections so far as his conduct is concerned; on the other hand he possesses marvellous powers of accumulating recollections for himself, and of summoning them, consciously or subconsciously, to meet the needs of each moment. The acquisition of language is a striking illustration—the remembering without difficulty of thousands of sounds in proper association with the things which they represent. Feelings, it may be urged, are of more importance than recollections of impressions. But it is by memory that past feelings are re-assembled as sentiments, and exercise so complicated a control over the life of choice. We could

never attain the heights of self-consciousness did not memory recall to us the feelings that are our guides. We customarily pride ourselves upon our intelligence. But confidence in this talent is shaken by a review of the gross misjudgments of properties—of the superstitions and prejudices—which have darkened human history from its earliest beginnings until present times.

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